From
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/scotland/highlands_and_islands/7406368.stm

"A driver has been cut free from his car after a train smashed into it
at a railway crossing in the Highlands.

"Graham Macmillan, 44, was on his way to a shinty match when the
accident happened at about 1050 BST at Bunchrew, five miles north of
Inverness. "

The report goes on to say that the car driver is a Network Rail
employee.

John
-- 
John Ewing
Glaschu / Glasgow
Alba / Scotland

On Sat, 17 May 2008 14:37:06 +0100 someone who may be John Ewing
 wrote this:-

>http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/scotland/highlands_and_islands/7406368.stm
>
>The report goes on to say that the car driver is a Network Rail
>employee.

It will be very interesting to hear what is said in mitigation.

"Highlands and Islands Fire and Rescue Service said the train struck
the front of the vehicle and threw it forward quite a bit,"

There's a surprise. A train weighing around 80 tonnes striking a car
weighing rather less than 2 tonnes.


-- 
  David Hansen, Edinburgh 
 I will *always* explain revoked encryption keys, unless RIP prevents me
 http://www.opsi.gov.uk/acts/acts2000/00023--e.htm#54

On Sat, 17 May 2008 14:37:06 +0100 someone who may be John Ewing
 wrote this:-

>The report goes on to say that the car driver is a Network Rail
>employee.

A bit more information at
<http://scotlandonsunday.scotsman.com/latestnews/Lucky-driver-survives-collision-.4095308.jp>
which includes the claim that, "Investigations were under way into
the cause of the crash, but residents say the light at the level
crossing, which has no barriers, sometimes failed to work."





-- 
  David Hansen, Edinburgh 
 I will *always* explain revoked encryption keys, unless RIP prevents me
 http://www.opsi.gov.uk/acts/acts2000/00023--e.htm#54

"David Hansen"  wrote in message
news:qvnv249kcgf3qb738iiop0u6km99rs4ue6@4ax.com...
> On Sat, 17 May 2008 14:37:06 +0100 someone who may be John Ewing
>  wrote this:-
>
> >The report goes on to say that the car driver is a Network Rail
> >employee.
>
> A bit more information at
>
<http://scotlandonsunday.scotsman.com/latestnews/Lucky-driver-survives-colli
sion-.4095308.jp>
> which includes the claim that, "Investigations were under way into
> the cause of the crash, but residents say the light at the level
> crossing, which has no barriers, sometimes failed to work."
>
It is an Automatic Open Crossing, Locally Monitored (AOCL). When the lights
are working correctly a white light is displayed to train drivers. If the
(road) lights are not working correctly the white light is not displayed,
and the train must stop. The Rule Book explains what the train driver must
do in these circumstances, but the minimum is to sound the horn continuously
and make sure that it is safe for the train to proceed.

Peter

On Sun, 18 May 2008 12:16:01 +0100 someone who may be "Peter Masson"
 wrote this:-

>It is an Automatic Open Crossing, Locally Monitored (AOCL). When the lights
>are working correctly a white light is displayed to train drivers. If the
>(road) lights are not working correctly the white light is not displayed,

I recall from previous discussions that something like one lamp on
one side of the crossing can fail without affecting the proceed
signal to the train driver. However, total failure of one road light
unit would certainly mean the proceed indication will not be given
and the stop indication maintained.

Presumably the crossing has a data logger and I suspect that this
will indicate that the crossing lights were working properly at the
time. I suspect that the crossing will also have worked properly
when tested. Total wrong side failures of crossing equipment are
extremely rare, despite claims to the contrary by some.




-- 
  David Hansen, Edinburgh 
 I will *always* explain revoked encryption keys, unless RIP prevents me
 http://www.opsi.gov.uk/acts/acts2000/00023--e.htm#54

"David Hansen"  wrote

> Total wrong side failures of crossing equipment are
> extremely rare, despite claims to the contrary by some.
>
Local residents may recall occasions when the lights were not working. They
will have seen trains cross under these conditions, but not appreciate that
the train will have stopped before the crossing, and that responsibility for
safety has been transferred from the crossing equipment to the train driver.

Peter