ABSTRACT: My goal in this paper is to answer two questions: what, if
anything, did Locke have in mind when he spoke of substance in
general? and did Locke affirm the existence of substance in general?
Concerning the first of these, I argue that what Locke had in mind
were bare particulars (or something very closely akin thereto). In the
first part of this paper, I show why this interpretation of Locke is
preferable to its two main rivals. Concerning the second question,
Locke was agnostic about the existence of substance in general. He may
not have wished to deny its existence outright, but he certainly did
not affirm it. This claim runs counter to most readings of Locke, and
I defend it in the second half of the paper. This defense rests on an
examination of Locke's view of the relationship between conceivability
and possibility, an aspect of the debate that most commentators have
overlooked. Link: http://www.sorites.org/Issue_20/jordan.htm

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