From:

http://www.philosophynow.org/issue35/35blackburn.htm

... the philosophy of mind which has a central metaphysical (perhaps
the central metaphysical) focus. I think thirty years ago there was a
lot of optimism that some combination of functionalism, maybe some
ideas from Wittgenstein, some ideas left over from behaviourism, some
combination of those was really going to enable us to forge a new kind
of understanding of the nature of the mind. I think partly under the
influence of scientism, which creates an over-optimism about what
science can tell us in that area, we’ve actually gone back to a much
more primitive philosophy of mind. You get some books which are little
better than Cartesian dualist tracts or you get people like Colin
McGinn who is pessimistic about us ever understanding the mind any
better than Descartes or dualists do. You get a philosophy that grinds
to a halt on epiphenomenalism, or the inability to imagine a causal
interaction between mind and body. I think that is regressive and sad
and I think basically the subject is fairly close to ground to a halt.

On 20 Jun, 12:26, Paul Grieg  wrote:
> From:
>
> http://www.philosophynow.org/issue35/35blackburn.htm
>
> ... the philosophy of mind which has a central metaphysical (perhaps
> the central metaphysical) focus. I think thirty years ago there was a
> lot of optimism that some combination of functionalism, maybe some
> ideas from Wittgenstein, some ideas left over from behaviourism, some
> combination of those was really going to enable us to forge a new kind
> of understanding of the nature of the mind. I think partly under the
> influence of scientism, which creates an over-optimism about what
> science can tell us in that area, we’ve actually gone back to a much
> more primitive philosophy of mind. You get some books which are little
> better than Cartesian dualist tracts or you get people like Colin
> McGinn who is pessimistic about us ever understanding the mind any
> better than Descartes or dualists do. You get a philosophy that grinds
> to a halt on epiphenomenalism, or the inability to imagine a causal
> interaction between mind and body. I think that is regressive and sad
> and I think basically the subject is fairly close to ground to a halt.


Perhaps the problem for Blackburn, if he believes in mental causation
and dislikes the idea of epiphenomenalism,  is that the philosophy of
mind isn't producing the answers he wants.  I think the work of
Chalmers and Kim are worthy recent contributions.  Also, it seems to
me that there has recently been valuable relevant work conducted by
psychologists and neuroscientists.

Dave

On Jun 20, 9:10 pm, Dave Smith  wrote:
> On 20 Jun, 12:26, Paul Grieg  wrote:
>
>
>
> > From:
>
> >http://www.philosophynow.org/issue35/35blackburn.htm
>
> > ... the philosophy of mind which has a central metaphysical (perhaps
> > the central metaphysical) focus. I think thirty years ago there was a
> > lot of optimism that some combination of functionalism, maybe some
> > ideas from Wittgenstein, some ideas left over from behaviourism, some
> > combination of those was really going to enable us to forge a new kind
> > of understanding of the nature of the mind. I think partly under the
> > influence of scientism, which creates an over-optimism about what
> > science can tell us in that area, we’ve actually gone back to a much
> > more primitive philosophy of mind. You get some books which are little
> > better than Cartesian dualist tracts or you get people like Colin
> > McGinn who is pessimistic about us ever understanding the mind any
> > better than Descartes or dualists do. You get a philosophy that grinds
> > to a halt on epiphenomenalism, or the inability to imagine a causal
> > interaction between mind and body. I think that is regressive and sad
> > and I think basically the subject is fairly close to ground to a halt.
>
> Perhaps the problem for Blackburn, if he believes in mental causation
> and dislikes the idea of epiphenomenalism,  is that the philosophy of
> mind isn't producing the answers he wants.  I think the work of
> Chalmers and Kim are worthy recent contributions.  Also, it seems to
> me that there has recently been valuable relevant work conducted by
> psychologists and neuroscientists.
>
Absolutely! As you say, we're experimental results that are starting
to answer the questions that were thought only philosophical ones a
short while back. It's all very well to object to scientism, but it is
a bit rich to do so when there are actual results from science that
inform philosophy.

On Jun 20, 8:10 pm, Dave Smith  wrote:
> On 20 Jun, 12:26, Paul Grieg  wrote:
>
>
>
> > From:
>
> >http://www.philosophynow.org/issue35/35blackburn.htm
>
> > ... the philosophy of mind which has a central metaphysical (perhaps
> > the central metaphysical) focus. I think thirty years ago there was a
> > lot of optimism that some combination of functionalism, maybe some
> > ideas from Wittgenstein, some ideas left over from behaviourism, some
> > combination of those was really going to enable us to forge a new kind
> > of understanding of the nature of the mind. I think partly under the
> > influence of scientism, which creates an over-optimism about what
> > science can tell us in that area, we’ve actually gone back to a much
> > more primitive philosophy of mind. You get some books which are little
> > better than Cartesian dualist tracts or you get people like Colin
> > McGinn who is pessimistic about us ever understanding the mind any
> > better than Descartes or dualists do. You get a philosophy that grinds
> > to a halt on epiphenomenalism, or the inability to imagine a causal
> > interaction between mind and body. I think that is regressive and sad
> > and I think basically the subject is fairly close to ground to a halt.
>
> Perhaps the problem for Blackburn, if he believes in mental causation
> and dislikes the idea of epiphenomenalism,  is that the philosophy of
> mind isn't producing the answers he wants.

Where does he say he dislikes the idea of epiphenomenalism? He says he
can't imagine a causal interaction between mind and body. That doesn't
sound like belief to me. Maybe he wants to believe, but that's not
belief. With both of these position, all he says is, philosophy of
mind grinds to a halt.

You've said previously that lack of a causal connection between mind
and brain isn't a problem for you. You flick the light switch and the
light comes on, that's enough for you. Thank God that wasn't enough
for Edison! He actually worked out the wiring, vacuum technology, etc,
etc that gave the full causal explanation (or at least went down a
level) I think Blackburn is right, modern philosophy of mind has
ground to a halt (did it ever get started?) with no explanation for
how brain 'interacts/causes/is a dual aspect' of mind.

> I think the work of
> Chalmers and Kim are worthy recent contributions.  Also, it seems to
> me that there has recently been valuable relevant work conducted by
> psychologists and neuroscientists.

In what way? I've seen nothing that gets past Blackburn's complaints.
I agree there has been valuable work in neuroscience, but it's all to
do with brain structure, there's nothing that's thrown any light on
the mind-body problem. Or can you point to an argument that does? Or
are you just going to thrown names around? How *exactly* have Chalmers
and Kim contributed to the hard problem of consciousness?

On 21 Jun, 10:43, Paul Grieg  wrote:
> On Jun 20, 8:10 pm, Dave Smith  wrote:
>
> > On 20 Jun, 12:26, Paul Grieg  wrote:
>
> > > From:
>
> > >http://www.philosophynow.org/issue35/35blackburn.htm
>
> > > ... the philosophy of mind which has a central metaphysical (perhaps
> > > the central metaphysical) focus. I think thirty years ago there was a
> > > lot of optimism that some combination of functionalism, maybe some
> > > ideas from Wittgenstein, some ideas left over from behaviourism, some
> > > combination of those was really going to enable us to forge a new kind
> > > of understanding of the nature of the mind. I think partly under the
> > > influence of scientism, which creates an over-optimism about what
> > > science can tell us in that area, we’ve actually gone back to a much
> > > more primitive philosophy of mind. You get some books which are little
> > > better than Cartesian dualist tracts or you get people like Colin
> > > McGinn who is pessimistic about us ever understanding the mind any
> > > better than Descartes or dualists do. You get a philosophy that grinds
> > > to a halt on epiphenomenalism, or the inability to imagine a causal
> > > interaction between mind and body. I think that is regressive and sad
> > > and I think basically the subject is fairly close to ground to a halt> > Perhaps the problem for Blackburn, if he believes in mental causation
> > and dislikes the idea of epiphenomenalism,  is that the philosophy of
> > mind isn't producing the answers he wants.
>
> Where does he say he dislikes the idea of epiphenomenalism? He says he
> can't imagine a causal interaction between mind and body. That doesn't
> sound like belief to me. Maybe he wants to believe, but that's not
> belief. With both of these position, all he says is, philosophy of
> mind grinds to a halt.


Well, consider this passage:

"...You get a philosophy that grinds
to a halt on epiphenomenalism, or the inability to imagine a causal
interaction between mind and body. I think that is regressive and
sad."

Doesn't that suggest that Blackburn thinks that epiphenomenalism is
wrong?


> You've said previously that lack of a causal connection between mind
> and brain isn't a problem for you. You flick the light switch and the
> light comes on, that's enough for you. Thank God that wasn't enough
> for Edison! He actually worked out the wiring, vacuum technology, etc,
> etc that gave the full causal explanation (or at least went down a
> level) I think Blackburn is right, modern philosophy of mind has
> ground to a halt (did it ever get started?) with no explanation for
> how brain 'interacts/causes/is a dual aspect' of mind.


My comment about the light switch was merely intended to show that a
belief about causation might be correct, even if an underlying
mechanism hasn't been identfied.  I agree that it is better to have a
valid reductive explanation,  if there is one to discover.


> > I think the work of
> > Chalmers and Kim are worthy recent contributions.  Also, it seems to
> > me that there has recently been valuable relevant work conducted by
> > psychologists and neuroscientists.
>
> In what way? I've seen nothing that gets past Blackburn's complaints.
> I agree there has been valuable work in neuroscience, but it's all to
> do with brain structure, there's nothing that's thrown any light on
> the mind-body problem. Or can you point to an argument that does? Or
> are you just going to thrown names around? How *exactly* have Chalmers
> and Kim contributed to the hard problem of consciousness.


It was Chalmers who got philosophers discussing "the hard problem".
He and Kim have done much to clarify which issues contribute to what
Schopenhauer called the 'world knot',  and they both have argued that
consciousness is irreducible to the physical yet dependent
(supervenient) upon it.  It seems to me that,  as Chalmers has
claimed,  a better understanding will be obtained from detailed
scientific examination of the relationship between physical and mental
processes.

Dave

On Jun 22, 12:30 am, Dave Smith  wrote:
> On 21 Jun, 10:43, Paul Grieg  wrote:
>
>
>
> > On Jun 20, 8:10 pm, Dave Smith  wrote:
>
> > > On 20 Jun, 12:26, Paul Grieg  wrote:
>
> > > > From:
>
> > > >http://www.philosophynow.org/issue35/35blackburn.htm
>
> > > > ... the philosophy of mind which has a central metaphysical (perhaps
> > > > the central metaphysical) focus. I think thirty years ago there was a
> > > > lot of optimism that some combination of functionalism, maybe some
> > > > ideas from Wittgenstein, some ideas left over from behaviourism, some
> > > > combination of those was really going to enable us to forge a new kind
> > > > of understanding of the nature of the mind. I think partly under the
> > > > influence of scientism, which creates an over-optimism about what
> > > > science can tell us in that area, we’ve actually gone back to a much
> > > > more primitive philosophy of mind. You get some books which are little
> > > > better than Cartesian dualist tracts or you get people like Colin
> > > > McGinn who is pessimistic about us ever understanding the mind any
> > > > better than Descartes or dualists do. You get a philosophy that grinds
> > > > to a halt on epiphenomenalism, or the inability to imagine a causal
> > > > interaction between mind and body. I think that is regressive and sad
> > > > and I think basically the subject is fairly close to ground to a halt.
>
> > > Perhaps the problem for Blackburn, if he believes in mental causation
> > > and dislikes the idea of epiphenomenalism,  is that the philosophy of
> > > mind isn't producing the answers he wants.
>
> > Where does he say he dislikes the idea of epiphenomenalism? He says he
> > can't imagine a causal interaction between mind and body. That doesn't
> > sound like belief to me. Maybe he wants to believe, but that's not
> > belief. With both of these position, all he says is, philosophy of
> > mind grinds to a halt.
>
> Well, consider this passage:
>
> "...You get a philosophy that grinds
> to a halt on epiphenomenalism, or the inability to imagine a causal
> interaction between mind and body. I think that is regressive and
> sad."
>
> Doesn't that suggest that Blackburn thinks that epiphenomenalism is
> wrong?
>
> > You've said previously that lack of a causal connection between mind
> > and brain isn't a problem for you. You flick the light switch and the
> > light comes on, that's enough for you. Thank God that wasn't enough
> > for Edison! He actually worked out the wiring, vacuum technology, etc,
> > etc that gave the full causal explanation (or at least went down a
> > level) I think Blackburn is right, modern philosophy of mind has
> > ground to a halt (did it ever get started?) with no explanation for
> > how brain 'interacts/causes/is a dual aspect' of mind.
>
> My comment about the light switch was merely intended to show that a
> belief about causation might be correct, even if an underlying
> mechanism hasn't been identfied.  I agree that it is better to have a
> valid reductive explanation,  if there is one to discover.
>
> > > I think the work of
> > > Chalmers and Kim are worthy recent contributions.  Also, it seems to
> > > me that there has recently been valuable relevant work conducted by
> > > psychologists and neuroscientists.
>
> > In what way? I've seen nothing that gets past Blackburn's complaints.
> > I agree there has been valuable work in neuroscience, but it's all to
> > do with brain structure, there's nothing that's thrown any light on
> > the mind-body problem. Or can you point to an argument that does? Or
> > are you just going to thrown names around? How *exactly* have Chalmers
> > and Kim contributed to the hard problem of consciousness.
>
> It was Chalmers who got philosophers discussing "the hard problem".
> He and Kim have done much to clarify which issues contribute to what
> Schopenhauer called the 'world knot',  and they both have argued that
> consciousness is irreducible to the physical yet dependent
> (supervenient) upon it.  It seems to me that,  as Chalmers has
> claimed,  a better understanding will be obtained from detailed
> scientific examination of the relationship between physical and mental
> processes.
>
Which is exactly what any philosophy hopes for - that some day there
might be evidence to support the matter and it can move from
philosophy to science.

Paul Grieg wrote:
> From:
>
> http://www.philosophynow.org/issue35/35blackburn.htm
>
> ... the philosophy of mind which has a central metaphysical (perhaps
> the central metaphysical) focus. I think thirty years ago there was a
> lot of optimism that some combination of functionalism, maybe some
> ideas from Wittgenstein, some ideas left over from behaviourism, some
> combination of those was really going to enable us to forge a new kind
> of understanding of the nature of the mind. I think partly under the
> influence of scientism, which creates an over-optimism about what
> science can tell us in that area, we�ve actually gone back to a much
> more primitive philosophy of mind. You get some books which are little
> better than Cartesian dualist tracts or you get people like Colin
> McGinn who is pessimistic about us ever understanding the mind any
> better than Descartes or dualists do. You get a philosophy that grinds
> to a halt on epiphenomenalism, or the inability to imagine a causal
> interaction between mind and body. I think that is regressive and sad
> and I think basically the subject is fairly close to ground to a halt.

I don't think philosophy makes progress quickly, and I think some of
the "lack" of progress relates less to the philosophy of mind than to
a general reassessment of analytic philosophy taht seems to be
happening at the moment.

Lance

On Jun 21, 11:30 pm, Dave Smith  wrote:
> On 21 Jun, 10:43, Paul Grieg  wrote:
>
>
>
> > On Jun 20, 8:10 pm, Dave Smith  wrote:
>
> > > On 20 Jun, 12:26, Paul Grieg  wrote:
>
> > > > From:
>
> > > >http://www.philosophynow.org/issue35/35blackburn.htm
>
> > > > ... the philosophy of mind which has a central metaphysical (perhaps> > > > the central metaphysical) focus. I think thirty years ago there was a
> > > > lot of optimism that some combination of functionalism, maybe some
> > > > ideas from Wittgenstein, some ideas left over from behaviourism, some
> > > > combination of those was really going to enable us to forge a new kind
> > > > of understanding of the nature of the mind. I think partly under the> > > > influence of scientism, which creates an over-optimism about what
> > > > science can tell us in that area, we’ve actually gone back to a much
> > > > more primitive philosophy of mind. You get some books which are little
> > > > better than Cartesian dualist tracts or you get people like Colin
> > > > McGinn who is pessimistic about us ever understanding the mind any
> > > > better than Descartes or dualists do. You get a philosophy that grinds
> > > > to a halt on epiphenomenalism, or the inability to imagine a causal
> > > > interaction between mind and body. I think that is regressive and sad
> > > > and I think basically the subject is fairly close to ground to a halt.
>
> > > Perhaps the problem for Blackburn, if he believes in mental causation
> > > and dislikes the idea of epiphenomenalism,  is that the philosophy of
> > > mind isn't producing the answers he wants.
>
> > Where does he say he dislikes the idea of epiphenomenalism? He says he
> > can't imagine a causal interaction between mind and body. That doesn't
> > sound like belief to me. Maybe he wants to believe, but that's not
> > belief. With both of these position, all he says is, philosophy of
> > mind grinds to a halt.
>
> Well, consider this passage:
>
> "...You get a philosophy that grinds
> to a halt on epiphenomenalism, or the inability to imagine a causal
> interaction between mind and body. I think that is regressive and
> sad."
>
> Doesn't that suggest that Blackburn thinks that epiphenomenalism is
> wrong?

It's ambiguous, it might mean that, but I think he means he can't
explain epiphenomenalism, not that it's a wrong explanation. I dug
around questia, and here's a quote from one of his essays that seems
to back my reading:

"There is nothing wrong with saying that the thermometer went up
because the temperature is rising, even if ('strictly speaking') what
made it go up was a succession of microscopic impingings,... We might
even take a Humean pleasure in reflecting that the ultimate causes of
things are forever obscured from us, so that all we can do is mark the
patterns they reliably create as events unfold. And it draws some of
the sting from the epiphenomenalism of the mental if its causal
inefficacy is on all fours with that of changes of temperature or
energy levels. Nevertheless, it would be good to put into place some
other route to a solution. We ought to reflect that in spite of the
shift in our understanding of causation that Hume brought about, it is
not compulsory to describe it by saying that we never identify real
causes."

> > You've said previously that lack of a causal connection between mind
> > and brain isn't a problem for you. You flick the light switch and the
> > light comes on, that's enough for you. Thank God that wasn't enough
> > for Edison! He actually worked out the wiring, vacuum technology, etc,
> > etc that gave the full causal explanation (or at least went down a
> > level) I think Blackburn is right, modern philosophy of mind has
> > ground to a halt (did it ever get started?) with no explanation for
> > how brain 'interacts/causes/is a dual aspect' of mind.
>
> My comment about the light switch was merely intended to show that a
> belief about causation might be correct, even if an underlying
> mechanism hasn't been identfied.  I agree that it is better to have a
> valid reductive explanation,  if there is one to discover.
>
> > > I think the work of
> > > Chalmers and Kim are worthy recent contributions.  Also, it seems to
> > > me that there has recently been valuable relevant work conducted by
> > > psychologists and neuroscientists.
>
> > In what way? I've seen nothing that gets past Blackburn's complaints.
> > I agree there has been valuable work in neuroscience, but it's all to
> > do with brain structure, there's nothing that's thrown any light on
> > the mind-body problem. Or can you point to an argument that does? Or
> > are you just going to thrown names around? How *exactly* have Chalmers
> > and Kim contributed to the hard problem of consciousness.
>
> It was Chalmers who got philosophers discussing "the hard problem".
> He and Kim have done much to clarify which issues contribute to what
> Schopenhauer called the 'world knot',  and they both have argued that
> consciousness is irreducible to the physical yet dependent
> (supervenient) upon it.  It seems to me that,  as Chalmers has
> claimed,  a better understanding will be obtained from detailed
> scientific examination of the relationship between physical and mental
> processes.

Maybe Chalmers has stirred thing up recently, but surely it was
Descartes who started this discussion? Though he had some strange
ideas though about mind being a kind of substance working on the brain
through the pineal gland. So Chalmer's adoption of dual-aspect
explanations seems neater. But that wasn't his idea, it was Spinoza's
and has a long history:

http://www.iscid.org/encyclopedia/Dual-Aspect_Theory

"In philosophy of mind, dual-aspect [also known as double-aspect or
dual-attribute] theory holds that the mental and the physical are
different aspects of the same substance. Originally postulated by
Spinoza, dual-aspect is also theorized by Schopenhaur, Lewes, Nagel
and Chalmers. The theory holds that physical and mental states are
phases of a single phenomenon, and that neither phase is reducible to
the other."

How can a better understanding be obtained from "detailed scientific
examination of the relationship between physical and mental
processes"? Neither seems reducible to the other. And unless Chalmers
has said exactly how one might be reduced to the other he's just hand
waving and repeating Spinoza's ideas. So, what has Chalmers
contributed to the hard problem of consciousness, besides coining the
snappy phrase, but which adds nothing new to what Spinoza suggested
centuries ago?

The term epiphenomenalism also has a history, and the lates
development of this just idea seem just another way of saying what
Spinoza said:

http://moebius.psy.ed.ac.uk/~dualism/papers/brains.html

"It was Thomas Huxley (1825-1895) who coined the term
'epiphenomenalism' in an article he wrote for the Fortnightly Review
of 1874. In so doing Huxley willingly sacrificed the notion of 'free
will' as an illusion despite its deep embedment in our language and
common sense. For the epiphenomenalist, the brain was a machine, like
everything else in nature, and the mind no more than a passive
reflection of its activity. During the present century, various
attempts have been made to refine the epiphenomenalist formulation.
Thus the so-called 'mind-brain identity' theory, associated with
Herbert Feigl in the United States and with Bertrand Russell in
Britain, which flourished during the 1950s, insisted that the mental
events we associate with consciousness just are the relevant brain
events but viewed, as it were, from the inside rather than the
outside."

Makes you think that philosophers, like Magee says, should read the
great philosophers and stop re-inventing the wheel (or lesser wheels!)

Paul�Grieg wrote (quoted Blackburn):

>http://www.philosophynow.org/issue35/35blackburn.htm
> ...the philosophy of mind which has a central
> metaphysical (perhaps the central metaphysical)
> focus.

If that's the case, then I don't see how they could have expected
anything else. The bane of metaphysics, long since noted by Pyrrho and
Kant, is that it produces many rival theories --its own brand of
underdetermination. The only "progress" taking place is neuroscience's
finer and finer mapping of "mental states" to "brain states". These
correlations establish relationships --not a penetration of the
microphysical appearance of the brain-- and thus the multitude of
philosophical interpretations and concepts go unculled (as found in
someplace like the online Dictionary of Philosophy of Mind).

>I think thirty years ago there was a lot of optimism
> that some combination of functionalism, maybe some
> ideas from Wittgenstein, some ideas left over from
> behaviourism, some combination of those was really
> going to enable us to forge a new kind of
> understanding of the nature of the mind.

And perhaps they have --just in a plural sense. Again, the foolishness
of expecting anything else to result. The same damn thing happens when
abstract constructs of science are reified, like spacetime or quantum
language / formalism.

>I think partly under the influence of scientism,
> which creates an over-optimism about what science
> can tell us in that area, we've actually gone back
> to a much more primitive philosophy of mind. . . .
> You get a philosophy that grinds to a halt on
> epiphenomenalism, or the inability to imagine a
> causal interaction between mind and body.

Neurobiology doesn't even need "private states" as causal
contributions to brain functioning. So why would it care about doing
anything more than correlations, even if it technologically had the
capacity to do more than that? Behaviorists, qualia nihilists, and
eliminativists aren't completely daft in contending (seemingly) that
folk psychology beliefs don't belong in science --or the physical
sciences, anyway.

On Jun 22, 4:57 pm, impromptu  wrote:
> Paul�Grieg wrote (quoted Blackburn):
>
> >http://www.philosophynow.org/issue35/35blackburn.htm
> > ...the philosophy of mind which has a central
> > metaphysical (perhaps the central metaphysical)
> > focus.
>
> The only "progress" taking place is neuroscience's
> finer and finer mapping of "mental states" to "brain states".

Yes this is progress, if of a rather pedestrian kind. Of course there
is nothing to show through this work how brain states lead to mental
states. It's also difficult to see how there could be. Still, if you
get well paid for it, why not do it.

>
> >I think thirty years ago there was a lot of optimism
> > that some combination of functionalism, maybe some
> > ideas from Wittgenstein, some ideas left over from
> > behaviourism, some combination of those was really
> > going to enable us to forge a new kind of
> > understanding of the nature of the mind.
>
> And perhaps they have --just in a plural sense.

You sound doubtful :-)

> >I think partly under the influence of scientism,
> > which creates an over-optimism about what science
> > can tell us in that area, we've actually gone back
> > to a much more primitive philosophy of mind. . . .
> > You get a philosophy that grinds to a halt on
> > epiphenomenalism, or the inability to imagine a
> > causal interaction between mind and body.
>
> Neurobiology doesn't even need "private states" as causal
> contributions to brain functioning. So why would it care about doing
> anything more than correlations, even if it technologically had the
> capacity to do more than that? Behaviorists, qualia nihilists, and
> eliminativists aren't completely daft in contending (seemingly) that
> folk psychology beliefs don't belong in science --or the physical
> sciences, anyway.

Neurobiology is about the biology of neurons, so I agree -- why should
it bother its head about deeper matters? It's when neurobiologists
dismiss that there are any deeper matters that one can only shake ones
head and wonder at the blinkers of scientism.

On 22 Jun, 11:10, Paul Grieg  wrote:
> On Jun 21, 11:30 pm, Dave Smith  wrote:
>
>
>
>
>
> > On 21 Jun, 10:43, Paul Grieg  wrote:
>
> > > On Jun 20, 8:10 pm, Dave Smith  wrote:
>
> > > > On 20 Jun, 12:26, Paul Grieg  wrote:
>
> > > > > From:
>
> > > > >http://www.philosophynow.org/issue35/35blackburn.htm
>
> > > > > ... the philosophy of mind which has a central metaphysical (perhaps
> > > > > the central metaphysical) focus. I think thirty years ago there was a
> > > > > lot of optimism that some combination of functionalism, maybe some
> > > > > ideas from Wittgenstein, some ideas left over from behaviourism, some
> > > > > combination of those was really going to enable us to forge a new kind
> > > > > of understanding of the nature of the mind. I think partly under the
> > > > > influence of scientism, which creates an over-optimism about what
> > > > > science can tell us in that area, we’ve actually gone back to a much
> > > > > more primitive philosophy of mind. You get some books which are little
> > > > > better than Cartesian dualist tracts or you get people like Colin
> > > > > McGinn who is pessimistic about us ever understanding the mind any
> > > > > better than Descartes or dualists do. You get a philosophy that grinds
> > > > > to a halt on epiphenomenalism, or the inability to imagine a causal
> > > > > interaction between mind and body. I think that is regressive and sad
> > > > > and I think basically the subject is fairly close to ground to a halt.
>
> > > > Perhaps the problem for Blackburn, if he believes in mental causation
> > > > and dislikes the idea of epiphenomenalism,  is that the philosophy of
> > > > mind isn't producing the answers he wants.
>
> > > Where does he say he dislikes the idea of epiphenomenalism? He says he
> > > can't imagine a causal interaction between mind and body. That doesn't
> > > sound like belief to me. Maybe he wants to believe, but that's not
> > > belief. With both of these position, all he says is, philosophy of
> > > mind grinds to a halt.
>
> > Well, consider this passage:
>
> > "...You get a philosophy that grinds
> > to a halt on epiphenomenalism, or the inability to imagine a causal
> > interaction between mind and body. I think that is regressive and
> > sad."
>
> > Doesn't that suggest that Blackburn thinks that epiphenomenalism is
> > wrong?
>
> It's ambiguous, it might mean that, but I think he means he can't
> explain epiphenomenalism, not that it's a wrong explanation. I dug
> around questia, and here's a quote from one of his essays that seems
> to back my reading:
>
> "There is nothing wrong with saying that the thermometer went up
> because the temperature is rising, even if ('strictly speaking') what
> made it go up was a succession of microscopic impingings,... We might
> even take a Humean pleasure in reflecting that the ultimate causes of
> things are forever obscured from us, so that all we can do is mark the
> patterns they reliably create as events unfold. And it draws some of
> the sting from the epiphenomenalism of the mental if its causal
> inefficacy is on all fours with that of changes of temperature or
> energy levels. Nevertheless, it would be good to put into place some
> other route to a solution. We ought to reflect that in spite of the
> shift in our understanding of causation that Hume brought about, it is
> not compulsory to describe it by saying that we never identify real
> causes."
>
>
>
>
>
> > > You've said previously that lack of a causal connection between mind
> > > and brain isn't a problem for you. You flick the light switch and the
> > > light comes on, that's enough for you. Thank God that wasn't enough
> > > for Edison! He actually worked out the wiring, vacuum technology, etc> > > etc that gave the full causal explanation (or at least went down a
> > > level) I think Blackburn is right, modern philosophy of mind has
> > > ground to a halt (did it ever get started?) with no explanation for
> > > how brain 'interacts/causes/is a dual aspect' of mind.
>
> > My comment about the light switch was merely intended to show that a
> > belief about causation might be correct, even if an underlying
> > mechanism hasn't been identfied.  I agree that it is better to have a
> > valid reductive explanation,  if there is one to discover.
>
> > > > I think the work of
> > > > Chalmers and Kim are worthy recent contributions.  Also, it seems to
> > > > me that there has recently been valuable relevant work conducted by
> > > > psychologists and neuroscientists.
>
> > > In what way? I've seen nothing that gets past Blackburn's complaints.
> > > I agree there has been valuable work in neuroscience, but it's all to
> > > do with brain structure, there's nothing that's thrown any light on
> > > the mind-body problem. Or can you point to an argument that does? Or
> > > are you just going to thrown names around? How *exactly* have Chalmers
> > > and Kim contributed to the hard problem of consciousness.
>
> > It was Chalmers who got philosophers discussing "the hard problem".
> > He and Kim have done much to clarify which issues contribute to what
> > Schopenhauer called the 'world knot',  and they both have argued that
> > consciousness is irreducible to the physical yet dependent
> > (supervenient) upon it.  It seems to me that,  as Chalmers has
> > claimed,  a better understanding will be obtained from detailed
> > scientific examination of the relationship between physical and mental
> > processes.
>
> Maybe Chalmers has stirred thing up recently, but surely it was
> Descartes who started this discussion? Though he had some strange
> ideas though about mind being a kind of substance working on the brain
> through the pineal gland. So Chalmer's adoption of dual-aspect
> explanations seems neater. But that wasn't his idea, it was Spinoza's
> and has a long history:
>
> http://www.iscid.org/encyclopedia/Dual-Aspect_Theory
>
> "In philosophy of mind, dual-aspect [also known as double-aspect or
> dual-attribute] theory holds that the mental and the physical are
> different aspects of the same substance. Originally postulated by
> Spinoza, dual-aspect is also theorized by Schopenhaur, Lewes, Nagel
> and Chalmers. The theory holds that physical and mental states are
> phases of a single phenomenon, and that neither phase is reducible to
> the other."
>
> How can a better understanding be obtained from "detailed scientific
> examination of the relationship between physical and mental
> processes"? Neither seems reducible to the other. And unless Chalmers
> has said exactly how one might be reduced to the other he's just hand
> waving and repeating Spinoza's ideas. So, what has Chalmers
> contributed to the hard problem of consciousness, besides coining the
> snappy phrase, but which adds nothing new to what Spinoza suggested
> centuries ago?
>
> The term epiphenomenalism also has a history, and the lates
> development of this just idea seem just another way of saying what
> Spinoza said:
>
> http://moebius.psy.ed.ac.uk/~dualism/papers/brains.html
>
> "It was Thomas Huxley (1825-1895) who coined the term
> 'epiphenomenalism' in an article he wrote for the Fortnightly Review
> of 1874. In so doing Huxley willingly sacrificed the notion of 'free
> will' as an illusion despite its deep embedment in our language and
> common sense. For the epiphenomenalist, the brain was a machine, like
> everything else in nature, and the mind no more than a passive
> reflection of its activity. During the present century, various
> attempts have been made to refine the epiphenomenalist formulation.
> Thus the so-called 'mind-brain identity' theory, associated with
> Herbert Feigl in the United States and with Bertrand Russell in
> Britain, which flourished during the 1950s, insisted that the mental
> events we associate with consciousness just are the relevant brain
> events but viewed, as it were, from the inside rather than the
> outside."
>
> Makes you think that philosophers, like Magee says, should read the
> great philosophers and stop re-inventing the wheel (or lesser wheels!)- Hide quoted text -
>
> - Show quoted text -- Hide quoted text -
>
> - Show quoted text -

Ideas can often be traced back over the centuries.  I believe
theorists have been discussing evolution for thousands of years,  but
that doesn't show that Darwin, Mendel, Dawkins etc. etc. have simply
re-invented the wheel.  I'm no expert,  but I think Chalmers and Kim
have clarified and advanced the philosophy of mind.  For instance,
they have considered which aspects of mental functioning are reducible
to physics and which don't seem to be.   Do you seriously contend that
they haven't studied the work of their famous forebears?

On Jun 22, 8:10 pm, Dave Smith  wrote:
> On 22 Jun, 11:10, Paul Grieg  wrote:
>
>
>
> > On Jun 21, 11:30 pm, Dave Smith  wrote:
>
> > > On 21 Jun, 10:43, Paul Grieg  wrote:
>
> > > > On Jun 20, 8:10 pm, Dave Smith  wrote> > > > > On 20 Jun, 12:26, Paul Grieg  wrote:
>
> > > > > > From:
>
> > > > > >http://www.philosophynow.org/issue35/35blackburn.htm
>
> > > > > > ... the philosophy of mind which has a central metaphysical (perhaps
> > > > > > the central metaphysical) focus. I think thirty years ago there was a
> > > > > > lot of optimism that some combination of functionalism, maybe some
> > > > > > ideas from Wittgenstein, some ideas left over from behaviourism, some
> > > > > > combination of those was really going to enable us to forge a new kind
> > > > > > of understanding of the nature of the mind. I think partly under the
> > > > > > influence of scientism, which creates an over-optimism about what
> > > > > > science can tell us in that area, we’ve actually gone back to a much
> > > > > > more primitive philosophy of mind. You get some books which are little
> > > > > > better than Cartesian dualist tracts or you get people like Colin
> > > > > > McGinn who is pessimistic about us ever understanding the mind any
> > > > > > better than Descartes or dualists do. You get a philosophy that grinds
> > > > > > to a halt on epiphenomenalism, or the inability to imagine a causal
> > > > > > interaction between mind and body. I think that is regressive and sad
> > > > > > and I think basically the subject is fairly close to ground to a halt.
>
> > > > > Perhaps the problem for Blackburn, if he believes in mental causation
> > > > > and dislikes the idea of epiphenomenalism,  is that the philosophy of
> > > > > mind isn't producing the answers he wants.
>
> > > > Where does he say he dislikes the idea of epiphenomenalism? He says he
> > > > can't imagine a causal interaction between mind and body. That doesn't
> > > > sound like belief to me. Maybe he wants to believe, but that's not
> > > > belief. With both of these position, all he says is, philosophy of
> > > > mind grinds to a halt.
>
> > > Well, consider this passage:
>
> > > "...You get a philosophy that grinds
> > > to a halt on epiphenomenalism, or the inability to imagine a causal
> > > interaction between mind and body. I think that is regressive and
> > > sad."
>
> > > Doesn't that suggest that Blackburn thinks that epiphenomenalism is
> > > wrong?
>
> > It's ambiguous, it might mean that, but I think he means he can't
> > explain epiphenomenalism, not that it's a wrong explanation. I dug
> > around questia, and here's a quote from one of his essays that seems
> > to back my reading:
>
> > "There is nothing wrong with saying that the thermometer went up
> > because the temperature is rising, even if ('strictly speaking') what
> > made it go up was a succession of microscopic impingings,... We might
> > even take a Humean pleasure in reflecting that the ultimate causes of
> > things are forever obscured from us, so that all we can do is mark the
> > patterns they reliably create as events unfold. And it draws some of
> > the sting from the epiphenomenalism of the mental if its causal
> > inefficacy is on all fours with that of changes of temperature or
> > energy levels. Nevertheless, it would be good to put into place some
> > other route to a solution. We ought to reflect that in spite of the
> > shift in our understanding of causation that Hume brought about, it is
> > not compulsory to describe it by saying that we never identify real
> > causes."
>
> > > > You've said previously that lack of a causal connection between mind
> > > > and brain isn't a problem for you. You flick the light switch and the
> > > > light comes on, that's enough for you. Thank God that wasn't enough
> > > > for Edison! He actually worked out the wiring, vacuum technology, etc,
> > > > etc that gave the full causal explanation (or at least went down a
> > > > level) I think Blackburn is right, modern philosophy of mind has
> > > > ground to a halt (did it ever get started?) with no explanation for
> > > > how brain 'interacts/causes/is a dual aspect' of mind.
>
> > > My comment about the light switch was merely intended to show that a
> > > belief about causation might be correct, even if an underlying
> > > mechanism hasn't been identfied.  I agree that it is better to have a
> > > valid reductive explanation,  if there is one to discover.
>
> > > > > I think the work of
> > > > > Chalmers and Kim are worthy recent contributions.  Also, it seems to
> > > > > me that there has recently been valuable relevant work conducted by
> > > > > psychologists and neuroscientists.
>
> > > > In what way? I've seen nothing that gets past Blackburn's complaints.
> > > > I agree there has been valuable work in neuroscience, but it's all to
> > > > do with brain structure, there's nothing that's thrown any light on
> > > > the mind-body problem. Or can you point to an argument that does? Or
> > > > are you just going to thrown names around? How *exactly* have Chalmers
> > > > and Kim contributed to the hard problem of consciousness.
>
> > > It was Chalmers who got philosophers discussing "the hard problem".
> > > He and Kim have done much to clarify which issues contribute to what
> > > Schopenhauer called the 'world knot',  and they both have argued that
> > > consciousness is irreducible to the physical yet dependent
> > > (supervenient) upon it.  It seems to me that,  as Chalmers has
> > > claimed,  a better understanding will be obtained from detailed
> > > scientific examination of the relationship between physical and mental
> > > processes.
>
> > Maybe Chalmers has stirred thing up recently, but surely it was
> > Descartes who started this discussion? Though he had some strange
> > ideas though about mind being a kind of substance working on the brain
> > through the pineal gland. So Chalmer's adoption of dual-aspect
> > explanations seems neater. But that wasn't his idea, it was Spinoza's
> > and has a long history:
>
> >http://www.iscid.org/encyclopedia/Dual-Aspect_Theory
>
> > "In philosophy of mind, dual-aspect [also known as double-aspect or
> > dual-attribute] theory holds that the mental and the physical are
> > different aspects of the same substance. Originally postulated by
> > Spinoza, dual-aspect is also theorized by Schopenhaur, Lewes, Nagel
> > and Chalmers. The theory holds that physical and mental states are
> > phases of a single phenomenon, and that neither phase is reducible to
> > the other."
>
> > How can a better understanding be obtained from "detailed scientific
> > examination of the relationship between physical and mental
> > processes"? Neither seems reducible to the other. And unless Chalmers
> > has said exactly how one might be reduced to the other he's just hand
> > waving and repeating Spinoza's ideas. So, what has Chalmers
> > contributed to the hard problem of consciousness, besides coining the
> > snappy phrase, but which adds nothing new to what Spinoza suggested
> > centuries ago?
>
> > The term epiphenomenalism also has a history, and the lates
> > development of this just idea seem just another way of saying what
> > Spinoza said:
>
> >http://moebius.psy.ed.ac.uk/~dualism/papers/brains.html
>
> > "It was Thomas Huxley (1825-1895) who coined the term
> > 'epiphenomenalism' in an article he wrote for the Fortnightly Review
> > of 1874. In so doing Huxley willingly sacrificed the notion of 'free
> > will' as an illusion despite its deep embedment in our language and
> > common sense. For the epiphenomenalist, the brain was a machine, like
> > everything else in nature, and the mind no more than a passive
> > reflection of its activity. During the present century, various
> > attempts have been made to refine the epiphenomenalist formulation.
> > Thus the so-called 'mind-brain identity' theory, associated with
> > Herbert Feigl in the United States and with Bertrand Russell in
> > Britain, which flourished during the 1950s, insisted that the mental
> > events we associate with consciousness just are the relevant brain
> > events but viewed, as it were, from the inside rather than the
> > outside."
>
> > Makes you think that philosophers, like Magee says, should read the
> > great philosophers and stop re-inventing the wheel (or lesser wheels!)- Hide quoted text -
>
> > - Show quoted text -- Hide quoted text -
>
> > - Show quoted text -
>
> Ideas can often be traced back over the centuries.  I believe
> theorists have been discussing evolution for thousands of years,  but
> that doesn't show that Darwin, Mendel, Dawkins etc. etc. have simply
> re-invented the wheel.  I'm no expert,  but I think Chalmers and Kim
> have clarified and advanced the philosophy of mind.  For instance,
> they have considered which aspects of mental functioning are reducible
> to physics and which don't seem to be.   Do you seriously contend that
> they haven't studied the work of their famous forebears?

If you think that isn't a possibility you haven't absorbed Magee!

Then again, maybe Chalmers has studied them? But you made it sound
like the meat of the hard problem was down to Chalmers. I hope he
hasn't done a Raj Persaud and copied Spinoza and Schopenhauer without
acknowledging them... I just checked the index and tried 'look inside
search' on his book and he doesn't mention them -- the two most famous
names associated with dual aspectism! What's with that?

I think Chalmers is probably safe from accusation of plagiarism, no
one would directly cut and paste Spinoza and Schopenhauer! Also,
Wittgenstein used Schopenhauer's ideas without acknowledging them, and
very few  'professional' philosophers of his time had read
Schopenhauer. So as not quoting sources, 'borrowing' ideas, and not
reading famous forbears is common practice amongst professional
philosophers then perhaps one shouldn't be too hard on Chalmers :-)

Which aspects of mental functioning does he think are reducible to
physics?

Paul Grieg wrote:
> On Jun 22, 4:57 pm, impromptu  wrote:
> > Paul Grieg wrote (quoted Blackburn):
> >
> > >http://www.philosophynow.org/issue35/35blackburn.htm
> > > ...the philosophy of mind which has a central
> > > metaphysical (perhaps the central metaphysical)
> > > focus.
> >
> > The only "progress" taking place is neuroscience's
> > finer and finer mapping of "mental states" to "brain states".
>
> Yes this is progress, if of a rather pedestrian kind. Of course there
> is nothing to show through this work how brain states lead to mental
> states. It's also difficult to see how there could be. Still, if you
> get well paid for it, why not do it.
>
> >
> > >I think thirty years ago there was a lot of optimism
> > > that some combination of functionalism, maybe some
> > > ideas from Wittgenstein, some ideas left over from
> > > behaviourism, some combination of those was really
> > > going to enable us to forge a new kind of
> > > understanding of the nature of the mind.
> >
> > And perhaps they have --just in a plural sense.
>
> You sound doubtful :-)
>
> > >I think partly under the influence of scientism,
> > > which creates an over-optimism about what science
> > > can tell us in that area, we've actually gone back
> > > to a much more primitive philosophy of mind. . . .
> > > You get a philosophy that grinds to a halt on
> > > epiphenomenalism, or the inability to imagine a
> > > causal interaction between mind and body.
> >
> > Neurobiology doesn't even need "private states" as causal
> > contributions to brain functioning. So why would it care about doing
> > anything more than correlations, even if it technologically had the
> > capacity to do more than that? Behaviorists, qualia nihilists, and
> > eliminativists aren't completely daft in contending (seemingly) that
> > folk psychology beliefs don't belong in science --or the physical
> > sciences, anyway.
>
> Neurobiology is about the biology of neurons, so I agree -- why should
> it bother its head about deeper matters? It's when neurobiologists
> dismiss that there are any deeper matters that one can only shake ones
> head and wonder at the blinkers of scientism.

They might as well, if they couldn't extend their turf to a deeper
level of explanation, anyway. Imagine biologists trying tell
physicists that there were either elemental or emergent "properties"
of matter that they had somehow missed --the latter having
systematically started excluding the subjective from their "objective"
area of study since Galileo (an attitude that arguably should still
include biology, as a member of the physical sciences category).

They'd at least get a reaction similar to what the occasional rogue
physicist receives when trying to drag the study of consciousness down
to his/her substrate: ridicule. It's a rather amusing box each is
uniquely trapped in: The biologists are confined to NCCs and maybe
someday chemical activity correlations (at best); while the physicists
(or mathematicians with a background in physics) are deemed nonexperts
when it comes to dealing with unusual "features" associated with a
body organ.

But perhaps there's a hybrid field of "quantum brain physics" in the
works, if it's not being laughed out of town with "pioneer" pictures
of Penrose types glued to the backend of the asylum wagon. LOL

On 23 Jun, 11:41, Paul Grieg  wrote:


> .............. So as not quoting sources, 'borrowing' ideas, and not
> reading famous forbears is common practice amongst professional
> philosophers then perhaps one shouldn't be too hard on Chalmers :-)


If you are going to smear someone like this, I think you should
provide some evidence.  For instance,  can you show that he presents
Spinoza's or Schopenhauer's ideas as his own?  Unlike those of some
philosophers, his books and articles have copious references;  and he
has taken the trouble to put on the web an extensive bibliography on
consciousness


> Which aspects of mental functioning does he think are reducible to
> physics?


The 'easy problems' as distinct from the 'hard problem':

http://www.imprint.co.uk/chalmers.html


Dave

On 23 Jun, 16:28, impromptu  wrote:

> .................. Imagine biologists trying tell
> physicists that there were either elemental or emergent "properties"
> of matter that they had somehow missed --the latter having
> systematically started excluding the subjective from their "objective"
> area of study since Galileo (an attitude that arguably should still
> include biology, as a member of the physical sciences category).


Yes, a good point developed by Searle in 'The Rediscovery of the
Mind".

Dave Smith

On Jun 23, 5:28 pm, impromptu  wrote:
>
>
> But perhaps there's a hybrid field of "quantum brain physics" in the
> works, if it's not being laughed out of town with "pioneer" pictures
> of Penrose types glued to the backend of the asylum wagon. LOL
>
Well Penrose really ought not to have made the elementary mistake of
not considering the dimensions of microtubules, it might be less
obvious to a mathematician than to a physicist, but he ought to have
checked with somebody to see that it could make at least some sense
before going public.

Peter Brooks wrote:
> On Jun 23, 5:28�pm, impromptu  wrote> > But perhaps there's a hybrid field of "quantum brain physics" in the
> > works, if it's not being laughed out of town with "pioneer" pictures
> > of Penrose types glued to the backend of the asylum wagon. LOL
> >
> Well Penrose really ought not to have made the elementary mistake of
> not considering the dimensions of microtubules, it might be less
> obvious to a mathematician than to a physicist, but he ought to have
> checked with somebody to see that it could make at least some sense
> before going public.

Penrose is certainly not the "nut" that the media / entertainment
dullards sometimes portray him as (I seem to recollect an outrageous
depiction of him --played by an actor-- babbling silly nonsense in a
film about Hawking). But I felt that I still ought to capture a little
of the "heckling flavor" of their contribution in obstructing any
"brain physics" becoming respectable.

Before his meeting with Hameroff, Penrose was uncertain as to how his
general ideas would actually be instantiated in brain structure.
Hameroff still defends microtubules playing that role, but he's only
an anesthesiologist (though I guess two physicists jumped on his
bandwagon a few years back). I think Max Tegmark is correct to a point
in his criticism, but cytoskeleton components certainly aren't his
specialty anymore than quantum physics is Hameroff's.

As I understand it, no study has tested yet whether or not this
"shielding" exists that Hameroff and his physicist buddies proposed
for maintaining states (longer than what Tegmark asserted). So the
full "decapitation" of microtubules' role hasn't happened yet, but
probably might as well be the case in advance.

On Jun 24, 7:18 pm, impromptu  wrote:
> Peter Brooks wrote:
> > On Jun 23, 5:28�pm, impromptu  wrote:
>
> > > But perhaps there's a hybrid field of "quantum brain physics" in the
> > > works, if it's not being laughed out of town with "pioneer" pictures
> > > of Penrose types glued to the backend of the asylum wagon. LOL
>
> > Well Penrose really ought not to have made the elementary mistake of
> > not considering the dimensions of microtubules, it might be less
> > obvious to a mathematician than to a physicist, but he ought to have
> > checked with somebody to see that it could make at least some sense
> > before going public.
>
> Penrose is certainly not the "nut" that the media / entertainment
> dullards sometimes portray him as (I seem to recollect an outrageous
> depiction of him --played by an actor-- babbling silly nonsense in a
> film about Hawking). But I felt that I still ought to capture a little
> of the "heckling flavor" of their contribution in obstructing any
> "brain physics" becoming respectable.
>
> Before his meeting with Hameroff, Penrose was uncertain as to how his
> general ideas would actually be instantiated in brain structure.
> Hameroff still defends microtubules playing that role, but he's only
> an anesthesiologist (though I guess two physicists jumped on his
> bandwagon a few years back). I think Max Tegmark is correct to a point
> in his criticism, but cytoskeleton components certainly aren't his
> specialty anymore than quantum physics is Hameroff's.
>
Something doesn't have to be your specialty for you to be right - just
as it being your specialty doesn't preclude your being wrong.

I agree completely the Penrose is not a nut, though he was misled by
Hamenroff and, in any event, the idea of trying to link QM to
consciousness is a misguided attempt to reintroduce some sort of soul.

If Hameroff could offer some explanation for anaesthesia works and use
it to predict correctly what substances would prove to have
anaesthetic properties then the world would certainly sit up and take
notice.

On Jun 25, 7:01 am, Peter Brooks  wrote:
> On Jun 24, 7:18 pm, impromptu  wrote:
>
> > Peter Brooks wrote:
> > > On Jun 23, 5:28�pm, impromptu  wrote:
>
> > > > But perhaps there's a hybrid field of "quantum brain physics" in the
> > > > works, if it's not being laughed out of town with "pioneer" pictures
> > > > of Penrose types glued to the backend of the asylum wagon. LOL
>
> > > Well Penrose really ought not to have made the elementary mistake of
> > > not considering the dimensions of microtubules, it might be less
> > > obvious to a mathematician than to a physicist, but he ought to have
> > > checked with somebody to see that it could make at least some sense
> > > before going public.
>
> > Penrose is certainly not the "nut" that the media / entertainment
> > dullards sometimes portray him as (I seem to recollect an outrageous
> > depiction of him --played by an actor-- babbling silly nonsense in a
> > film about Hawking). But I felt that I still ought to capture a little
> > of the "heckling flavor" of their contribution in obstructing any
> > "brain physics" becoming respectable.
>
> > Before his meeting with Hameroff, Penrose was uncertain as to how his
> > general ideas would actually be instantiated in brain structure.
> > Hameroff still defends microtubules playing that role, but he's only
> > an anesthesiologist (though I guess two physicists jumped on his
> > bandwagon a few years back). I think Max Tegmark is correct to a point
> > in his criticism, but cytoskeleton components certainly aren't his
> > specialty anymore than quantum physics is Hameroff's.
>
> Something doesn't have to be your specialty for you to be right - just
> as it being your specialty doesn't preclude your being wrong.
>
> I agree completely the Penrose is not a nut, though he was misled by
> Hamenroff and, in any event, the idea of trying to link QM to
> consciousness is a misguided attempt to reintroduce some sort of soul.

What sort of soul? And why is this misguided?