Here are some essays on the conflict between scientific and religious
beliefs that may be of interest:

http://www.templeton.org/belief/

On May 26, 9:34 am, Dave Smith  wrote:
> Here are some essays on the conflict between scientific and religious
> beliefs that may be of interest:
>
> http://www.templeton.org/belief/

Thanks for that. Pinker's contribution is excellent. How on Earth can
Christoph Cardinal Schönborn start his unintelligent contribution with
"The knowledge we have gained through modern science makes belief in
an Intelligence behind the cosmos more reasonable than ever." What
humbug!

He says: "To view all these extremely complex, elegant, and
intelligible laws, entities, properties, and relations in the
evolution of the universe as "brute facts" in need of no further
explanation is, in the words of the great John Paul II, "an abdication
of human intelligence.""

The abdication of human intelligence is saying 'God did it'!

Cosmologists have a number of speculative hypothesis that attempt to
explain these brute facts, so scientists have hardly dismissed the
need for explanation of fundamental constants. (If they had i would
have failed my MSc thesis!)

As that was a reading experience I don't want to repeat I gave up at
that point. Are any of the others actually worth reading?

"Paul Grieg"  wrote in message 
news:247b2b71-0eb7-4bec-bc07-9794e62cd282@w7g2000hsa.googlegroups.com...
>On May 26, 9:34 am, Dave Smith  wrote:
>> Here are some essays on the conflict between scientific and religious
>> beliefs that may be of interest:
>>
>> http://www.templeton.org/belief/
[...]
> Are any of the others actually worth reading?

I found Pervez Amirali Hoodbhoy's contribution quite entertaining.  The rest 
seemed a bit too earnest for my taste, but possibly you are more concerned 
with content than style.

On May 26, 12:58 pm, "Philip"  wrote:
> "Paul Grieg"  wrote in message
>
> news:247b2b71-0eb7-4bec-bc07-9794e62cd282@w7g2000hsa.googlegroups.com...
>
> >On May 26, 9:34 am, Dave Smith  wrote:
> >> Here are some essays on the conflict between scientific and religious
> >> beliefs that may be of interest:
>
> >>http://www.templeton.org/belief/
> [...]
> > Are any of the others actually worth reading?
>
> I found Pervez Amirali Hoodbhoy's contribution quite entertaining.  The rest
> seemed a bit too earnest for my taste, but possibly you are more concerned
> with content than style.

That was quite amusing, but certainly lacking in content. I cannot see
how the multitude of multiverses could produce a science friendly God.
Even if you had 10^40 universes (one current estimate!) then I still
don't see how one of them would produce an omnipotent, omniscient, all
good being. And if it did, why isn't he making his presence felt in
all multiverses, including ours, and making life a bit cushier.

On 26 May, 12:07, Paul Grieg  wrote:

> ........ Are any of the others actually worth reading?

I found quite a few of them interesting,  inasmuch as they throw light
on how people attempt to deal with the issue   --   the evidence and
arguments they use to support their viewpoints.   I get rather
frustrated with the issue itself.  For me,  appeals to God never seem
to explain anything,  they just invite further questions.

Dave

On May 26, 8:54 pm, Dave Smith  wrote:
> On 26 May, 12:07, Paul Grieg  wrote:
>
> > ........ Are any of the others actually worth reading?
>
> I found quite a few of them interesting,  inasmuch as they throw light
> on how people attempt to deal with the issue   --   the evidence and
> arguments they use to support their viewpoints.   I get rather
> frustrated with the issue itself.  For me,  appeals to God never seem
> to explain anything,  they just invite further questions.
>
> Dave

Is William D. Phillips the only  Nobel Laureate in physics who
believes in God? He's certainly the only one I've heard of. His
argument shows you can be a real expert in a technical science but not
very good at more philosophical questions.

His "She sings beautifully." example, as being similar to "God is
love", is incredibly beside the point. "She" and one's internal
feeling of "that's beautiful!" obviously exist, the evidence is in
front of you, or inside you!

But there is no stand-up evidence for the Hebrew God.

There's an interesting biography of Phillips here:

http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/physics/laureates/1997/phillips-autobio.html

Note his family and friends were very religious so he always had
social pressures to be a Christian. They seemed 'nice people', so he
probably had warm feelings about religion from an early age. His work
was highly technical & experimental and revealed little inclination to
engage with philosophical matters, unlike Einstein or Bohr (say). His
school interests: science, French , track revealed little
philosophical inclination. He also had, it seems, great mentors in his
path to physics glory, (so he had little need for existential
questioning of his situation.) Interesting to see how a very clever
(but not broad minded) man can shut down part of his thinking mind and
retain a simple ( simplistic!) faith.

On 27 May, 13:17, Paul Grieg  wrote:

 Interesting to see how a very clever
> (but not broad minded) man can shut down part of his thinking mind and
> retain a simple ( simplistic!) faith.

Yes.  He avoids conflict between his scientific and religious
activities by arguing that different rules of thought apply:

"..........a scientist can believe in God because such belief is not a
scientific matter. Scientific statements must be "falsifiable." That
is, there must be some outcome that at least in principle could show
that the statement is false."

On May 28, 9:54 am, Dave Smith  wrote:
> On 27 May, 13:17, Paul Grieg  wrote:
>
>  Interesting to see how a very clever
>
> > (but not broad minded) man can shut down part of his thinking mind and
> > retain a simple ( simplistic!) faith.
>
> Yes.  He avoids conflict between his scientific and religious
> activities by arguing that different rules of thought apply:
>
> "..........a scientist can believe in God because such belief is not a
> scientific matter. Scientific statements must be "falsifiable." That
> is, there must be some outcome that at least in principle could show
> that the statement is false."

I think a good argument can be made for scientific (i.e. empirical)
rules of thought not applying in some areas. For instance, are the
existence of subjective consciousness and subjective feelings
explicable by neuroscience?

His example is of experiencing a beautiful woman. You could argue a
beautiful woman has objective characteristics -- perfect symmetry,
large eyes... but how do you explain the subjective feeling that comes
with appreciating beauty?

So he's arguing that there are areas which are beyond scientific
scrutiny, but then he draws the false conclusion that his makes it
alright for him to believe there is a God!

But he can't do that because there is nothing in the objective *or*
the subjective world that you can point to that has any of the
characteristics of the Christian God.

He appears to get feelings of love and comfort from interacting with
his church going friends. Maybe he thinks there must be an objective
correlate for these cuddly feelings?

You could point to the friends, but (being a scientist) perhaps he
thinks this is too fuzzy (there are nasty people as well) so he looks
for a more consistently loving and friendly thing and finds God (or,
rather, makes him up from an abstract series of characteristics from
his nicer friends and family).

What I don't get is that, being an experimental physicists, why
doesn't he looking for that thing? Then he would surely see it isn't
there!

Maybe he just doesn't bother looking, as he doesn't bother to go
looking for  DNA molecules (that's the biologists job). Maybe he just
accepts the statements from his cult leaders that God has been seen by
JC  and others. Also, perhaps, there's a mental block. If he went
looking , perhaps he feels subconsciously that this could shake his
world and plunge him into existential despair.

His physics friends should send him biographies of Feynman, Einstein,
etc. Maybe they could show him that atheism is OK emotionally, as well
as being intellectually consistent! And experimentalists know that the
theoreticians are the *really* bright guys :-)

On May 28, 1:12 pm, Paul Grieg  wrote:
>
>
> His example is of experiencing a beautiful woman. You could argue a
> beautiful woman has objective characteristics -- perfect symmetry,
> large eyes... but how do you explain the subjective feeling that comes
> with appreciating beauty?
>
The most beautiful women have been shown not to be perfectly
symmetrical - that's one reason beauty spots were used.

The subjective feeling can be described with reference to sex - bulls
find cows beautiful for similar reasons. General aesthetics can be
explained by reference to the evolutionary benefits of having an
aesthetic sense.

Midgley's contributions isn't very good:

"Belief—or disbelief—in God is not a scientific opinion, a judgment
about physical facts in the world."

If this was so, why do Christians point to miracles like burning
bushes and loaves & fishes as *evidence*? Science is all about finding
evidence. So as there is no (repeatable) evidence for burning bushes
then there is no God. This seems a reasonable scientific opinion,
based on judgements about facts in the world.

She suggest there are *some* unprovable assumptions:

"Other people are conscious beings, not mindless robots.
They have thoughts and feelings more or less like our own.
Most of what they tell us is true.
The physical world itself will, on the whole, go on acting pretty much
as it has done so far (the "regularity of nature")."

In fact, *nothing* is provable, except perhaps Descartes' cogito. She
should read Hume.

"If we really did start to doubt other people's consciousness and
truthfulness or the regularity of nature, we would lose not just our
science but our sanity. We could not act at all."

That's a good reason to believe in these things, but no reason to
believe in God.

"It is this claim to a monopoly of meaning, rather than any special
scientific doctrine, that makes science and religion look like
competitors today."

Many philosophers, e.g., Schopenhauer, do not believe that science has
a monopoly of meaning but are atheists.

"[Scientists suggest] Consciousness, if it exists at all, is something
trivial, unintelligible and ineffective."

Mary is slipping into sophism here. This attempts to make scientists
look bad by suggesting they deny the obvious. *This* scientist (i.e.,
me!) certainly believes Consciousness exists and is certainly not
trivial. Without consciousness toothache (certainly not trivial!)
wouldn't be such a pain.

Then again, consciousness might be just an epiphenomenon of neuronal
activity -- so *in that sense alone* it might be trivial.

Why is Mary still fighting the behaviourists? Are there any
behaviourists left? I thought cognitive science killed them off thirty
years ago?

"Jacques Monod's dream of a cosmic casino run by natural selection and
Richard Dawkins's drama of domination by selfish genes—are still with
us, causing confusion."

Why confusion? Mary produces no arguments against these thinkers.

I haven't read Midgley's books. This essay reminds me why!

On May 28, 12:44 pm, Peter Brooks  wrote:
> On May 28, 1:12 pm, Paul Grieg  wrote:
>
> > His example is of experiencing a beautiful woman. You could argue a
> > beautiful woman has objective characteristics -- perfect symmetry,
> > large eyes... but how do you explain the subjective feeling that comes
> > with appreciating beauty?
>
> The most beautiful women have been shown not to be perfectly
> symmetrical - that's one reason beauty spots were used.

While accepting your point on "perfect symmetry", I would question the
'beauty spot' argument. They seem to  me to be culturally conditioned,
and not much in evidence today.

Wouldn't you expect natural selection to deselect women with large
spots, as usually they would be evidence of disease (e.g., melanoma)?

But I could imagine you are right about *small* deviations from
symmetry being  more succesful. Absolutely perfect symmetry might be
an indication of extreme abnormality!

> The subjective feeling can be described with reference to sex - bulls
> find cows beautiful for similar reasons. General aesthetics can be
> explained by reference to the evolutionary benefits of having an
> aesthetic sense.

But can specific aesthetic developments (Mozart's music, say) be
predicted by evolutionary theory?

On May 28, 2:35 pm, Paul Grieg  wrote:
>
> > The subjective feeling can be described with reference to sex - bulls
> > find cows beautiful for similar reasons. General aesthetics can be
> > explained by reference to the evolutionary benefits of having an
> > aesthetic sense.
>
> But can specific aesthetic developments (Mozart's music, say) be
> predicted by evolutionary theory?
>
It depends on what you mean by 'predicted'. Many natural phenomena
follow bell shaped curves, so you expect a very few completely
inaesthetic people and the odd Mozart. So, yes, you would predict that
such a person would arrive from time to time.

On 28 May, 12:12, Paul Grieg  wrote:
>
> I think a good argument can be made for scientific (i.e. empirical)
> rules of thought not applying in some areas. For instance, are the
> existence of subjective consciousness and subjective feelings
> explicable by neuroscience?


I'm not sure what the 'good argument' would be.  It seems to me that
careful collection and evaluation of evidence should apply in all
areas.  Some religious beliefs such as the efficacy of prayer can be
experimentally tested,  and there is plenty of evidence to challenge
vaguer religious ideas such as the combined benevolence and
omnipotence of God.

I think neuroscience and an evolutionary perspective do help us begin
to understand the nature and origins of consciousness.  I agree that
the existence of subjectivity is mysterious, but so is the existence
of matter and energy ---  or more generally that there is 'something'
rather than 'nothing'.  And if science fails to answer such
metaphysical questions,  which method of inquiry is more successful?

Dave

On 28 May, 13:18, Paul Grieg  wrote:
> Midgley's contributions isn't very good:
>
> "Belief—or disbelief—in God is not a scientific opinion, a judgment
> about physical facts in the world."
>
> If this was so, why do Christians point to miracles like burning
> bushes and loaves & fishes as *evidence*? Science is all about finding
> evidence. So as there is no (repeatable) evidence for burning bushes
> then there is no God. This seems a reasonable scientific opinion,
> based on judgements about facts in the world.
>
> She suggest there are *some* unprovable assumptions:
>
> "Other people are conscious beings, not mindless robots.
> They have thoughts and feelings more or less like our own.
> Most of what they tell us is true.
> The physical world itself will, on the whole, go on acting pretty much
> as it has done so far (the "regularity of nature")."
>
> In fact, *nothing* is provable, except perhaps Descartes' cogito. She
> should read Hume.
>
> "If we really did start to doubt other people's consciousness and
> truthfulness or the regularity of nature, we would lose not just our
> science but our sanity. We could not act at all."
>
> That's a good reason to believe in these things, but no reason to
> believe in God.
>
> "It is this claim to a monopoly of meaning, rather than any special
> scientific doctrine, that makes science and religion look like
> competitors today."
>
> Many philosophers, e.g., Schopenhauer, do not believe that science has
> a monopoly of meaning but are atheists.
>
> "[Scientists suggest] Consciousness, if it exists at all, is something
> trivial, unintelligible and ineffective."
>
> Mary is slipping into sophism here. This attempts to make scientists
> look bad by suggesting they deny the obvious. *This* scientist (i.e.,
> me!) certainly believes Consciousness exists and is certainly not
> trivial. Without consciousness toothache (certainly not trivial!)
> wouldn't be such a pain.
>
> Then again, consciousness might be just an epiphenomenon of neuronal
> activity -- so *in that sense alone* it might be trivial.
>
> Why is Mary still fighting the behaviourists? Are there any
> behaviourists left? I thought cognitive science killed them off thirty
> years ago?
>
> "Jacques Monod's dream of a cosmic casino run by natural selection and
> Richard Dawkins's drama of domination by selfish genes—are still with
> us, causing confusion."
>
> Why confusion? Mary produces no arguments against these thinkers.
>
> I haven't read Midgley's books. This essay reminds me why!

I found her books 'Beast and Man' and 'The Ethical Primate'
interesting,  but I agree that her essay here isn't particularly
convincing.

Dave

On May 28, 11:56 pm, Dave Smith  wrote:
> On 28 May, 12:12, Paul Grieg  wrote:
>
>
>
> > I think a good argument can be made for scientific (i.e. empirical)
> > rules of thought not applying in some areas. For instance, are the
> > existence of subjective consciousness and subjective feelings
> > explicable by neuroscience?
>
> I'm not sure what the 'good argument' would be.  It seems to me that
> careful collection and evaluation of evidence should apply in all
> areas.

But there are some areas that seem beyond careful collection of
evidence. For instance, the problem of other minds cannot be solved
through careful collection of empirical evidence. How do you know that
other humans are not zombies? That is, how do you know that you are
not the only conscious being? There is circumstantial evidence (they
walk like you, talk like you...) but no direct evdicence (can you take
a photograph of consciousness?


> Some religious beliefs such as the efficacy of prayer can be
> experimentally tested

What if they are praying to get into heaven?

>  and there is plenty of evidence to challenge
> vaguer religious ideas such as the combined benevolence and
> omnipotence of God.

There are also plenty of arguments against the evidence. For instance,
our hundred years on Earth might be a "stiffener" before we enter
heaven forever. Maybe God is being benevolent in giving us a taste of
pain followed by an eternity of pleasure. Pleasure always feels better
when you contrast it to a pain. So perhaps 100 year sof pain and an
eternity of pleasure results in more pleasure than an eternity of
pleasure.

'The problem of evil' is an easy 'get round' for Christians --
everything will be fixed in heaven and God works in mysterious ways.

The simple lack of evidence for God is the crucial atheist argument.
There are no burning bushes, there is no voice from heaven, Hubble
hasn't spotted heaven, there is no parting of the red sea, ergo, there
is no God.

> I think neuroscience and an evolutionary perspective do help us begin
> to understand the nature and origins of consciousness.

The origins maybe, i.e., consciousness somehow originates, or comes
with, the brain. Maybe you could even get down to saying 'when the X
neurons fire consciousness is present'. But origin + correlation do
not add up to knowing the nature of something.

>  I agree that
> the existence of subjectivity is mysterious, but so is the existence
> of matter and energy ---  or more generally that there is 'something'
> rather than 'nothing'.

I agree!

> And if science fails to answer such
> metaphysical questions,  which method of inquiry is more successful?

Magee, for one, accuses most empirical philosophers of ignoring these
questions. They think science explains everything, and resort to hand
waving when you mention these fundamental problems. They ignore, for
instance, Kant's antimonies and suggest that cosmologists will soon
hack out an answer to them (or suggest they have answered them already
-- when they haven't) or point to neurobiologists and say, they'll
soon have the answer to the hard problem of consciousness, so let's
think continue to paddle in our little pool of common sense language
philosophy.

Cosmologist are as far away as everyone else from answering the
'something' rather than 'nothing' question. And there is no sign of
anyone getting anywhere near even finding out in what terms such a
question can be answered.

You could say 'build a bigger telescope' or 'get a better string
theory', but those haven't worked very well in the last thirty years.
To me (though I might be wrong) these questions seem beyond empirical
analysis perhaps exploring and extending an analysis like that of Kant
or Schopenhauer will help. This is a fundamentally metaphysical
approach, and not part of the empirical evidence seeking you suggest
(although, I agree, such seeking is always a good idea, -- certainly
build more telescopes!) Any metaphysical geniuses out there?

I found Keith Ward's argument to be fairly good. He really knows
science and its place in intellectual history -- better than most
scientists.

This is the reason that I argue atheist scientists should take Kant
and Schopenhauer on board. Kant's argument are profoundly destructive
of arguments for God, although he didn't come out as an outright
atheists. Schopenhauer did that for him :-)

So when you see a Christian trying to gain backing from Kant, you know
you have him! If you know your Kant. (Magee's summary of Kant will do
if you can't face the original).

If you know Kants arguments you can easily puncture Christian
arguments that pretend to gain backing from Kant. For instance Kant
hammers Ward's argument into pieces when you ask the Kantian question:
How can a non-physical God have a causal impact on a physical world?
As Kant argued at length, causality only acts in the empirical world
-- to attribute a non-physical origin of causality is nonsense.

Ward wants to put God outside the physical world so he can explain the
fact that we have not observed Him. But then he wants God to be able
to influence the world (otherwise he might as well not exist!) But if
he influenced the world he would be observed to be doing it. So Ward's
argument collapses in the simplistic contradiction at its heart.

Here's his core argument. There are probably other flaws in there. Any
more thoughts on Ward?:

"I shall adopt the rather minimal view that God is a non-physical
being of consciousness and intelligence or wisdom, who creates the
universe for the sake of distinctive values that the universe
generates.

If there is such a God, it follows that a non-physical conscious
intelligence is possible—so a materialist view that all existent
things must be physical, or must have location in space-time and must
be subject to the causal laws of such a space-time, must be false. It
follows that the nature of the universe must be compatible with being
the product of intelligent creation, and must contain states that are
of distinctive value and that could not otherwise exist."

"Some writers have supposed that science rules out any non-physical
beings or forms of causality. Auguste Comte propagated the nineteenth
century idea of a progress of humanity through three states of thought—
religious, metaphysical, and positive or scientific. The final stage
supersedes the others. Thus science renders belief in God obsolete.

But quantum physicists have decisively rejected Comte's philosophical
proposal that human sense-observations provide the ultimate truth
about objective reality. They more nearly vindicate Kant's alternative
proposal that our senses only reveal reality as it appears to us.
Reality in itself is quite different, and is accessible only through
mathematical descriptions that are increasingly removed from
observation or pictorial imagination (how do you picture a probability-
wave in Hilbert space?)."

"It is simply untrue that modern physics rules out the possibility of
non-physical entities. And it is untrue that science has established a
set of inflexible laws so tightly constraining and universally
dominating that they exclude the possibility of other forms, including
perhaps non-physical forms, of causal influence that we may not be
able to measure or predict. It is more accurate to say that
fundamental laws of nature are seen by many physicists as
approximations to an open, holistic and flexible reality, as we
encounter it in relatively isolated and controlled conditions.

An important fact about God is that if God is a non-physical entity
causally influencing the cosmos in non-physical ways, God's mode of
causal influence is most unlikely to be law-governed, measurable,
predictable, or publicly observable. To the extent that the sciences
describe regular, measurable, predictable, controllable, and
repeatable behavior, acts of God will be outside the scientific remit.
But that does not mean they cannot occur.

But this is not a scientific hypothesis. It posits no observationally
confirmable entities, and produces no specific predictions. It is a
philosophical hypothesis about the most adequate overall
interpretation of a very wide set of data, including scientific data,
but also including non-scientific data from history, personal
experience, and morality. And that is the fundamental point. It is not
science that renders belief in God obsolete. It is a strictly
materialist interpretation of the world that renders belief in God
obsolete, and which science is taken by some people to support. But
science is more ambiguous than that, and modern scientific belief in
the intelligibility and mathematical beauty of nature, and in the
ultimately "veiled" nature of objective reality, can reasonably be
taken as suggestive of an underlying cosmic intelligence. To that
extent, science may make a certain sort of belief in God highly
plausible."

Given his background, Ward appears to be the best intellectual canon
the Christians can fire these days. Good, perhaps. But not good
enough.

On 29 May, 12:30, Paul Grieg  wrote:
> I found Keith Ward's argument to be fairly good. He really knows
> science and its place in intellectual history -- better than most
> scientists.
>
> This is the reason that I argue atheist scientists should take Kant
> and Schopenhauer on board. Kant's argument are profoundly destructive
> of arguments for God, although he didn't come out as an outright
> atheists. Schopenhauer did that for him :-)
>
> So when you see a Christian trying to gain backing from Kant, you know
> you have him! If you know your Kant. (Magee's summary of Kant will do
> if you can't face the original).
>
> If you know Kants arguments you can easily puncture Christian
> arguments that pretend to gain backing from Kant. For instance Kant
> hammers Ward's argument into pieces when you ask the Kantian question:
> How can a non-physical God have a causal impact on a physical world?
> As Kant argued at length, causality only acts in the empirical world
> -- to attribute a non-physical origin of causality is nonsense.
>
> Ward wants to put God outside the physical world so he can explain the
> fact that we have not observed Him. But then he wants God to be able
> to influence the world (otherwise he might as well not exist!) But if
> he influenced the world he would be observed to be doing it. So Ward's
> argument collapses in the simplistic contradiction at its heart.
>
> Here's his core argument. There are probably other flaws in there. Any
> more thoughts on Ward?:
>
> "I shall adopt the rather minimal view that God is a non-physical
> being of consciousness and intelligence or wisdom, who creates the
> universe for the sake of distinctive values that the universe
> generates.
>
> If there is such a God, it follows that a non-physical conscious
> intelligence is possible—so a materialist view that all existent
> things must be physical, or must have location in space-time and must
> be subject to the causal laws of such a space-time, must be false. It
> follows that the nature of the universe must be compatible with being
> the product of intelligent creation, and must contain states that are
> of distinctive value and that could not otherwise exist."
>
> "Some writers have supposed that science rules out any non-physical
> beings or forms of causality. Auguste Comte propagated the nineteenth
> century idea of a progress of humanity through three states of thought—
> religious, metaphysical, and positive or scientific. The final stage
> supersedes the others. Thus science renders belief in God obsolete.
>
> But quantum physicists have decisively rejected Comte's philosophical
> proposal that human sense-observations provide the ultimate truth
> about objective reality. They more nearly vindicate Kant's alternative
> proposal that our senses only reveal reality as it appears to us.
> Reality in itself is quite different, and is accessible only through
> mathematical descriptions that are increasingly removed from
> observation or pictorial imagination (how do you picture a probability-
> wave in Hilbert space?)."
>
> "It is simply untrue that modern physics rules out the possibility of
> non-physical entities. And it is untrue that science has established a
> set of inflexible laws so tightly constraining and universally
> dominating that they exclude the possibility of other forms, including
> perhaps non-physical forms, of causal influence that we may not be
> able to measure or predict. It is more accurate to say that
> fundamental laws of nature are seen by many physicists as
> approximations to an open, holistic and flexible reality, as we
> encounter it in relatively isolated and controlled conditions.
>
> An important fact about God is that if God is a non-physical entity
> causally influencing the cosmos in non-physical ways, God's mode of
> causal influence is most unlikely to be law-governed, measurable,
> predictable, or publicly observable. To the extent that the sciences
> describe regular, measurable, predictable, controllable, and
> repeatable behavior, acts of God will be outside the scientific remit.
> But that does not mean they cannot occur.
>
> But this is not a scientific hypothesis. It posits no observationally
> confirmable entities, and produces no specific predictions. It is a
> philosophical hypothesis about the most adequate overall
> interpretation of a very wide set of data, including scientific data,
> but also including non-scientific data from history, personal
> experience, and morality. And that is the fundamental point. It is not
> science that renders belief in God obsolete. It is a strictly
> materialist interpretation of the world that renders belief in God
> obsolete, and which science is taken by some people to support. But
> science is more ambiguous than that, and modern scientific belief in
> the intelligibility and mathematical beauty of nature, and in the
> ultimately "veiled" nature of objective reality, can reasonably be
> taken as suggestive of an underlying cosmic intelligence. To that
> extent, science may make a certain sort of belief in God highly
> plausible."
>> Given his background, Ward appears to be the best intellectual canon
> the Christians can fire these days. Good, perhaps. But not good
> enough.


What use is a hypothesis which "posits no observationally confirmable
entities, and produces no specific predictions"  ?

Dave

On May 30, 1:16 am, Dave Smith  wrote:
>
>
> What use is a hypothesis which "posits no observationally confirmable
> entities, and produces no specific predictions"  ?
>
It makes some people happy? It annoys rational people? Those seem to
be uses.

This particular nutter has got my mother-in-law all fired up about how
somebody has 'proved gods exist by mathematics'. Making mother-in-law
even more annoying is certainly a 'use'.

On May 30, 12:16 am, Dave Smith  wrote:
> On 29 May, 12:30, Paul Grieg  wrote:
>
>
>
> > I found Keith Ward's argument to be fairly good. He really knows
> > science and its place in intellectual history -- better than most
> > scientists.
>
> > This is the reason that I argue atheist scientists should take Kant
> > and Schopenhauer on board. Kant's argument are profoundly destructive
> > of arguments for God, although he didn't come out as an outright
> > atheists. Schopenhauer did that for him :-)
>
> > So when you see a Christian trying to gain backing from Kant, you know
> > you have him! If you know your Kant. (Magee's summary of Kant will do
> > if you can't face the original).
>
> > If you know Kants arguments you can easily puncture Christian
> > arguments that pretend to gain backing from Kant. For instance Kant
> > hammers Ward's argument into pieces when you ask the Kantian question:
> > How can a non-physical God have a causal impact on a physical world?
> > As Kant argued at length, causality only acts in the empirical world
> > -- to attribute a non-physical origin of causality is nonsense.
>
> > Ward wants to put God outside the physical world so he can explain the
> > fact that we have not observed Him. But then he wants God to be able
> > to influence the world (otherwise he might as well not exist!) But if
> > he influenced the world he would be observed to be doing it. So Ward's
> > argument collapses in the simplistic contradiction at its heart.
>
> > Here's his core argument. There are probably other flaws in there. Any
> > more thoughts on Ward?:
>
> > "I shall adopt the rather minimal view that God is a non-physical
> > being of consciousness and intelligence or wisdom, who creates the
> > universe for the sake of distinctive values that the universe
> > generates.
>
> > If there is such a God, it follows that a non-physical conscious
> > intelligence is possible—so a materialist view that all existent
> > things must be physical, or must have location in space-time and must
> > be subject to the causal laws of such a space-time, must be false. It
> > follows that the nature of the universe must be compatible with being
> > the product of intelligent creation, and must contain states that are
> > of distinctive value and that could not otherwise exist."
>
> > "Some writers have supposed that science rules out any non-physical
> > beings or forms of causality. Auguste Comte propagated the nineteenth
> > century idea of a progress of humanity through three states of thought—
> > religious, metaphysical, and positive or scientific. The final stage
> > supersedes the others. Thus science renders belief in God obsolete.
>
> > But quantum physicists have decisively rejected Comte's philosophical
> > proposal that human sense-observations provide the ultimate truth
> > about objective reality. They more nearly vindicate Kant's alternative
> > proposal that our senses only reveal reality as it appears to us.
> > Reality in itself is quite different, and is accessible only through
> > mathematical descriptions that are increasingly removed from
> > observation or pictorial imagination (how do you picture a probability-
> > wave in Hilbert space?)."
>
> > "It is simply untrue that modern physics rules out the possibility of
> > non-physical entities. And it is untrue that science has established a
> > set of inflexible laws so tightly constraining and universally
> > dominating that they exclude the possibility of other forms, including
> > perhaps non-physical forms, of causal influence that we may not be
> > able to measure or predict. It is more accurate to say that
> > fundamental laws of nature are seen by many physicists as
> > approximations to an open, holistic and flexible reality, as we
> > encounter it in relatively isolated and controlled conditions.
>
> > An important fact about God is that if God is a non-physical entity
> > causally influencing the cosmos in non-physical ways, God's mode of
> > causal influence is most unlikely to be law-governed, measurable,
> > predictable, or publicly observable. To the extent that the sciences
> > describe regular, measurable, predictable, controllable, and
> > repeatable behavior, acts of God will be outside the scientific remit.
> > But that does not mean they cannot occur.
>
> > But this is not a scientific hypothesis. It posits no observationally
> > confirmable entities, and produces no specific predictions. It is a
> > philosophical hypothesis about the most adequate overall
> > interpretation of a very wide set of data, including scientific data,
> > but also including non-scientific data from history, personal
> > experience, and morality. And that is the fundamental point. It is not
> > science that renders belief in God obsolete. It is a strictly
> > materialist interpretation of the world that renders belief in God
> > obsolete, and which science is taken by some people to support. But
> > science is more ambiguous than that, and modern scientific belief in
> > the intelligibility and mathematical beauty of nature, and in the
> > ultimately "veiled" nature of objective reality, can reasonably be
> > taken as suggestive of an underlying cosmic intelligence. To that
> > extent, science may make a certain sort of belief in God highly
> > plausible."
> >> Given his background, Ward appears to be the best intellectual canon
> > the Christians can fire these days. Good, perhaps. But not good
> > enough.
>
> What use is a hypothesis which "posits no observationally confirmable
> entities, and produces no specific predictions"  ?

Hypothesis: "if I take local anesthetic then I will feel no pain at
the dentist."

This seems to me a very useful hypothesis! But pain is not an
observable entity.

You might argue that the argument involves some observable entities
(anesthetics, dentist...)

So a better example might be a cognitive therapy exercise. You can do
that with eyes closed, in your armchair. You feel the mental pain of
depression, use purely cognitve techniques to stop the pain. None of
the entities (pain, cognitive techniques) are observable, but you can
make a hyptohesis & prediction (CT will cure my depression).

Then again, to take your argument to the letter, you need make no
prediction. You might just use the CT exercise at random, and get
better without intending to. By you getting better the hypothesis
shows its use useful even though "no observationally confirmable
entities" and no "specific predictions" are involved.

On May 30, 2:42 am, Peter Brooks  wrote:
> On May 30, 1:16 am, Dave Smith  wrote:
>
> > What use is a hypothesis which "posits no observationally confirmable
> > entities, and produces no specific predictions"  ?
>
> It makes some people happy? It annoys rational people? Those seem to
> be uses.
>
> This particular nutter has got my mother-in-law all fired up about how
> somebody has 'proved gods exist by mathematics'. Making mother-in-law
> even more annoying is certainly a 'use'.

Good example!

I'm reading "Brideshead Revisited" at the moment, where Sebastian (the
toff with the Teddy Bear) defends his Catholicism in exactly this
manner. Like his Teddy Bear, Catholicism makes him feel good. And he
doesn't seem to mind that 'rational grown up people' think he's daft.
In fact even though people think he's daft, even the rational ones
treat him really well, because he's so endearing.

Many Christians I've met seem to have this eccentric quality which
makes them quite endearing (if you're not careful!).  Maybe that's why
they are Christians? It gives them a warm glow and makes other people
treat them better than they otherwise would. I don't have any
Christian friends, probably because my response to theior 'endearing
eccentricty' is an all out attack on their irrational views.

Stenger's essay wasn't very good, I thought. I recently read an essay
of his in Hitchen's 'Portable Atheist" collection that I thought was
excellent, and added him to my list of "must reads". So, given your
comments on Midgley it looks like there's a quality control issue
here!

If these essays are so poor, why have the thinkers involved allowed
them to be published on the site?

On 30 May, 11:50, Paul Grieg  wrote:

> Then again, to take your argument to the letter, you need make no
> prediction. You might just use the CT exercise at random, and get
> better without intending to. By you getting better the hypothesis
> shows its use useful even though "no observationally confirmable
> entities" and no "specific predictions" are involved.

But in this example you have made no hypothesis, so the question of
its usefulness doesn't arise.

Dave

On May 30, 7:02 pm, Dave Smith  wrote:
> On 30 May, 11:50, Paul Grieg  wrote:
>
> > Then again, to take your argument to the letter, you need make no
> > prediction. You might just use the CT exercise at random, and get
> > better without intending to. By you getting better the hypothesis
> > shows its use useful even though "no observationally confirmable
> > entities" and no "specific predictions" are involved.
>
> But in this example you have made no hypothesis, so the question of
> its usefulness doesn't arise.
>
> Dave

There is a hypothesis lurking in there, or pehaps it's better called a
meta-hypothesis, i.e.: 'there are times when useful things happen when
no hypothesis (or aim) is set'.

Maybe it would be more fun to approach this directly.

Kantian hypothesis: there is a noumenal reality beyond all possible
observations we can make.

So, by definition, the noumenal is not an observationally confirmable
entity. Also, it does not produce specific predictions because *all*
specific predictions are based on empirical investigations.

What it does offer is 'philosophical coherence'. Everything we know
comes from the evidence of our senses. Given that we are small,
limited creatures bodged together by the processes of evolution it
would seem very strange if these senses allowed us to understand
everything. It would make us seem like Gods, and humanists do not
believe in Gods :-)

So it seems reasonable, just about inescapable, to believe in
something beyond what we can sense. And we can call everything we can
know, and everything beyond what we can now, the noumenal. This
Kantian/ Schopenhaurian concept seems to me the *real* unified theory,
and it makes me happier than I would be if I tried to stick to a
philosophy of materialism. (Although, I keep an open mind, materialism
might work, but I *really* can't see how).

Anything that makes me happier is useful, therefore, I have totally
blown your argument out of the water and you have to admit defeat :-)

Note, although transcendental idealism, in a sense, explains
everything, the explanation is (necessarily) very vague in places
(especially places beyond empiricism). So much work still to do!

Actually if you read Magee's book on Schopenhauer you get a vivid
account of how Schopenhauer predicted the equivalence of mass energy
from purely Kantian arguments. So thinking about something beyond all
possible observations *does* have usefulness, even in scientific
thinking.  He didn't produce E=mc^2, I admit, his argument was not
mathematical. But, still, that's pretty good going fifty years before
Einstein. And Einstein was growing up when and where Schopenhauer's
fame was at its maximum. So maybe there was some direct inspiration
there?

So really taking these ideas on board has been, and could be, useful
for fundamental science.

(Note, Schrodinger was an explicit Schopenhaurian. it would be
interesting to untangle any direct influences there...)

On 31 May, 12:16, Paul Grieg  wrote:
> On May 30, 7:02 pm, Dave Smith  wrote:
>
> > On 30 May, 11:50, Paul Grieg  wrote:
>
> > > Then again, to take your argument to the letter, you need make no
> > > prediction. You might just use the CT exercise at random, and get
> > > better without intending to. By you getting better the hypothesis
> > > shows its use useful even though "no observationally confirmable
> > > entities" and no "specific predictions" are involved.
>
> > But in this example you have made no hypothesis, so the question of
> > its usefulness doesn't arise.
>
> > Dave
>
> There is a hypothesis lurking in there, or pehaps it's better called a
> meta-hypothesis, i.e.: 'there are times when useful things happen when
> no hypothesis (or aim) is set'.


I think you are shifting your ground.  However,  if it occurred to you
that useful things can happen by chance, then you could collect
evidence indicative of such serendipity.  The issue is whether
hypotheses are useful (in the sense of advancing knowledge) if they
don't allow any specific predictions.


> Maybe it would be more fun to approach this directly.
>
> Kantian hypothesis: there is a noumenal reality beyond all possible
> observations we can make.
>
> So, by definition, the noumenal is not an observationally confirmable
> entity. Also, it does not produce specific predictions because *all*
> specific predictions are based on empirical investigations.


Surely explicit predictions emerge from thinking about concepts,
theories etc?  (We also have vaguer expectations which may not be
verbally formulated or even conscious).


> What it does offer is 'philosophical coherence'. Everything we know
> comes from the evidence of our senses. Given that we are small,
> limited creatures bodged together by the processes of evolution it
> would seem very strange if these senses allowed us to understand
> everything. It would make us seem like Gods, and humanists do not
> believe in Gods :-)


Rumsfeld might comment that we don't know what we don't know.  How can
you think about something that, in principle, you know nothing about
and can discover nothing about?  (Incidentally, I think it reasonable
to claim that knowledge is to some extent innate.)


> So it seems reasonable, just about inescapable, to believe in
> something beyond what we can sense. And we can call everything we can
> know, and everything beyond what we can now, the noumenal. This
> Kantian/ Schopenhaurian concept seems to me the *real* unified theory,
> and it makes me happier than I would be if I tried to stick to a
> philosophy of materialism. (Although, I keep an open mind, materialism
> might work, but I *really* can't see how).


It isn't profound to claim that there is much that we don't know and
may never know.

It doesn't seem sensible to accept theories because they make us
happy.

I think I have a wider notion of science than you. I would argue, for
instance, that subjectivity can be investigated using scientific
methods.


> Anything that makes me happier is useful, therefore, I have totally
> blown your argument out of the water and you have to admit defeat :-)


So religious ideas are useful because they make some people happy?  As
you are aware,  it depends what is meant by 'useful'.  For example,
below you qualify by writing "useful for fundamental science".


> Note, although transcendental idealism, in a sense, explains
> everything, the explanation is (necessarily) very vague in places
> (especially places beyond empiricism). So much work still to do!


I find this very strange.  All this stuff we don't know and can never
know,  explains everything?


> Actually if you read Magee's book on Schopenhauer you get a vivid
> account of how Schopenhauer predicted the equivalence of mass energy
> from purely Kantian arguments. So thinking about something beyond all
> possible observations *does* have usefulness, even in scientific
> thinking.  He didn't produce E=mc^2, I admit, his argument was not
> mathematical. But, still, that's pretty good going fifty years before
> Einstein. And Einstein was growing up when and where Schopenhauer's
> fame was at its maximum. So maybe there was some direct inspiration
> there?
>
> So really taking these ideas on board has been, and could be, useful
> for fundamental science.

> (Note, Schrodinger was an explicit Schopenhaurian. it would be
> interesting to untangle any direct influences there...)


This sounds more like an example of how theorising can lead to
hypothesis formulation and empirical inquiry.


Dave

On Jun 1, 12:37 am, Dave Smith  wrote:
> On 31 May, 12:16, Paul Grieg  wrote:
>
>
>
> > On May 30, 7:02 pm, Dave Smith  wrote:
>
> > > On 30 May, 11:50, Paul Grieg  wrote:
>
> > > > Then again, to take your argument to the letter, you need make no
> > > > prediction. You might just use the CT exercise at random, and get
> > > > better without intending to. By you getting better the hypothesis
> > > > shows its use useful even though "no observationally confirmable
> > > > entities" and no "specific predictions" are involved.
>
> > > But in this example you have made no hypothesis, so the question of
> > > its usefulness doesn't arise.
>
> > > Dave
>
> > There is a hypothesis lurking in there, or pehaps it's better called a
> > meta-hypothesis, i.e.: 'there are times when useful things happen when
> > no hypothesis (or aim) is set'.
>
> I think you are shifting your ground.  However,  if it occurred to you
> that useful things can happen by chance, then you could collect
> evidence indicative of such serendipity.  The issue is whether
> hypotheses are useful (in the sense of advancing knowledge) if they
> don't allow any specific predictions.
>
> > Maybe it would be more fun to approach this directly.
>
> > Kantian hypothesis: there is a noumenal reality beyond all possible
> > observations we can make.
>
> > So, by definition, the noumenal is not an observationally confirmable
> > entity. Also, it does not produce specific predictions because *all*
> > specific predictions are based on empirical investigations.
>
> Surely explicit predictions emerge from thinking about concepts,
> theories etc?  (We also have vaguer expectations which may not be
> verbally formulated or even conscious).

I'm assuming that concept formation is part of empirical
investigation. Where else can you get concepts from? For instance, you
can't have the theory/concept 'all swans are white' without having
seen a swan (or, at least, enough bird like things).

> > What it does offer is 'philosophical coherence'. Everything we know
> > comes from the evidence of our senses. Given that we are small,
> > limited creatures bodged together by the processes of evolution it
> > would seem very strange if these senses allowed us to understand
> > everything. It would make us seem like Gods, and humanists do not
> > believe in Gods :-)
>
> Rumsfeld might comment that we don't know what we don't know.  How can
> you think about something that, in principle, you know nothing about
> and can discover nothing about?

How can you think about a black hole? Only through the light that
surrounds it. It doesn't mean the black hole isn't there, or that you
can ignore it.

> (Incidentally, I think it reasonable
> to claim that knowledge is to some extent innate.)

Give an example.

I think all knowledge 8always* involves an object 'out there' and a
knowing a subject 'in here'. So knowledge is *never* innate.  By
suggesting this you are, amongst other sins, opening the door to every
religious nutter who suggests he has innate knowledge of God.

> > So it seems reasonable, just about inescapable, to believe in
> > something beyond what we can sense. And we can call everything we can
> > know, and everything beyond what we can now, the noumenal. This
> > Kantian/ Schopenhaurian concept seems to me the *real* unified theory,
> > and it makes me happier than I would be if I tried to stick to a
> > philosophy of materialism. (Although, I keep an open mind, materialism
> > might work, but I *really* can't see how).
>
> It isn't profound to claim that there is much that we don't know and
> may never know.

It is if it's done carefully, as with Kant and Schopenhauer. It's the
difference between saying there's a dark continent, maybe, and mapping
its edges.

> It doesn't seem sensible to accept theories because they make us
> happy.

Not if that's the only reason. But if a theory seems the most sensible
*and* it makes you happy, then that makes you even happier :-)

> I think I have a wider notion of science than you. I would argue, for
> instance, that subjectivity can be investigated using scientific
> methods.

Give an example.

> > Anything that makes me happier is useful, therefore, I have totally
> > blown your argument out of the water and you have to admit defeat :-)
>
> So religious ideas are useful because they make some people happy?

For something to be useful does it have to be true? Psychologists have
found that optimists are happier, more productive, better paid, more
successful with the opposite sex, etc,. etc, But they have less of a
true understanding of their situation than their less successful
pessimistic-realistic friends.

Also, on average, the more fundamental religious types are happier and
more optimistic than less religious types and atheists. According to
latest research it seems to be *hope* that is the factor. I guess if
you can brainwash yourself to believing that 72 virgins are waiting
for you in paradise it's likely to generate hope. How do atheists
generate hope when only the blackness awaits? Anyway, the point is,
that fundies make more money, so religion seems eminently useful by
the most materialistic standards. (Just look at the all the good jobs
the Al Quida bombers had: doctors, engineers...)

> > Note, although transcendental idealism, in a sense, explains
> > everything, the explanation is (necessarily) very vague in places
> > (especially places beyond empiricism). So much work still to do!
>
> I find this very strange.  All this stuff we don't know and can never
> know,  explains everything?

As much as we can know. Imagine the whole world had been mapped out
but there was a dark continent with unscalable cliffs. The map makers
could say 'job done' without mapping the dark continent, and feel
satisfaction at completing their task, as far as it was possible to
complete it.

> > Actually if you read Magee's book on Schopenhauer you get a vivid
> > account of how Schopenhauer predicted the equivalence of mass energy
> > from purely Kantian arguments. So thinking about something beyond all
> > possible observations *does* have usefulness, even in scientific
> > thinking.  He didn't produce E=mc^2, I admit, his argument was not
> > mathematical. But, still, that's pretty good going fifty years before
> > Einstein. And Einstein was growing up when and where Schopenhauer's
> > fame was at its maximum. So maybe there was some direct inspiration
> > there?
>
> > So really taking these ideas on board has been, and could be, useful
> > for fundamental science.
> > (Note, Schrodinger was an explicit Schopenhaurian. it would be
> > interesting to untangle any direct influences there...)
>
> This sounds more like an example of how theorising can lead to
> hypothesis formulation and empirical inquiry.

Yes, but it's metaphysical theorising.

On 1 Jun, 12:35, Paul Grieg  wrote:

> I'm assuming that concept formation is part of empirical
> investigation. Where else can you get concepts from? For instance, you
> can't have the theory/concept 'all swans are white' without having
> seen a swan (or, at least, enough bird like things).


It seems to me that merely seeing birds is not sufficient to form a
concept of swans --  more than that needs to take place in the brain/
mind.  I expect some things --  for example, snakes -- might be
recognised and responded to without prior, directly relevant
experience.


> How can you think about a black hole? Only through the light that
> surrounds it. It doesn't mean the black hole isn't there, or that you
> can ignore it.


Does it not have properties?


> > (Incidentally, I think it reasonable
> > to claim that knowledge is to some extent innate.)
>
> Give an example.

> I think all knowledge 8always* involves an object 'out there' and a
> knowing a subject 'in here'. So knowledge is *never* innate.  By
> suggesting this you are, amongst other sins, opening the door to every
> religious nutter who suggests he has innate knowledge of God.


Evolutionary adaptations and instincts can be regarded as forms of
knowledge.


> It is if it's done carefully, as with Kant and Schopenhauer. It's the
> difference between saying there's a dark continent, maybe, and mapping
> its edges.


The edges would surround what is known rather than what is not known,
so would tell you nothing about the latter.  Also, the edges round the
known must be constantly redrawn.


> > I think I have a wider notion of science than you. I would argue, for
> > instance, that subjectivity can be investigated using scientific
> > methods.
>
> Give an example.


Neuroscientists and psychologists often use psychophysical methods.  A
specific example might be synaesthesia  -- some clever tests have been
devised to corroborate the unusual experiences reported by
synaesthetes, and brain scans have provided further supportive
evidence.


> For something to be useful does it have to be true? Psychologists have
> found that optimists are happier, more productive, better paid, more
> successful with the opposite sex, etc,. etc, But they have less of a
> true understanding of their situation than their less successful
> pessimistic-realistic friends.
>
> Also, on average, the more fundamental religious types are happier and
> more optimistic than less religious types and atheists. According to
> latest research it seems to be *hope* that is the factor. I guess if
> you can brainwash yourself to believing that 72 virgins are waiting
> for you in paradise it's likely to generate hope. How do atheists
> generate hope when only the blackness awaits? Anyway, the point is,
> that fundies make more money, so religion seems eminently useful by
> the most materialistic standards. (Just look at the all the good jobs
> the Al Quida bombers had: doctors, engineers...)


I have suggested already that for the purposes of this discussion
'useful'  should mean something like 'aiding understanding'.  I agree
that religion can be 'useful' inasmuch as it can promote happiness.
William James argued (in his book 'Pragmatism')  that the appeal of
religious ideas comes more from what they promise than from what they
explain.


> As much as we can know. Imagine the whole world had been mapped out
> but there was a dark continent with unscalable cliffs. The map makers
> could say 'job done' without mapping the dark continent, and feel
> satisfaction at completing their task, as far as it was possible to
> complete it.


But you know nothing about what is not known,  so a metaphor about pie
in the sky might be just as appropriate.


> > This sounds more like an example of how theorising can lead to
> > hypothesis formulation and empirical inquiry.
>
> Yes, but it's metaphysical theorising.


Remember,  my question was:   'What use is a hypothesis which "posits
no observationally confirmable
entities, and produces no specific predictions"  ? ' .


Dave

On Jun 1, 10:21 pm, Dave Smith  wrote:
> On 1 Jun, 12:35, Paul Grieg  wrote:
>
> > I'm assuming that concept formation is part of empirical
> > investigation. Where else can you get concepts from? For instance, you
> > can't have the theory/concept 'all swans are white' without having
> > seen a swan (or, at least, enough bird like things).
>
> It seems to me that merely seeing birds is not sufficient to form a
> concept of swans --  more than that needs to take place in the brain/
> mind.

Certainly. To form an adequate conception of a swan you would need to
build it from other concepts - white, duck, bigger than... Of course
you would need a better concept than this to attend an ornithological
conference (but, to do that, I would have to have a better concept of
swans that I have, even though I see swans about once a week).

> I expect some things --  for example, snakes -- might be
> recognised and responded to without prior, directly relevant
> experience.

I partly agree.

I agree -- that recognition of long wiggly things, and a flight
repsonse to them,  could be hard wired into the mind/brain.

I disagree - in you using the word 'snake'. To recognise 'long wiggly
thing' as 'a snake' requires concept formation. That's what you do
when you label things, you bring them under concepts.

A toddler might say 'ran, wiggly!' And you might ask 'snake? worm?
garden hose?' Toddler might say 'wot snek?' Having never heard of or
seen pictures of a snake.

> > How can you think about a black hole? Only through the light that
> > surrounds it. It doesn't mean the black hole isn't there, or that you
> > can ignore it.
>
> Does it not have properties?

OK. I was using a partial metaphor here. Forget it has mass or spin
for the moment!

> > > (Incidentally, I think it reasonable
> > > to claim that knowledge is to some extent innate.)
>
> > Give an example.
> > I think all knowledge 8always* involves an object 'out there' and a
> > knowing a subject 'in here'. So knowledge is *never* innate.  By
> > suggesting this you are, amongst other sins, opening the door to every
> > religious nutter who suggests he has innate knowledge of God.
>
> Evolutionary adaptations and instincts can be regarded as forms of
> knowledge.

I think that broadens the concept of knowledge too far to be useful,
at least for this thread.

> > It is if it's done carefully, as with Kant and Schopenhauer. It's the
> > difference between saying there's a dark continent, maybe, and mapping
> > its edges.
>
> The edges would surround what is known rather than what is not known,
> so would tell you nothing about the latter.  Also, the edges round the
> known must be constantly redrawn.

Imagine the continent has a beach. The line between the water and the
beach is the line between the known and the unknown. The line between
the beach an dthe cliffs is between the unknown and the cannot be
known.

You can (quite) easily access the beach -- tide coves it (Netonian
sicence goes on apace) or the water erodes it (major shift Einstein ->
Newton). But the cliffs are stable you (never|?) need to redraw the
map.

> > > I think I have a wider notion of science than you. I would argue, for
> > > instance, that subjectivity can be investigated using scientific
> > > methods.
>
> > Give an example.
>
> Neuroscientists and psychologists often use psychophysical methods.  A
> specific example might be synaesthesia  -- some clever tests have been
> devised to corroborate the unusual experiences reported by
> synaesthetes, and brain scans have provided further supportive
> evidence.

I think I have a narrower conception of subjectivity than you, which
means my conception of science is at least as broad as yours.

The sound that a synsesthete sees is an object of perception, it is
not fundamentally subjective.

> I have suggested already that for the purposes of this discussion
> 'useful'  should mean something like 'aiding understanding'.

I'll try and stick to your definition of 'useful' if you try to stick
to my definition of knowledge and subjectivity :-)

> > As much as we can know. Imagine the whole world had been mapped out
> > but there was a dark continent with unscalable cliffs. The map makers
> > could say 'job done' without mapping the dark continent, and feel
> > satisfaction at completing their task, as far as it was possible to
> > complete it.
>
> But you know nothing about what is not known,  so a metaphor about pie
> in the sky might be just as appropriate.

You know some things -- that it is not known, that it might be known,
that it cannot ever be known.

To push my beach metaphor into dangerous waters, I might even say that
you better knowledge of what cannot ever be known than what you don't
know yet.

> > > This sounds more like an example of how theorising can lead to
> > > hypothesis formulation and empirical inquiry.
>
> > Yes, but it's metaphysical theorising.
>
> Remember,  my question was:   'What use is a hypothesis which "posits
> no observationally confirmable
> entities, and produces no specific predictions"  ? ' .

Hypothesis: All we know is what we observe, but there is likely to be
something beyond what we observe.

I accept this hypothesis, and I think it adds to my understanding
(i.e, is 'useful' -- see I remembered :-)

On 2 Jun, 13:11, Paul Grieg  wrote:
>
> Hypothesis: All we know is what we observe, but there is likely to be
> something beyond what we observe.
>
> I accept this hypothesis, and I think it adds to my understanding
> (i.e, is 'useful' -- see I remembered :-)


Isn't your hypothesis that there is likely to be 'something' that we
can never observe?  How does such a hypothesis  promote
understanding?  It seems to me that it can not be verified or refuted
and has no specifiable application.

On Jun 2, 11:21 pm, Dave Smith  wrote:
> On 2 Jun, 13:11, Paul Grieg  wrote:
>
>
>
> > Hypothesis: All we know is what we observe, but there is likely to be
> > something beyond what we observe.
>
> > I accept this hypothesis, and I think it adds to my understanding
> > (i.e, is 'useful' -- see I remembered :-)
>
> Isn't your hypothesis that there is likely to be 'something' that we
> can never observe?  How does such a hypothesis  promote
> understanding?

Actually I should have been stronger, it isn't *likely* that there is
something we can never observe. There *is* something that we can never
observe, i.e., that which is left when all observations are taken out
of the equation (the ultimate 'x' the unknown).

Note, we can know things about the unknown. Like, that it cannot be
observed. There are many others, check out the dozen or so weighty
books in the Kant-Schopenhauer-Magee axis.

So Kant's term 'noumenon' is probably better than 'unknown'.

> It seems to me that it can not be verified or refuted
> and has no specifiable application.

As it cannot be observed it cannot be verified or refuted in am
empirical manner. It 'verifies' itself by providing, for me, the most
consistent account of the universe in all aspects (empirical and non-
empirical).

You might prefer another account, but that would have to include
holding the universe to be *only* what you perceive or can perceive or
could have perceived, i.e., empiricism. But this has too many obvious
problems to hold seriously...

On 3 Jun, 11:54, Paul Grieg  wrote:
> On Jun 2, 11:21 pm, Dave Smith  wrote:
>
> > On 2 Jun, 13:11, Paul Grieg  wrote:
>
> > > Hypothesis: All we know is what we observe, but there is likely to be
> > > something beyond what we observe.
>
> > > I accept this hypothesis, and I think it adds to my understanding
> > > (i.e, is 'useful' -- see I remembered :-)
>
> > Isn't your hypothesis that there is likely to be 'something' that we
> > can never observe?  How does such a hypothesis  promote
> > understanding?
>
> Actually I should have been stronger, it isn't *likely* that there is
> something we can never observe. There *is* something that we can never
> observe, i.e., that which is left when all observations are taken out
> of the equation (the ultimate 'x' the unknown).
>
> Note, we can know things about the unknown. Like, that it cannot be
> observed. There are many others, check out the dozen or so weighty
> books in the Kant-Schopenhauer-Magee axis.
>
> So Kant's term 'noumenon' is probably better than 'unknown'.
>
> > It seems to me that it can not be verified or refuted
> > and has no specifiable application.
>
> As it cannot be observed it cannot be verified or refuted in am
> empirical manner. It 'verifies' itself by providing, for me, the most
> consistent account of the universe in all aspects (empirical and non-
> empirical).
>
> You might prefer another account, but that would have to include
> holding the universe to be *only* what you perceive or can perceive or
> could have perceived, i.e., empiricism. But this has too many obvious
> problems to hold seriously...


Surely science goes beyond perception in inferring forces, miniscule
particles and so forth?  Also, we all accept the reality of other
minds, though not at present observing them directly.  So it seems we
know more about the world than our senses tell us.  There's no way of
telling what theories will emerge in the future and how closely such
theories will correspond to 'things-in-themselves'.  Strictly
speaking, we will always have to deal with what appears to be the
case,  rather than what necessarily is the case  (forgive my
ignorance,  but wasn't this what Kant claimed?).

Would you mind providing an example of how pondering the noumenal
promotes understanding?  I'm going away for a couple of days, so
there's no rush.  :>)

Dave

On Jun 3, 10:55 pm, Dave Smith  wrote:
> On 3 Jun, 11:54, Paul Grieg  wrote:
>
>
>
> > On Jun 2, 11:21 pm, Dave Smith  wrote:
>
> > > On 2 Jun, 13:11, Paul Grieg  wrote:
>
> > > > Hypothesis: All we know is what we observe, but there is likely to be
> > > > something beyond what we observe.
>
> > > > I accept this hypothesis, and I think it adds to my understanding
> > > > (i.e, is 'useful' -- see I remembered :-)
>
> > > Isn't your hypothesis that there is likely to be 'something' that we
> > > can never observe?  How does such a hypothesis  promote
> > > understanding?
>
> > Actually I should have been stronger, it isn't *likely* that there is
> > something we can never observe. There *is* something that we can never
> > observe, i.e., that which is left when all observations are taken out
> > of the equation (the ultimate 'x' the unknown).
>
> > Note, we can know things about the unknown. Like, that it cannot be
> > observed. There are many others, check out the dozen or so weighty
> > books in the Kant-Schopenhauer-Magee axis.
>
> > So Kant's term 'noumenon' is probably better than 'unknown'.
>
> > > It seems to me that it can not be verified or refuted
> > > and has no specifiable application.
>
> > As it cannot be observed it cannot be verified or refuted in am
> > empirical manner. It 'verifies' itself by providing, for me, the most
> > consistent account of the universe in all aspects (empirical and non-
> > empirical).
>
> > You might prefer another account, but that would have to include
> > holding the universe to be *only* what you perceive or can perceive or
> > could have perceived, i.e., empiricism. But this has too many obvious
> > problems to hold seriously...
>
> Surely science goes beyond perception in inferring forces, miniscule
> particles and so forth?

But in 'going beyond perception' does it give us a greater grip on
reality?

The inferred forces do not give you any greater insight into reality
because they are just that, inferences. They are not actualities that
can be present to us. Newton's laws were just models of reality, not
reality, and were shown to be incorrect by Einstein. And Einstein also
just provided another model that may someday be superceded by one with
'go faster' stripes.

So, in fact, 'forces' do get us any further than perception. In a way
they are a backward step. Immediate perceptions are closer to reality
in that they are immediately present to our faculty of perception.
Then we have concepts (like planets or apples) which are further from
reality that the actual perceptions, something we make up in our
heads. And then (even further away from reality!) are Newton's
invisible forces at a distance, an abstraction built upon
abstractions. Really unreal!

Also, if planets and apples (and other gravitating objects) did not
exist then Newton's 'forces' would not exist. The reverse is not
necessarily true.

> Also, we all accept the reality of other
> minds, though not at present observing them directly.

Only as a hypothesis. We do not have as much certainty of the
existence of other minds as we have of our own. Have you had the
experience of seeing a really life-like manikin? I have. For a moment
I thought the beautiful girl had a mind like mine, and perhaps would
like me. I plucked up the courage to say hello. Then realised I was
about to talk to plastic. I slinked away slowly...

> know more about the world than our senses tell us.

Depends how loosely you define 'know'. I might say 'I know' you have
human mind like mine. But do I really? Maybe Google will announce that
the DSAI robot has been operating in newsgroups and fooling averyone
for the last few years.

I would susggest the strongest form of knowledge we have, apart from
the Cartesian cogito, is knowledge gained from perception. That only
has the right to be called 'the best' knowledge, after the cogito,
that we have and can have.

Anyway the argument appears to have turned round somewhat. i was
arguing that  we have 'knwoledge' of the noumenon earlier. Obviously I
must now add that this is not the same as empirical knowledge, just as
the knowledge I have that you have a mind is another kind of knowledge
again. Three kinds of knowledge? And more! (E.g., Newton's laws. A
fourth kind.) So what is knowledge, ultimately? What do all these
knowledges have in common that makes us want to call them all
'knowledge'.

> There's no way of
> telling what theories will emerge in the future and how closely such
> theories will correspond to 'things-in-themselves'.

How do you know there are things-in-themselves? Our capacity to pick
out individual objects does not mean that 'ultimately there are
individual noumenal objects. Maybe there is only a thing-in-itself.
Ooops but even here I'm picking out one object.

From another angle: as empirical perception involves individuation,
and we are abstracting out everything that applies to empirical
phenomena, all I can say is the the noumenon does not have the
property of multiplicity.

[This is difficult stuff, if it sound a bit mad note that Kant held
there were noumena, and Schopenhauer produced the argument against
multiplicity. So I agree with Schopenhauer. It's not just me who is
nuts :-)]

> Strictly
> speaking, we will always have to deal with what appears to be the
> case,  rather than what necessarily is the case  (forgive my
> ignorance,  but wasn't this what Kant claimed?).

I'm not enough of a Kant expert to say if he claimed this directly.
But I think it is certainly what his philosophy entails.

> Would you mind providing an example of how pondering the noumenal
> promotes understanding?  I'm going away for a couple of days, so
> there's no rush.  :>)

Read this thread again slowly. If you feel you now have a greater
understanding of reality then that is my example. If not, then it's
likely due to my quick, unpolished responses :-)

Note, I use newsgroups as a substitute for intelligent conversations
"without risk", where I can take the risk to go too far!. So don't
expect a considered response, it's (mostly) top of the head stuff, and
expect some outrageous (but honest!) responses.

It's always better to read something more considered to gain
understanding of a complex system like transcendental idealism. So I
would recommend reading Magee's 'Confessions of a Philosopher' to find
the examples you seek.

> paul

On 4 Jun, 12:02, Paul Grieg  wrote:
>
> But in 'going beyond perception' does it give us a greater grip on
> reality?
>
> The inferred forces do not give you any greater insight into reality
> because they are just that, inferences. They are not actualities that
> can be present to us. Newton's laws were just models of reality, not
> reality, and were shown to be incorrect by Einstein. And Einstein also
> just provided another model that may someday be superceded by one with
> 'go faster' stripes.
>
> So, in fact, 'forces' do get us any further than perception. In a way
> they are a backward step. Immediate perceptions are closer to reality
> in that they are immediately present to our faculty of perception.
> Then we have concepts (like planets or apples) which are further from
> reality that the actual perceptions, something we make up in our
> heads. And then (even further away from reality!) are Newton's
> invisible forces at a distance, an abstraction built upon
> abstractions. Really unreal!
>
> Also, if planets and apples (and other gravitating objects) did not
> exist then Newton's 'forces' would not exist. The reverse is not
> necessarily true.


Perceptions model the external world as well, and thinking of 'apples'
and 'planets' requires conceptualisation.  Abstract thought can be
more powerful than concrete thought -- no doubt that is why it
evolved.


> Only as a hypothesis. We do not have as much certainty of the
> existence of other minds as we have of our own. Have you had the
> experience of seeing a really life-like manikin? I have. For a moment
> I thought the beautiful girl had a mind like mine, and perhaps would
> like me. I plucked up the courage to say hello. Then realised I was
> about to talk to plastic. I slinked away slowly...


You had also formed the hypothesis that the manikin had a body like
yours in some respects,  which is why you assumed she had a mind like
yours in some respects.  (Incidentally, I was once shaken when a
figure I thought was a model suddenly 'came alive'.)


> Depends how loosely you define 'know'. I might say 'I know' you have
> human mind like mine. But do I really? Maybe Google will announce that
> the DSAI robot has been operating in newsgroups and fooling averyone
> for the last few years.


Maybe neuroscientists will devise ways of linking brains together, so
that one person can tap into another person's experiences........


> I would susggest the strongest form of knowledge we have, apart from
> the Cartesian cogito, is knowledge gained from perception. That only
> has the right to be called 'the best' knowledge, after the cogito,
> that we have and can have.


As I commented above, abstract thinking can be very useful for some
purposes.


> Anyway the argument appears to have turned round somewhat. i was
> arguing that  we have 'knwoledge' of the noumenon earlier. Obviously I
> must now add that this is not the same as empirical knowledge, just as
> the knowledge I have that you have a mind is another kind of knowledge
> again. Three kinds of knowledge? And more! (E.g., Newton's laws. A
> fourth kind.) So what is knowledge, ultimately? What do all these
> knowledges have in common that makes us want to call them all
> 'knowledge'.


They are 'justified true beliefs'  ?  (discussed in previous posts)


> How do you know there are things-in-themselves? Our capacity to pick
> out individual objects does not mean that 'ultimately there are
> individual noumenal objects. Maybe there is only a thing-in-itself.
> Ooops but even here I'm picking out one object.
>
> From another angle: as empirical perception involves individuation,
> and we are abstracting out everything that applies to empirical
> phenomena, all I can say is the the noumenon does not have the
> property of multiplicity.


Wholes can be regarded as having interacting parts (systems within
systems).


> It's always better to read something more considered to gain
> understanding of a complex system like transcendental idealism. So I
> would recommend reading Magee's 'Confessions of a Philosopher' to find
> the examples you seek.


I started reading it today and am greatly enjoying it.  I read
Magee's little book on Popper a  short while ago and was impressed by
that, too.

Dave

On Jun 6, 10:56 pm, Dave Smith  wrote:
> On 4 Jun, 12:02, Paul Grieg  wrote:
>
>
>
>
>
> > But in 'going beyond perception' does it give us a greater grip on
> > reality?
>
> > The inferred forces do not give you any greater insight into reality
> > because they are just that, inferences. They are not actualities that
> > can be present to us. Newton's laws were just models of reality, not
> > reality, and were shown to be incorrect by Einstein. And Einstein also
> > just provided another model that may someday be superceded by one with
> > 'go faster' stripes.
>
> > So, in fact, 'forces' do get us any further than perception. In a way
> > they are a backward step. Immediate perceptions are closer to reality
> > in that they are immediately present to our faculty of perception.
> > Then we have concepts (like planets or apples) which are further from
> > reality that the actual perceptions, something we make up in our
> > heads. And then (even further away from reality!) are Newton's
> > invisible forces at a distance, an abstraction built upon
> > abstractions. Really unreal!
>
> > Also, if planets and apples (and other gravitating objects) did not
> > exist then Newton's 'forces' would not exist. The reverse is not
> > necessarily true.
>
> Perceptions model the external world as well, and thinking of 'apples'
> and 'planets' requires conceptualisation.  Abstract thought can be
> more powerful than concrete thought -- no doubt that is why it
> evolved.

A waterfall is more powerful than still water, but you cannot have the
former without the latter. Abstract thought requires concrete thought.
In certain circumstances a particular abstract thought might be more
powerful than a particular concrete thought. So, the gravitational
force exerted by an average star (an abstract object) is greater than
that exerted by the apple in my kitchen. But that apple is 'more real'
than this average average star -- as ar the concrete stars form which
the average star was abstracted. So power (actual or explanatory) is
not fundamental, perceptions are.

> > Only as a hypothesis. We do not have as much certainty of the
> > existence of other minds as we have of our own. Have you had the
> > experience of seeing a really life-like manikin? I have. For a moment
> > I thought the beautiful girl had a mind like mine, and perhaps would
> > like me. I plucked up the courage to say hello. Then realised I was
> > about to talk to plastic. I slinked away slowly...
>
> You had also formed the hypothesis that the manikin had a body like
> yours in some respects,  which is why you assumed she had a mind like
> yours in some respects.  (Incidentally, I was once shaken when a
> figure I thought was a model suddenly 'came alive'.)

Yes I've had that as well! Attractive young women should not be
allowed to sit around in M & S. I wonder if they do it on purpose? :-)

> > Depends how loosely you define 'know'. I might say 'I know' you have
> > human mind like mine. But do I really? Maybe Google will announce that
> > the DSAI robot has been operating in newsgroups and fooling averyone
> > for the last few years.
>
> Maybe neuroscientists will devise ways of linking brains together, so
> that one person can tap into another person's experiences........

Would both brains still have their own motivations? Brain 1 might want
to go to the fair, and brain 2 to the cinema, even though they share
exactly the same experiences. Brain's 1 and 2 do have differences
though -- brain 1's store of experiences are physically closer to
brain 1's seat of consciousness. They are also stored in, brain 1! So
are they really 'the same' experiences to both brains?. By having
greater strength & closeness they are different. So brain 1 could
*never* have the same experiences as brain 2.

> > I would susggest the strongest form of knowledge we have, apart from
> > the Cartesian cogito, is knowledge gained from perception. That only
> > has the right to be called 'the best' knowledge, after the cogito,
> > that we have and can have.
>
> As I commented above, abstract thinking can be very useful for some
> purposes.

Yes but it's secondary knowledge, not the gold standard that
perceptions give you.

> > Anyway the argument appears to have turned round somewhat. i was
> > arguing that  we have 'knwoledge' of the noumenon earlier. Obviously I
> > must now add that this is not the same as empirical knowledge, just as
> > the knowledge I have that you have a mind is another kind of knowledge
> > again. Three kinds of knowledge? And more! (E.g., Newton's laws. A
> > fourth kind.) So what is knowledge, ultimately? What do all these
> > knowledges have in common that makes us want to call them all
> > 'knowledge'.
>
> They are 'justified true beliefs'  ?  (discussed in previous posts)

OK. But what makes one more  justified than another?

> > How do you know there are things-in-themselves? Our capacity to pick
> > out individual objects does not mean that 'ultimately there are
> > individual noumenal objects. Maybe there is only a thing-in-itself.
> > Ooops but even here I'm picking out one object.
>
> > From another angle: as empirical perception involves individuation,
> > and we are abstracting out everything that applies to empirical
> > phenomena, all I can say is the the noumenon does not have the
> > property of multiplicity.
>
> Wholes can be regarded as having interacting parts (systems within
> systems).

Only objects of perception can be divided into parts, or concepts
derived from objects of perception. By definition, the noumenom is not
such a beast. It cannot have parts.

> > It's always better to read something more considered to gain
> > understanding of a complex system like transcendental idealism. So I
> > would recommend reading Magee's 'Confessions of a Philosopher' to find
> > the examples you seek.
>
> I started reading it today and am greatly enjoying it.  I read
> Magee's little book on Popper a short while ago and was impressed by
> that, too.

I read his Popper book several decades ago, I must re-read it. I've
read his "Confessions" several times in the last decade (it's my
"touchstone" book). If you are tempted to read more about Schopenhauer
I'd recommend starting with Magee's "Schopenhauer". I'm re-reading it
at the moment.  After that you may feel like plunging into
Schopenhauer's work. I read his WWR a few years ago, and am planning
to re-read soon. Just recently I went through his FFRPSR online at:

http://www.archive.org/details/onthefourfoldroo00schouoft

On Jun 7, 12:58 pm, Paul Grieg  wrote:
>
>
> > They are 'justified true beliefs'  ?  (discussed in previous posts)
>
> OK. But what makes one more  justified than another?
>
The test is based on the evidence and accurate use of deductive logic
from them. A belief that is based on faulty evidence or arrived at by
faulty logic is less justified than one that is.
>
> Only objects of perception can be divided into parts, or concepts
> derived from objects of perception. By definition, the noumenom is not
> such a beast. It cannot have parts.
>
Understanding the noumenon is the object of our enquiry. Whether or
not it is particulate, or, indeed a 'beast', is part of that enquiry.
Only an aristotelian would presume to pontificate on its nature, for
example to declare that it is, or is not, particulate, without
evidence. The definition of the noumenon is as an object of our
investigation and such definition does not, cannot, and should not,
include any presumption.

On Jun 7, 3:55 pm, Peter Brooks  wrote:
> On Jun 7, 12:58 pm, Paul Grieg  wrote:
>
> > > They are 'justified true beliefs'  ?  (discussed in previous posts)
>
> > OK. But what makes one more  justified than another?
>
> The test is based on the evidence and accurate use of deductive logic
> from them. A belief that is based on faulty evidence or arrived at by
> faulty logic is less justified than one that is.

Yes. But there are, surely, levels of fault. For instance, Newton's
law of gravity is based on faulty evidence (or at least insufficient
evidence or evidence without the required precision).  But we
'believed in it' enough to send men to the moon. The evidence for JC's
resurrection is surely 'more faulty'.

> > Only objects of perception can be divided into parts, or concepts
> > derived from objects of perception. By definition, the noumenom is not
> > such a beast. It cannot have parts.
>
> Understanding the noumenon is the object of our enquiry. Whether or
> not it is particulate, or, indeed a 'beast', is part of that enquiry.
> Only an aristotelian would presume to pontificate on its nature, for
> example to declare that it is, or is not, particulate, without
> evidence. The definition of the noumenon is as an object of our
> investigation and such definition does not, cannot, and should not,
> include any presumption.

We cannot get any evidence about the noumenon, in Kant /
Schopenhauer's sense, because it is defined as being beyond empirical
investigation. For instance, if we take a 'red ball' we define the
noumenon as what's left when we take away redness, individuation,
spatiality, temporality, matter, and so on... You might say, 'then we
have nothing'. But we have only taken away what appears to us, and
it's rather hubristic of us to think that everything can be known by
us through our primate brain. That is, how would we know 'we have
nothing'?

So I'm saying the noumenon cannot be particulate because 'being
particulate' is how the object looks. We are trying to 'look' beyond
how the object looks :-)

I don't think I'm being Aristotelian, but my knowledge of Aristotle's
metaphysics is very limited. So if you can expand on that, I'd be
grateful.

- Paul

On Jun 7, 6:13 pm, Paul Grieg  wrote:
> On Jun 7, 3:55 pm, Peter Brooks  wrote:
>
> > On Jun 7, 12:58 pm, Paul Grieg  wrote:
>
> > > > They are 'justified true beliefs'  ?  (discussed in previous posts)
>
> > > OK. But what makes one more  justified than another?
>
> > The test is based on the evidence and accurate use of deductive logic
> > from them. A belief that is based on faulty evidence or arrived at by
> > faulty logic is less justified than one that is.
>
> Yes. But there are, surely, levels of fault. For instance, Newton's
> law of gravity is based on faulty evidence (or at least insufficient
> evidence or evidence without the required precision).  But we
> 'believed in it' enough to send men to the moon. The evidence for JC's
> resurrection is surely 'more faulty'.
>
Our evidence is always faulty. My point was just the one you expand
on. Jesus Christ, get a grip, that was my point!
>
> > > Only objects of perception can be divided into parts, or concepts
> > > derived from objects of perception. By definition, the noumenom is not> > > such a beast. It cannot have parts.
>
> > Understanding the noumenon is the object of our enquiry. Whether or
> > not it is particulate, or, indeed a 'beast', is part of that enquiry.
> > Only an aristotelian would presume to pontificate on its nature, for
> > example to declare that it is, or is not, particulate, without
> > evidence. The definition of the noumenon is as an object of our
> > investigation and such definition does not, cannot, and should not,
> > include any presumption.
>
> We cannot get any evidence about the noumenon, in Kant /
> Schopenhauer's sense, because it is defined as being beyond empirical
> investigation. For instance, if we take a 'red ball' we define the
> noumenon as what's left when we take away redness, individuation,
> spa