The Philosophy of Pain

Scientific ethics dealing with experimentation is dominated by the
need to minimize or avoiding inflicting pain on animals or humans.

The pain is conscious pain. Peter Asbhy has suggested in a new
scientist letter that the experience of pain requires a brain – so
apparent suffering when an animal only has a spinal cord doesn’t
count.

Conscious pain means that suffering when a person or animal is
unconscious doesn’t count. I can remember watching my grandmother on
her deathbed. She was unconscious but seemed to be in great pain.
Still if she was unconscious that doesn’t count.

Pain has to be immediately experienced, not remembered, in order to be
minimized. Since our human experience of time is a tensed one, an
experience of living in a short now, it is the pain experienced in the
short now that counts. Still for learning and for an impact on
character pain has to be remembered. Daniel Kahneman has discovered
that remembered pain differs from experienced pain in a number of
ways. The absolute magnitude of the pain (a difficult concept) seems
less important that the change in pain when one remembers pain. So a
surgeon who deliberately inflicts more pain in order that the
reduction of pain is greater when he applies an anaesthetic will
produce a better memory than a surgeon who inflicts less pain but
where the reduction in pain is smaller when an anaesthetic is
applied.

Some questions. Is the ethical imperative to minimize pain a last
bastion of dualism? For example, why do we worry less about the sort
of pain my grandmother was so obviously experiencing just because she
was unconscious? Clearly the pain areas of her brain were working even
if she was not conscious. So, given that the physical realization of
pain was present, why the emphasis on consciousness if not for
dualistic reasons?

What is the relation between pain and memory? Should we concentrate
only on the immediate experience or should we also be concerned with
the longer impact of the pain as it endures in memory? If we must
focus only on the immediate experience of pain, is that also a
decision motivated by dualistic concerns?

Lance

On Jan 17, 3:57 pm, Lance  wrote:
> The Philosophy of Pain
>
> Scientific ethics dealing with experimentation is dominated by the
> need to minimize or avoiding inflicting pain on animals or humans.
>
> The pain is conscious pain. Peter Asbhy has suggested in a new
> scientist letter that the experience of pain requires a brain - so
> apparent suffering when an animal only has a spinal cord doesn't
> count.
>
> Conscious pain means that suffering when a person or animal is
> unconscious doesn't count. I can remember watching my grandmother on
> her deathbed. She was unconscious but seemed to be in great pain.
> Still if she was unconscious that doesn't count.
>
> Pain has to be immediately experienced, not remembered, in order to be
> minimized. Since our human experience of time is a tensed one, an
> experience of living in a short now, it is the pain experienced in the
> short now that counts. Still for learning and for an impact on
> character pain has to be remembered. Daniel Kahneman has discovered
> that remembered pain differs from experienced pain in a number of
> ways. The absolute magnitude of the pain (a difficult concept) seems
> less important that the change in pain when one remembers pain. So a
> surgeon who deliberately inflicts more pain in order that the
> reduction of pain is greater when he applies an anaesthetic will
> produce a better memory than a surgeon who inflicts less pain but
> where the reduction in pain is smaller when an anaesthetic is
> applied.
>
> Some questions. Is the ethical imperative to minimize pain a last
> bastion of dualism? For example, why do we worry less about the sort
> of pain my grandmother was so obviously experiencing just because she
> was unconscious? Clearly the pain areas of her brain were working even
> if she was not conscious. So, given that the physical realization of
> pain was present, why the emphasis on consciousness if not for
> dualistic reasons?
>
> What is the relation between pain and memory? Should we concentrate
> only on the immediate experience or should we also be concerned with
> the longer impact of the pain as it endures in memory? If we must
> focus only on the immediate experience of pain, is that also a
> decision motivated by dualistic concerns?
>
> Lance

I should have included it though it is clear from the context. the
concern over minimizing pain in execution (with suprem,e courts
stopping executions for fear that they are painful) also seems to be
related to dualism. The conscious experience of pain is being given
greater weight that a person's physical life. How can such a view
possibly be justified except dualistically?

Lance

Lance wrote:
>
>
> I should have included it though it is clear from the context. the
> concern over minimizing pain in execution (with suprem,e courts
> stopping executions for fear that they are painful) also seems to be
> related to dualism. The conscious experience of pain is being given
> greater weight that a person's physical life. How can such a view
> possibly be justified except dualistically?
>
I'm not sure if it is simply dualism. I think that there is a certain
amount of sentiment, or, if you prefer, emotion, attached to final
things.

The end of term, the end of the holidays, the end of your school
years, the death of friends and relatives, the end of a friendship or
love affair. All these changes are, understandably frightening, or, at
least, likely to give rise to some anxiety. So we invest more meaning
in these last times - there are often rituals to go with them.

The end of life is all of these, only more so. So the notion of the
final moments of your life being an experience of pain and cold,
judicial hatred is a pretty horrific one, particularly as death is
feared even in happy, comfortable and painless situations. If it
happened to me that I was to find myself not only alone, but the
object of murderous hatred by, apparently, the world, I think it'd be
enough to turn me into a solipsist.

So I think that the concern is an understandable and rational response
to the empathy that normal human beings feel towards a victim of such
a process. Death comes to us all, but a deliberate, planned,
intentionally undignified and painful one only to victims of murder,
judicial or otherwise.

I don't think any of this requires dualism.

On 17 Jan, 13:57, Lance  wrote:
> The Philosophy of Pain
>
> Scientific ethics dealing with experimentation is dominated by the
> need to minimize or avoiding inflicting pain on animals or humans.
>
> The pain is conscious pain. Peter Asbhy has suggested in a new
> scientist letter that the experience of pain requires a brain - so
> apparent suffering when an animal only has a spinal cord doesn't
> count.
>
> Conscious pain means that suffering when a person or animal is
> unconscious doesn't count. I can remember watching my grandmother on
> her deathbed. She was unconscious but seemed to be in great pain.
> Still if she was unconscious that doesn't count.
>
> Pain has to be immediately experienced, not remembered, in order to be
> minimized. Since our human experience of time is a tensed one, an
> experience of living in a short now, it is the pain experienced in the
> short now that counts. Still for learning and for an impact on
> character pain has to be remembered. Daniel Kahneman has discovered
> that remembered pain differs from experienced pain in a number of
> ways. The absolute magnitude of the pain (a difficult concept) seems
> less important that the change in pain when one remembers pain. So a
> surgeon who deliberately inflicts more pain in order that the
> reduction of pain is greater when he applies an anaesthetic will
> produce a better memory than a surgeon who inflicts less pain but
> where the reduction in pain is smaller when an anaesthetic is
> applied.
>
> Some questions. Is the ethical imperative to minimize pain a last
> bastion of dualism? For example, why do we worry less about the sort
> of pain my grandmother was so obviously experiencing just because she
> was unconscious? Clearly the pain areas of her brain were working even
> if she was not conscious. So, given that the physical realization of
> pain was present, why the emphasis on consciousness if not for
> dualistic reasons?
>
> What is the relation between pain and memory? Should we concentrate
> only on the immediate experience or should we also be concerned with
> the longer impact of the pain as it endures in memory? If we must
> focus only on the immediate experience of pain, is that also a
> decision motivated by dualistic concerns?
>
> Lance


I think ethics is more concerned with suffering than with pain.
Anticipation of pain, remembering pain and witnessing the pain of
others cause unpleasant emotions, but not (at least to the same
extent)  pain sensations.  I have read that brain scans and other
studies of brain activity indicate that to some extent different areas
of the brain are involved in pain sensation and pain affect. Damasio
argues that pain is a feeling and therefore entails consciousness.
Certainly, it doesn't seem to make much sense to say that a person is
in pain but doesn't feel it.  Hopefully, in your example, your
grandmother appeared to be in pain but wasn't.  I think, taking a dual
aspect point of view, it would depend on which areas of her brain were
active at the time.

Dave

On Jan 17, 9:54 pm, Peter Brooks  wrote:
> Lance wrote:
>
> > I should have included it though it is clear from the context. the
> > concern over minimizing pain in execution (with suprem,e courts
> > stopping executions for fear that they are painful) also seems to be
> > related to dualism. The conscious experience of pain is being given
> > greater weight that a person's physical life. How can such a view
> > possibly be justified except dualistically?
>
> I'm not sure if it is simply dualism. I think that there is a certain
> amount of sentiment, or, if you prefer, emotion, attached to final
> things.
>
> The end of term, the end of the holidays, the end of your school
> years, the death of friends and relatives, the end of a friendship or
> love affair. All these changes are, understandably frightening, or, at
> least, likely to give rise to some anxiety. So we invest more meaning
> in these last times - there are often rituals to go with them.
>
> The end of life is all of these, only more so. So the notion of the
> final moments of your life being an experience of pain and cold,
> judicial hatred is a pretty horrific one, particularly as death is
> feared even in happy, comfortable and painless situations. If it
> happened to me that I was to find myself not only alone, but the
> object of murderous hatred by, apparently, the world, I think it'd be
> enough to turn me into a solipsist.
>
> So I think that the concern is an understandable and rational response
> to the empathy that normal human beings feel towards a victim of such
> a process. Death comes to us all, but a deliberate, planned,
> intentionally undignified and painful one only to victims of murder,
> judicial or otherwise.
>
> I don't think any of this requires dualism.

We happily take the lives of animals (cattle pigs etc) but insist that
their pain and suffering be minimized. So we regard pain and suffering
as more important than life. That seems a little dualistic to me.

Lance

On Jan 18, 1:53 am, Dave Smith  wrote:
> On 17 Jan, 13:57, Lance  wrote:
>
>
>
>
>
> > The Philosophy of Pain
>
> > Scientific ethics dealing with experimentation is dominated by the
> > need to minimize or avoiding inflicting pain on animals or humans.
>
> > The pain is conscious pain. Peter Asbhy has suggested in a new
> > scientist letter that the experience of pain requires a brain - so
> > apparent suffering when an animal only has a spinal cord doesn't
> > count.
>
> > Conscious pain means that suffering when a person or animal is
> > unconscious doesn't count. I can remember watching my grandmother on
> > her deathbed. She was unconscious but seemed to be in great pain.
> > Still if she was unconscious that doesn't count.
>
> > Pain has to be immediately experienced, not remembered, in order to be
> > minimized. Since our human experience of time is a tensed one, an
> > experience of living in a short now, it is the pain experienced in the
> > short now that counts. Still for learning and for an impact on
> > character pain has to be remembered. Daniel Kahneman has discovered
> > that remembered pain differs from experienced pain in a number of
> > ways. The absolute magnitude of the pain (a difficult concept) seems
> > less important that the change in pain when one remembers pain. So a
> > surgeon who deliberately inflicts more pain in order that the
> > reduction of pain is greater when he applies an anaesthetic will
> > produce a better memory than a surgeon who inflicts less pain but
> > where the reduction in pain is smaller when an anaesthetic is
> > applied.
>
> > Some questions. Is the ethical imperative to minimize pain a last
> > bastion of dualism? For example, why do we worry less about the sort
> > of pain my grandmother was so obviously experiencing just because she
> > was unconscious? Clearly the pain areas of her brain were working even
> > if she was not conscious. So, given that the physical realization of
> > pain was present, why the emphasis on consciousness if not for
> > dualistic reasons?
>
> > What is the relation between pain and memory? Should we concentrate
> > only on the immediate experience or should we also be concerned with
> > the longer impact of the pain as it endures in memory? If we must
> > focus only on the immediate experience of pain, is that also a
> > decision motivated by dualistic concerns?
>
> > Lance
>
> I think ethics is more concerned with suffering than with pain.
> Anticipation of pain, remembering pain and witnessing the pain of
> others cause unpleasant emotions, but not (at least to the same
> extent)  pain sensations.  I have read that brain scans and other
> studies of brain activity indicate that to some extent different areas
> of the brain are involved in pain sensation and pain affect. Damasio
> argues that pain is a feeling and therefore entails consciousness.
> Certainly, it doesn't seem to make much sense to say that a person is
> in pain but doesn't feel it.  Hopefully, in your example, your
> grandmother appeared to be in pain but wasn't.  I think, taking a dual
> aspect point of view, it would depend on which areas of her brain were
> active at the time.
>
> Dave- Hide quoted text -
>
> - Show quoted text -


"Damasio argues that pain is a feeling and therefore entails
consciousness."

I am not sure. Much research now shows that some visual syimuli are
processed in the brain but are never made consious. Ditto for sound,
and the other modalities.

Pain is not a simple sensation with no meaning (qualia). I am not sure
that such a thing as qualia actually exists. Pain has meaning - it
tells about the type injury, the location of the injury, etc., and it
has powerful motivational properties. So I think pain is not different
from sight and hearing and the like. It is a mode of perception.

I am certain that my grandmother is not unique. Go watch the patients
in a cancer ward - even those most heavily sedated are often in
obvious pain. So just as sight can be processed when one is not
conscious I think pain can be processed when one is not conscious.

This leads me back to the point. I seems dualistic to me to worry
about pain, but only the conscious moment of pain, not the existence
of pain. I think suffering as a broader category than pain increases
this problem, rather than diminishes it.

Lance

Lance wrote:
> 
> 
> We happily take the lives of animals (cattle pigs etc) but insist that
> their pain and suffering be minimized. So we regard pain and suffering
> as more important than life. That seems a little dualistic to me.
> 
I'm not sure that that follows. We kill animals in order to eat them, we 
have no desire to cause them pain or discomfort.

I don't see a contradiction or difficulty here. If we were able to grow 
meat in vats, without skin, bones, nerves and the rest, cheaply, I'm 
sure that we'd be happy to do it. There'd be less wastage and the end 
result could be nicer. There'd be no sentient being destroyed or in pain.

We don't have the technology to do that, so we use animals instead. I 
think being against unreasonable cruelty is perfectly sound, despite 
eating them.

The Koreans are sensitive about eating dogs - when I was there there was 
a case where the owner of an expensive, pedigreed rare breed of dog was 
suing his neighbours for the cost after they'd eaten his dog, and my 
hosts weren't that keen to talk about it. I see nothing wrong with 
eating dogs, if they are your dogs.

However, I do see things wrong with being cruel to dogs. Apparently dog 
meat can taste much better if the animals are garrotted to death slowly 
in great agony. I think that it would be quite wrong to eat meat that 
has been produced in that way. Dogs are sentient beings and we should 
not cause suffering to such beings if we can avoid it.

It isn't a matter of it being 'more important'. The lives of domestic 
animals, brief as they might be, are only there because we breed them - 
in many cases to eat them or to get other products from their bodies. So 
their lives are important to us. If we couldn't eat or otherwise use 
them, they wouldn't exist at all.

I'm not sure where dualism comes into this.

Lance wrote:
> 
> 
> This leads me back to the point. I seems dualistic to me to worry
> about pain, but only the conscious moment of pain, not the existence
> of pain. I think suffering as a broader category than pain increases
> this problem, rather than diminishes it.
> 
Maybe I'm not understanding the problem that you're seeing here.

Suffering is perfectly possible without pain and it is also perfectly 
possible to be in pain and not suffer, so I agree, suffering doesn't 
help in the discussion.

Our concern, in the matter of somebody being in pain, is twofold, as you 
say.

- Concern about physical damage that is signalled by the pain
- Concern for the discomfort that the pain gives to the victim

As medicine has improved the two are more and more distant from each 
other. The physical damage is treated as required, so all that is left 
is the problem of pain for the victim.

Opiates have, for centuries, been the treatment of choice for pain, 
despite their addictive qualities. Opiates do not interfere with pain at 
all, the pain remains. What they do is remove the perception of the pain 
to the person as unpleasant.

I think that pain probably consists of two qualia. The quale of extreme 
sensation, and the quale of unpleasant sensation. The two qualia usually 
occur together, but often not. Hot chillies affect the pain receptors in 
the mouth and, to somebody unaccustomed to them, produce both qualia, to 
somebody who likes them, the second quale is missing (I know this is 
complicated by the opiate nature of endorphins, but I don't think by much).

Things like nerve blocks or electrical stimulation operate in similar 
ways, they don't stop the pain, but they stop it impinging consciously 
as an unpleasant sensation - in this case by stopping the signal 
reaching the brain.

On 18 Jan, 09:04, Lance  wrote:
> On Jan 18, 1:53 am, Dave Smith  wrote:
>
>
>
>
>
> > On 17 Jan, 13:57, Lance  wrote:
>
> > > The Philosophy of Pain
>
> > > Scientific ethics dealing with experimentation is dominated by the
> > > need to minimize or avoiding inflicting pain on animals or humans.
>
> > > The pain is conscious pain. Peter Asbhy has suggested in a new
> > > scientist letter that the experience of pain requires a brain - so
> > > apparent suffering when an animal only has a spinal cord doesn't
> > > count.
>
> > > Conscious pain means that suffering when a person or animal is
> > > unconscious doesn't count. I can remember watching my grandmother on
> > > her deathbed. She was unconscious but seemed to be in great pain.
> > > Still if she was unconscious that doesn't count.
>
> > > Pain has to be immediately experienced, not remembered, in order to be> > > minimized. Since our human experience of time is a tensed one, an
> > > experience of living in a short now, it is the pain experienced in the> > > short now that counts. Still for learning and for an impact on
> > > character pain has to be remembered. Daniel Kahneman has discovered
> > > that remembered pain differs from experienced pain in a number of
> > > ways. The absolute magnitude of the pain (a difficult concept) seems
> > > less important that the change in pain when one remembers pain. So a
> > > surgeon who deliberately inflicts more pain in order that the
> > > reduction of pain is greater when he applies an anaesthetic will
> > > produce a better memory than a surgeon who inflicts less pain but
> > > where the reduction in pain is smaller when an anaesthetic is
> > > applied.
>
> > > Some questions. Is the ethical imperative to minimize pain a last
> > > bastion of dualism? For example, why do we worry less about the sort
> > > of pain my grandmother was so obviously experiencing just because she
> > > was unconscious? Clearly the pain areas of her brain were working even> > > if she was not conscious. So, given that the physical realization of
> > > pain was present, why the emphasis on consciousness if not for
> > > dualistic reasons?
>
> > > What is the relation between pain and memory? Should we concentrate
> > > only on the immediate experience or should we also be concerned with
> > > the longer impact of the pain as it endures in memory? If we must
> > > focus only on the immediate experience of pain, is that also a
> > > decision motivated by dualistic concerns?
>
> > > Lance
>
> > I think ethics is more concerned with suffering than with pain.
> > Anticipation of pain, remembering pain and witnessing the pain of
> > others cause unpleasant emotions, but not (at least to the same
> > extent)  pain sensations.  I have read that brain scans and other
> > studies of brain activity indicate that to some extent different areas
> > of the brain are involved in pain sensation and pain affect. Damasio
> > argues that pain is a feeling and therefore entails consciousness.
> > Certainly, it doesn't seem to make much sense to say that a person is
> > in pain but doesn't feel it.  Hopefully, in your example, your
> > grandmother appeared to be in pain but wasn't.  I think, taking a dual> > aspect point of view, it would depend on which areas of her brain were
> > active at the time.
>
> > Dave- Hide quoted text -
>
> > - Show quoted text -
>
> "Damasio argues that pain is a feeling and therefore entails
> consciousness."
>
> I am not sure. Much research now shows that some visual syimuli are
> processed in the brain but are never made consious. Ditto for sound,
> and the other modalities.
>
> Pain is not a simple sensation with no meaning (qualia). I am not sure
> that such a thing as qualia actually exists. Pain has meaning - it
> tells about the type injury, the location of the injury, etc., and it
> has powerful motivational properties. So I think pain is not different
> from sight and hearing and the like. It is a mode of perception.
>
> I am certain that my grandmother is not unique. Go watch the patients
> in a cancer ward - even those most heavily sedated are often in
> obvious pain. So just as sight can be processed when one is not
> conscious I think pain can be processed when one is not conscious.
>
> This leads me back to the point. I seems dualistic to me to worry
> about pain, but only the conscious moment of pain, not the existence
> of pain. I think suffering as a broader category than pain increases
> this problem, rather than diminishes it.
>
> Lance- Hide quoted text -
>
> - Show quoted text -

I'm not clear what type of dualism  you are trying to avoid,  nor how
you would define pain except as a subjective experience.

Dave

Dave Smith wrote:
> 
> 
> I'm not clear what type of dualism  you are trying to avoid,  nor how
> you would define pain except as a subjective experience.
> 
I think we can know quite a bit about it objectively even though it is a 
subjective experience.

Dave Smith wrote:
> On 18 Jan, 09:04, Lance  wrote:
> > On Jan 18, 1:53�am, Dave Smith  wrote:
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > > On 17 Jan, 13:57, Lance  wrote:
> >
> > > > The Philosophy of Pain
> >
> > > > Scientific ethics dealing with experimentation is dominated by the
> > > > need to minimize or avoiding inflicting pain on animals or humans.
> >
> > > > The pain is conscious pain. Peter Asbhy has suggested in a new
> > > > scientist letter that the experience of pain requires a brain - so
> > > > apparent suffering when an animal only has a spinal cord doesn't
> > > > count.
> >
> > > > Conscious pain means that suffering when a person or animal is
> > > > unconscious doesn't count. I can remember watching my grandmother on> > > > her deathbed. She was unconscious but seemed to be in great pain.
> > > > Still if she was unconscious that doesn't count.
> >
> > > > Pain has to be immediately experienced, not remembered, in order to be
> > > > minimized. Since our human experience of time is a tensed one, an
> > > > experience of living in a short now, it is the pain experienced in the
> > > > short now that counts. Still for learning and for an impact on
> > > > character pain has to be remembered. Daniel Kahneman has discovered
> > > > that remembered pain differs from experienced pain in a number of
> > > > ways. The absolute magnitude of the pain (a difficult concept) seems> > > > less important that the change in pain when one remembers pain. So a> > > > surgeon who deliberately inflicts more pain in order that the
> > > > reduction of pain is greater when he applies an anaesthetic will
> > > > produce a better memory than a surgeon who inflicts less pain but
> > > > where the reduction in pain is smaller when an anaesthetic is
> > > > applied.
> >
> > > > Some questions. Is the ethical imperative to minimize pain a last
> > > > bastion of dualism? For example, why do we worry less about the sort> > > > of pain my grandmother was so obviously experiencing just because she
> > > > was unconscious? Clearly the pain areas of her brain were working even
> > > > if she was not conscious. So, given that the physical realization of> > > > pain was present, why the emphasis on consciousness if not for
> > > > dualistic reasons?
> >
> > > > What is the relation between pain and memory? Should we concentrate
> > > > only on the immediate experience or should we also be concerned with> > > > the longer impact of the pain as it endures in memory? If we must
> > > > focus only on the immediate experience of pain, is that also a
> > > > decision motivated by dualistic concerns?
> >
> > > > Lance
> >
> > > I think ethics is more concerned with suffering than with pain.
> > > Anticipation of pain, remembering pain and witnessing the pain of
> > > others cause unpleasant emotions, but not (at least to the same
> > > extent) �pain sensations. �I have read that brain scans and other
> > > studies of brain activity indicate that to some extent different areas> > > of the brain are involved in pain sensation and pain affect. Damasio
> > > argues that pain is a feeling and therefore entails consciousness.
> > > Certainly, it doesn't seem to make much sense to say that a person is
> > > in pain but doesn't feel it. �Hopefully, in your example, your> > > grandmother appeared to be in pain but wasn't. �I think, taking a dual
> > > aspect point of view, it would depend on which areas of her brain were> > > active at the time.
> >
> > > Dave- Hide quoted text -
> >
> > > - Show quoted text -
> >
> > "Damasio argues that pain is a feeling and therefore entails
> > consciousness."
> >
> > I am not sure. Much research now shows that some visual syimuli are
> > processed in the brain but are never made consious. Ditto for sound,
> > and the other modalities.
> >
> > Pain is not a simple sensation with no meaning (qualia). I am not sure
> > that such a thing as qualia actually exists. Pain has meaning - it
> > tells about the type injury, the location of the injury, etc., and it
> > has powerful motivational properties. So I think pain is not different
> > from sight and hearing and the like. It is a mode of perception.
> >
> > I am certain that my grandmother is not unique. Go watch the patients
> > in a cancer ward - even those most heavily sedated are often in
> > obvious pain. So just as sight can be processed when one is not
> > conscious I think pain can be processed when one is not conscious.
> >
> > This leads me back to the point. I seems dualistic to me to worry
> > about pain, but only the conscious moment of pain, not the existence
> > of pain. I think suffering as a broader category than pain increases
> > this problem, rather than diminishes it.
> >
> > Lance- Hide quoted text -
> >
> > - Show quoted text -
>
> I'm not clear what type of dualism  you are trying to avoid,  nor how
> you would define pain except as a subjective experience.
>
> Dave

Strange - the above seems absolutely dualistic to me.

There is a long discussion in Wittgenstein on this issue arguing
against your position.

I am certain that there are neural responses and structures that would
give a more than adequate understanding of pain without reference to
subjective experience.

The possibility of blind sight and of subliminal perception shows that
perception need not be tied to subjectivity.

Lance

Peter H.M.Brooks wrote:
> Dave Smith wrote:
> >
> >
> > I'm not clear what type of dualism  you are trying to avoid,  nor how
> > you would define pain except as a subjective experience.
> >
> I think we can know quite a bit about it objectively even though it is a
> subjective experience.

Well I agree with the first part.

But it seems to me the latter is a mistake. Pain mostly is, but need
not only be an experience. The word "subjective" suggests that it is
priveledged in some way, so that only a person experiencing it can
know it. But I think that is misleading.

Lance

On Jan 19, 11:53 am, Lance  wrote:
> Peter H.M.Brooks wrote:
> > Dave Smith wrote:
>
> > > I'm not clear what type of dualism  you are trying to avoid,  nor how
> > > you would define pain except as a subjective experience.
>
> > I think we can know quite a bit about it objectively even though it is a
> > subjective experience.
>
> Well I agree with the first part.
>
> But it seems to me the latter is a mistake. Pain mostly is, but need
> not only be an experience. The word "subjective" suggests that it is
> priveledged in some way, so that only a person experiencing it can
> know it. But I think that is misleading.
>
Does 'subjective' imply that? I didn't think so. That would mean that,
if somebody was able, through, prose, poetry, painting and so forth to
convey his subjective experience it would cease to be subjective,
retrospectively, the moment he succeeded. That doesn't seem sensible
to me.

On 19 Jan, 05:01, "Peter H.M.Brooks"  wrote:
> Dave Smith wrote:
>
> > I'm not clear what type of dualism  you are trying to avoid,  nor how
> > you would define pain except as a subjective experience.
>
> I think we can know quite a bit about it objectively even though it is a
> subjective experience.

Yes, all about it, except what it feels like.

Dave

On 19 Jan, 09:50, Lance  wrote:
> Dave Smith wrote:
> > On 18 Jan, 09:04, Lance  wrote:
> > > On Jan 18, 1:53�am, Dave Smith  wrote:
>
> > > > On 17 Jan, 13:57, Lance  wrote:
>
> > > > > The Philosophy of Pain
>
> > > > > Scientific ethics dealing with experimentation is dominated by the> > > > > need to minimize or avoiding inflicting pain on animals or humans.> > > > > The pain is conscious pain. Peter Asbhy has suggested in a new
> > > > > scientist letter that the experience of pain requires a brain - so> > > > > apparent suffering when an animal only has a spinal cord doesn't
> > > > > count.
>
> > > > > Conscious pain means that suffering when a person or animal is
> > > > > unconscious doesn't count. I can remember watching my grandmother on
> > > > > her deathbed. She was unconscious but seemed to be in great pain.
> > > > > Still if she was unconscious that doesn't count.
>
> > > > > Pain has to be immediately experienced, not remembered, in order to be
> > > > > minimized. Since our human experience of time is a tensed one, an
> > > > > experience of living in a short now, it is the pain experienced in the
> > > > > short now that counts. Still for learning and for an impact on
> > > > > character pain has to be remembered. Daniel Kahneman has discovered
> > > > > that remembered pain differs from experienced pain in a number of
> > > > > ways. The absolute magnitude of the pain (a difficult concept) seems
> > > > > less important that the change in pain when one remembers pain. So a
> > > > > surgeon who deliberately inflicts more pain in order that the
> > > > > reduction of pain is greater when he applies an anaesthetic will
> > > > > produce a better memory than a surgeon who inflicts less pain but
> > > > > where the reduction in pain is smaller when an anaesthetic is
> > > > > applied.
>
> > > > > Some questions. Is the ethical imperative to minimize pain a last
> > > > > bastion of dualism? For example, why do we worry less about the sort
> > > > > of pain my grandmother was so obviously experiencing just because she
> > > > > was unconscious? Clearly the pain areas of her brain were working even
> > > > > if she was not conscious. So, given that the physical realization of
> > > > > pain was present, why the emphasis on consciousness if not for
> > > > > dualistic reasons?
>
> > > > > What is the relation between pain and memory? Should we concentrate
> > > > > only on the immediate experience or should we also be concerned with
> > > > > the longer impact of the pain as it endures in memory? If we must
> > > > > focus only on the immediate experience of pain, is that also a
> > > > > decision motivated by dualistic concerns?
>
> > > > > Lance
>
> > > > I think ethics is more concerned with suffering than with pain.
> > > > Anticipation of pain, remembering pain and witnessing the pain of
> > > > others cause unpleasant emotions, but not (at least to the same
> > > > extent) �pain sensations. �I have read that brain scans and other
> > > > studies of brain activity indicate that to some extent different areas
> > > > of the brain are involved in pain sensation and pain affect. Damasio> > > > argues that pain is a feeling and therefore entails consciousness.
> > > > Certainly, it doesn't seem to make much sense to say that a person is
> > > > in pain but doesn't feel it. �Hopefully, in your example, your
> > > > grandmother appeared to be in pain but wasn't. �I think, taking a dual
> > > > aspect point of view, it would depend on which areas of her brain were
> > > > active at the time.
>
> > > > Dave- Hide quoted text -
>
> > > > - Show quoted text -
>
> > > "Damasio argues that pain is a feeling and therefore entails
> > > consciousness."
>
> > > I am not sure. Much research now shows that some visual syimuli are
> > > processed in the brain but are never made consious. Ditto for sound,
> > > and the other modalities.
>
> > > Pain is not a simple sensation with no meaning (qualia). I am not sure> > > that such a thing as qualia actually exists. Pain has meaning - it
> > > tells about the type injury, the location of the injury, etc., and it
> > > has powerful motivational properties. So I think pain is not different> > > from sight and hearing and the like. It is a mode of perception.
>
> > > I am certain that my grandmother is not unique. Go watch the patients
> > > in a cancer ward - even those most heavily sedated are often in
> > > obvious pain. So just as sight can be processed when one is not
> > > conscious I think pain can be processed when one is not conscious.
>
> > > This leads me back to the point. I seems dualistic to me to worry
> > > about pain, but only the conscious moment of pain, not the existence
> > > of pain. I think suffering as a broader category than pain increases
> > > this problem, rather than diminishes it.
>
> > > Lance- Hide quoted text -
>
> > > - Show quoted text -
>
> > I'm not clear what type of dualism  you are trying to avoid,  nor how
> > you would define pain except as a subjective experience.
>
> > Dave
>
> Strange - the above seems absolutely dualistic to me.
>
> There is a long discussion in Wittgenstein on this issue arguing
> against your position.
>
> I am certain that there are neural responses and structures that would
> give a more than adequate understanding of pain without reference to
> subjective experience.
>
> The possibility of blind sight and of subliminal perception shows that
> perception need not be tied to subjectivity.
>
> Lance


Admittedly, I have only considered Wittgenstein's ideas superficially,
but I'm unconvinced by his later views about mental phenomena.
Grayling's recent 'very short introduction' to his work is politely
but seriously critical.

Physical and functional explanations are adequate for many scientific
purposes, but without consciousness it seems to me we might as well be
dead. Velmans commented  ( 'Understanding Consciousness', page 259):

"Leaving our physical and functional structure intact, we can, in our
imagination, strip consciousness away. If we do, the lights go out.
Although we would continue to inhabit and interact with a world, we
would not EXPERIENCE ourselves to be living in a world.  While
retaining perfect, functional 'blindsight', without visual experience
we would not see the shape of the earth or the light and colour of the
sky.  While retaining the ability to recognise auditory patterns, we
would hear no sound of the wind or of human voices. While maintaining
our survival skills, we would feel neither pain nor bodily pleasure.
And although we might have a 'self-model' that distinguished us from
other creatures and located us in surrounding space, we would have no
awareness of ourselves. We would experience no thoughts or emotions,
and we would dream no dreams. No greater loss is imaginable.  But in a
purely physical, functional world this would be no loss at all."

Velmans didn't argue for ontological dualism, though, but for
epistemological dualism.  He suggested that our knowledge of the one
reality is of two kinds. depending on whether the representations are
of phenomena external to ourselves or internal to ourselves.  From an
objective/external point of view, pain is a complicated network of
neural processes, and from a subjective/internal point of view it is
an unpleasant feeling.  Edelman has made a somewhat similar
distinction between knowing by description and knowing by being .  In
recent times, the philosopher, Thomas Nagel, has also argued for a
double aspect approach, as have the neuroscientists Damasio and
Ramachandran.  The latter, Ramachandran, has written ('The Emerging
Mind', pages 36-37):

"My own philosophical position about consciousness accords with the
view proposed by ... Bertrand Russell, that there is no separate 'mind
stuff' and 'physical stuff' in the universe: the two are one and the
same. (The formal term for this is neutral monism.)  Perhaps mind and
matter are like two sides of a Mobius strip that appear different but
are in fact the same."

Accordingly, it seems to me that a comprehensive view of human nature
must take account of experience as well as function, but that such an
approach doesn't necessarily entail a commitment to (ontological)
dualism.  I think it does, however, call for some revision of our
scientific understanding of physical reality.  As Nagel remarked in
his essay 'What is it like to be a bat?:  "If mental processes are
indeed physical processes, then there is something it is like ,
intrinsically, to undergo certain physical processes.".

Dave Smith wrote:
> On 19 Jan, 05:01, "Peter H.M.Brooks"  wrote:
>> Dave Smith wrote:
>>
>>> I'm not clear what type of dualism  you are trying to avoid,  nor how
>>> you would define pain except as a subjective experience.
>> I think we can know quite a bit about it objectively even though it is a
>> subjective experience.
> 
> Yes, all about it, except what it feels like.
> 
I'm not sure that I agree there. Yes, we cannot know what it is like to 
be a bat. We can know what it feels like to have a certain pain because 
we've felt pain ourselves.

On Jan 20, 3:53 am, Dave Smith  wrote:
> On 19 Jan, 09:50, Lance  wrote:
>
>
>
>
>
> > Dave Smith wrote:
> > > On 18 Jan, 09:04, Lance  wrote:
> > > > On Jan 18, 1:53�am, Dave Smith  wrote:
>
> > > > > On 17 Jan, 13:57, Lance  wrote:
>
> > > > > > The Philosophy of Pain
>
> > > > > > Scientific ethics dealing with experimentation is dominated by the
> > > > > > need to minimize or avoiding inflicting pain on animals or humans.
>
> > > > > > The pain is conscious pain. Peter Asbhy has suggested in a new
> > > > > > scientist letter that the experience of pain requires a brain - so
> > > > > > apparent suffering when an animal only has a spinal cord doesn't> > > > > > count.
>
> > > > > > Conscious pain means that suffering when a person or animal is
> > > > > > unconscious doesn't count. I can remember watching my grandmother on
> > > > > > her deathbed. She was unconscious but seemed to be in great pain> > > > > > Still if she was unconscious that doesn't count.
>
> > > > > > Pain has to be immediately experienced, not remembered, in order to be
> > > > > > minimized. Since our human experience of time is a tensed one, an
> > > > > > experience of living in a short now, it is the pain experienced in the
> > > > > > short now that counts. Still for learning and for an impact on
> > > > > > character pain has to be remembered. Daniel Kahneman has discovered
> > > > > > that remembered pain differs from experienced pain in a number of
> > > > > > ways. The absolute magnitude of the pain (a difficult concept) seems
> > > > > > less important that the change in pain when one remembers pain. So a
> > > > > > surgeon who deliberately inflicts more pain in order that the
> > > > > > reduction of pain is greater when he applies an anaesthetic will> > > > > > produce a better memory than a surgeon who inflicts less pain but
> > > > > > where the reduction in pain is smaller when an anaesthetic is
> > > > > > applied.
>
> > > > > > Some questions. Is the ethical imperative to minimize pain a last
> > > > > > bastion of dualism? For example, why do we worry less about the sort
> > > > > > of pain my grandmother was so obviously experiencing just because she
> > > > > > was unconscious? Clearly the pain areas of her brain were working even
> > > > > > if she was not conscious. So, given that the physical realization of
> > > > > > pain was present, why the emphasis on consciousness if not for
> > > > > > dualistic reasons?
>
> > > > > > What is the relation between pain and memory? Should we concentrate
> > > > > > only on the immediate experience or should we also be concerned with
> > > > > > the longer impact of the pain as it endures in memory? If we must
> > > > > > focus only on the immediate experience of pain, is that also a
> > > > > > decision motivated by dualistic concerns?
>
> > > > > > Lance
>
> > > > > I think ethics is more concerned with suffering than with pain.
> > > > > Anticipation of pain, remembering pain and witnessing the pain of
> > > > > others cause unpleasant emotions, but not (at least to the same
> > > > > extent) �pain sensations. �I have read that brain scans and other
> > > > > studies of brain activity indicate that to some extent different areas
> > > > > of the brain are involved in pain sensation and pain affect. Damasio
> > > > > argues that pain is a feeling and therefore entails consciousness.> > > > > Certainly, it doesn't seem to make much sense to say that a person is
> > > > > in pain but doesn't feel it. �Hopefully, in your example, your
> > > > > grandmother appeared to be in pain but wasn't. �I think, taking a dual
> > > > > aspect point of view, it would depend on which areas of her brain were
> > > > > active at the time.
>
> > > > > Dave- Hide quoted text -
>
> > > > > - Show quoted text -
>
> > > > "Damasio argues that pain is a feeling and therefore entails
> > > > consciousness."
>
> > > > I am not sure. Much research now shows that some visual syimuli are
> > > > processed in the brain but are never made consious. Ditto for sound,> > > > and the other modalities.
>
> > > > Pain is not a simple sensation with no meaning (qualia). I am not sure
> > > > that such a thing as qualia actually exists. Pain has meaning - it
> > > > tells about the type injury, the location of the injury, etc., and it
> > > > has powerful motivational properties. So I think pain is not different
> > > > from sight and hearing and the like. It is a mode of perception.
>
> > > > I am certain that my grandmother is not unique. Go watch the patients
> > > > in a cancer ward - even those most heavily sedated are often in
> > > > obvious pain. So just as sight can be processed when one is not
> > > > conscious I think pain can be processed when one is not conscious.
>
> > > > This leads me back to the point. I seems dualistic to me to worry
> > > > about pain, but only the conscious moment of pain, not the existence> > > > of pain. I think suffering as a broader category than pain increases> > > > this problem, rather than diminishes it.
>
> > > > Lance- Hide quoted text -
>
> > > > - Show quoted text -
>
> > > I'm not clear what type of dualism  you are trying to avoid,  nor how
> > > you would define pain except as a subjective experience.
>
> > > Dave
>
> > Strange - the above seems absolutely dualistic to me.
>
> > There is a long discussion in Wittgenstein on this issue arguing
> > against your position.
>
> > I am certain that there are neural responses and structures that would
> > give a more than adequate understanding of pain without reference to
> > subjective experience.
>
> > The possibility of blind sight and of subliminal perception shows that
> > perception need not be tied to subjectivity.
>
> > Lance
>
> Admittedly, I have only considered Wittgenstein's ideas superficially,
> but I'm unconvinced by his later views about mental phenomena.
> Grayling's recent 'very short introduction' to his work is politely
> but seriously critical.
>
> Physical and functional explanations are adequate for many scientific
> purposes, but without consciousness it seems to me we might as well be
> dead. Velmans commented  ( 'Understanding Consciousness', page 259):
>
> "Leaving our physical and functional structure intact, we can, in our
> imagination, strip consciousness away. If we do, the lights go out.
> Although we would continue to inhabit and interact with a world, we
> would not EXPERIENCE ourselves to be living in a world.  While
> retaining perfect, functional 'blindsight', without visual experience
> we would not see the shape of the earth or the light and colour of the
> sky.  While retaining the ability to recognise auditory patterns, we
> would hear no sound of the wind or of human voices. While maintaining
> our survival skills, we would feel neither pain nor bodily pleasure.
> And although we might have a 'self-model' that distinguished us from
> other creatures and located us in surrounding space, we would have no
> awareness of ourselves. We would experience no thoughts or emotions,
> and we would dream no dreams. No greater loss is imaginable.  But in a
> purely physical, functional world this would be no loss at all."
>
> Velmans didn't argue for ontological dualism, though, but for
> epistemological dualism.  He suggested that our knowledge of the one
> reality is of two kinds. depending on whether the representations are
> of phenomena external to ourselves or internal to ourselves.  From an> objective/external point of view, pain is a complicated network of
> neural processes, and from a subjective/internal point of view it is
> an unpleasant feeling.  Edelman has made a somewhat similar
> distinction between knowing by description and knowing by being .  In> recent times, the philosopher, Thomas Nagel, has also argued for a
> double aspect approach, as have the neuroscientists Damasio and
> Ramachandran.  The latter, Ramachandran, has written ('The Emerging
> Mind', pages 36-37):
>
> "My own philosophical position about consciousness accords with the
> view proposed by ... Bertrand Russell, that there is no separate 'mind
> stuff' and 'physical stuff' in the universe: the two are one and the
> same. (The formal term for this is neutral monism.)  Perhaps mind and> matter are like two sides of a Mobius strip that appear different but
> are in fact the same."
>
> Accordingly, it seems to me that a comprehensive view of human nature
> must take account of experience as well as function, but that such an
> approach doesn't necessarily entail a commitment to (ontological)
> dualism.  I think it does, however, call for some revision of our
> scientific understanding of physical reality.  As Nagel remarked in
> his essay 'What is it like to be a bat?:  "If mental processes are
> indeed physical processes, then there is something it is like ,
> intrinsically, to undergo certain physical processes.".- Hide quoted text > - Show quoted text -

I don't disagree with anything you wrote.

The only point I am making is that just as you can see without
consciousness so you can have pain without consciousness. I think
consciousness does indeed make up the world we value, but to think it
constitutes all that is the mind is a mistake. Many of our decisions,
and many of our motives, and many of our perceptions never get
considered in the arena of consciousness. That doesn't make them
unimportant though. And I think anyone who has watched cancer patients
in their final days will tell you that there is considerable suffering
happening even though the pateints are doped out on morphine. So I
don't think we should place too much reliance on arguments about
executions that simply turn on conscious pain...

Lance

On Jan 20, 6:42 am, "Peter H.M.Brooks"  wrote:
> Dave Smith wrote:
> > On 19 Jan, 05:01, "Peter H.M.Brooks"  wrote:
> >> Dave Smith wrote:
>
> >>> I'm not clear what type of dualism  you are trying to avoid,  nor how
> >>> you would define pain except as a subjective experience.
> >> I think we can know quite a bit about it objectively even though it is a
> >> subjective experience.
>
> > Yes, all about it, except what it feels like.
>
> I'm not sure that I agree there. Yes, we cannot know what it is like to
> be a bat. We can know what it feels like to have a certain pain because
> we've felt pain ourselves.

Well people differ in their pain experience. Women for example seem to
experience pain more intensely. There are even some people born
without a "sense" of pain. There are interesting but perhaps flawed
scales attempting to cpature a person's experience of pain and help
physicians make decisions on that basis.

Lance

On Jan 20, 2:45 pm, Lance  wrote:
> On Jan 20, 6:42 am, "Peter H.M.Brooks"  wrote:
>
> > Dave Smith wrote:
> > > On 19 Jan, 05:01, "Peter H.M.Brooks"  wrote:
> > >> Dave Smith wrote:
>
> > >>> I'm not clear what type of dualism  you are trying to avoid,  nor how
> > >>> you would define pain except as a subjective experience.
> > >> I think we can know quite a bit about it objectively even though it is a
> > >> subjective experience.
>
> > > Yes, all about it, except what it feels like.
>
> > I'm not sure that I agree there. Yes, we cannot know what it is like to
> > be a bat. We can know what it feels like to have a certain pain because
> > we've felt pain ourselves.
>
> Well people differ in their pain experience. Women for example seem to
> experience pain more intensely. There are even some people born
> without a "sense" of pain. There are interesting but perhaps flawed
> scales attempting to cpature a person's experience of pain and help
> physicians make decisions on that basis.
>
Yes, I agree. These all have to be taken into account on a daily basis
when nurses and doctors make decisions about pain relief.

The point is that we can know what it feels like because we've felt it
ourselves. If somebody says that it feels worse than, or not quite as
bad as, a burn on the finger, then we can know pretty well what it
feels like.

On Jan 20, 12:51 pm, Peter Brooks  wrote:
> On Jan 20, 2:45 pm, Lance  wrote:
>
> > On Jan 20, 6:42 am, "Peter H.M.Brooks"  wrote:
>
> > > Dave Smith wrote:
> > > > On 19 Jan, 05:01, "Peter H.M.Brooks"  wrote:
> > > >> Dave Smith wrote:
>
> > > >>> I'm not clear what type of dualism  you are trying to avoid,  nor how
> > > >>> you would define pain except as a subjective experience.
> > > >> I think we can know quite a bit about it objectively even though it is a
> > > >> subjective experience.
>
> > > > Yes, all about it, except what it feels like.
>
> > > I'm not sure that I agree there. Yes, we cannot know what it is like to
> > > be a bat. We can know what it feels like to have a certain pain because
> > > we've felt pain ourselves.
>
> > Well people differ in their pain experience. Women for example seem to
> > experience pain more intensely.

More intensely than who? If you say men, how do you know? If mum jumps
when burning herself on the cooker but dad grins can you say that mum
felt the pain more intensely than dad? Maybe women, or at least mums,
are more demonstrative? Anyway, I have read the opposite. I've read
that women do better at ultra-marathons than men because they can
tolerate the pain of exhaustion better.

Also, how about if we just concentrate on men. Do some men fell pain
more intensely than others? That's the interesting question if we are
looking at the problem of objectifying the subjective.

On Jan 20, 1:53 am, Dave Smith  wrote:
> On 19 Jan, 09:50, Lance  wrote:
>
>
>
> > Dave Smith wrote:
> > > On 18 Jan, 09:04, Lance  wrote:
> > > > On Jan 18, 1:53�am, Dave Smith  wrote:
>
> > > > > On 17 Jan, 13:57, Lance  wrote:
>
> > > > > > The Philosophy of Pain
>
> > > > > > Scientific ethics dealing with experimentation is dominated by the
> > > > > > need to minimize or avoiding inflicting pain on animals or humans.
>
> > > > > > The pain is conscious pain. Peter Asbhy has suggested in a new
> > > > > > scientist letter that the experience of pain requires a brain - so
> > > > > > apparent suffering when an animal only has a spinal cord doesn't> > > > > > count.
>
> > > > > > Conscious pain means that suffering when a person or animal is
> > > > > > unconscious doesn't count. I can remember watching my grandmother on
> > > > > > her deathbed. She was unconscious but seemed to be in great pain> > > > > > Still if she was unconscious that doesn't count.
>
> > > > > > Pain has to be immediately experienced, not remembered, in order to be
> > > > > > minimized. Since our human experience of time is a tensed one, an
> > > > > > experience of living in a short now, it is the pain experienced in the
> > > > > > short now that counts. Still for learning and for an impact on
> > > > > > character pain has to be remembered. Daniel Kahneman has discovered
> > > > > > that remembered pain differs from experienced pain in a number of
> > > > > > ways. The absolute magnitude of the pain (a difficult concept) seems
> > > > > > less important that the change in pain when one remembers pain. So a
> > > > > > surgeon who deliberately inflicts more pain in order that the
> > > > > > reduction of pain is greater when he applies an anaesthetic will> > > > > > produce a better memory than a surgeon who inflicts less pain but
> > > > > > where the reduction in pain is smaller when an anaesthetic is
> > > > > > applied.
>
> > > > > > Some questions. Is the ethical imperative to minimize pain a last
> > > > > > bastion of dualism? For example, why do we worry less about the sort
> > > > > > of pain my grandmother was so obviously experiencing just because she
> > > > > > was unconscious? Clearly the pain areas of her brain were working even
> > > > > > if she was not conscious. So, given that the physical realization of
> > > > > > pain was present, why the emphasis on consciousness if not for
> > > > > > dualistic reasons?
>
> > > > > > What is the relation between pain and memory? Should we concentrate
> > > > > > only on the immediate experience or should we also be concerned with
> > > > > > the longer impact of the pain as it endures in memory? If we must
> > > > > > focus only on the immediate experience of pain, is that also a
> > > > > > decision motivated by dualistic concerns?
>
> > > > > > Lance
>
> > > > > I think ethics is more concerned with suffering than with pain.
> > > > > Anticipation of pain, remembering pain and witnessing the pain of
> > > > > others cause unpleasant emotions, but not (at least to the same
> > > > > extent) �pain sensations. �I have read that brain scans and other
> > > > > studies of brain activity indicate that to some extent different areas
> > > > > of the brain are involved in pain sensation and pain affect. Damasio
> > > > > argues that pain is a feeling and therefore entails consciousness.> > > > > Certainly, it doesn't seem to make much sense to say that a person is
> > > > > in pain but doesn't feel it. �Hopefully, in your example, your
> > > > > grandmother appeared to be in pain but wasn't. �I think, taking a dual
> > > > > aspect point of view, it would depend on which areas of her brain were
> > > > > active at the time.
>
> > > > > Dave- Hide quoted text -
>
> > > > > - Show quoted text -
>
> > > > "Damasio argues that pain is a feeling and therefore entails
> > > > consciousness."
>
> > > > I am not sure. Much research now shows that some visual syimuli are
> > > > processed in the brain but are never made consious. Ditto for sound,> > > > and the other modalities.
>
> > > > Pain is not a simple sensation with no meaning (qualia). I am not sure
> > > > that such a thing as qualia actually exists. Pain has meaning - it
> > > > tells about the type injury, the location of the injury, etc., and it
> > > > has powerful motivational properties. So I think pain is not different
> > > > from sight and hearing and the like. It is a mode of perception.
>
> > > > I am certain that my grandmother is not unique. Go watch the patients
> > > > in a cancer ward - even those most heavily sedated are often in
> > > > obvious pain. So just as sight can be processed when one is not
> > > > conscious I think pain can be processed when one is not conscious.
>
> > > > This leads me back to the point. I seems dualistic to me to worry
> > > > about pain, but only the conscious moment of pain, not the existence> > > > of pain. I think suffering as a broader category than pain increases> > > > this problem, rather than diminishes it.
>
> > > > Lance- Hide quoted text -
>
> > > > - Show quoted text -
>
> > > I'm not clear what type of dualism  you are trying to avoid,  nor how
> > > you would define pain except as a subjective experience.
>
> > > Dave
>
> > Strange - the above seems absolutely dualistic to me.
>
> > There is a long discussion in Wittgenstein on this issue arguing
> > against your position.

Are you sure? Everybody seems to read different things into much of
Wittgenstein -- his writings are so cryptic. So a statement like this
is just dodging the issue, and leaves the poor chap to wrestle with
Wittgenstein. Come on, instead if hiding behind Wittgenstein make the
argument! Perhaps, unlike Wittgenstein, you will even make it lucid.

> Admittedly, I have only considered Wittgenstein's ideas superficially,
> but I'm unconvinced by his later views about mental phenomena.
> Grayling's recent 'very short introduction' to his work is politely
> but seriously critical.

That's a good book. Everybody should read it then they might stop
finding Wittgenstein worth name dropping. Forget the names let's have
the arguments!

> Velmans commented  ( 'Understanding Consciousness', page 259):
>
> "Leaving our physical and functional structure intact, we can, in our
> imagination, strip consciousness away. If we do, the lights go out.
> Although we would continue to inhabit and interact with a world, we
> would not EXPERIENCE ourselves to be living in a world.  While
> retaining perfect, functional 'blindsight', without visual experience
> we would not see the shape of the earth or the light and colour of the
> sky.  While retaining the ability to recognise auditory patterns, we
> would hear no sound of the wind or of human voices. While maintaining
> our survival skills, we would feel neither pain nor bodily pleasure.
> And although we might have a 'self-model' that distinguished us from
> other creatures and located us in surrounding space, we would have no
> awareness of ourselves. We would experience no thoughts or emotions,
> and we would dream no dreams. No greater loss is imaginable.  But in a
> purely physical, functional world this would be no loss at all."

That's better :-)

> Velmans didn't argue for ontological dualism, though, but for
> epistemological dualism.  He suggested that our knowledge of the one
> reality is of two kinds. depending on whether the representations are
> of phenomena external to ourselves or internal to ourselves.  From an
> objective/external point of view, pain is a complicated network of
> neural processes, and from a subjective/internal point of view it is
> an unpleasant feeling.

This view wasn't invented by Velman's. It goes back at least to
Schopenhauer and perhaps to Spinoza.

> ... Thomas Nagel, has also argued for a
> double aspect approach

Bryan Magee has as well, but he at least acknowledges that
Schopenhauer (or Spinoza?) gave him the idea :-)

> "My own philosophical position about consciousness accords with the
> view proposed by ... Bertrand Russell, that there is no separate 'mind
> stuff' and 'physical stuff' in the universe: the two are one and the
> same. (The formal term for this is neutral monism.)  Perhaps mind and
> matter are like two sides of a Mobius strip that appear different but
> are in fact the same."

Ho hum, now its supposedly Russell who propounded it! These guys
should try doing some scholarship before putting pen to paper.

> The only point I am making is that just as you can see without
> consciousness so you can have pain without consciousness. I think
> consciousness does indeed make up the world we value ... many of our
>  perceptions never get considered in the arena of consciousness. That
> doesn't make them unimportant though. And I think anyone who has watched
> cancer patients
> in their final days will tell you that there is considerable suffering
> happening even though the pateints are doped out on morphine. So I
> don't think we should place too much reliance on arguments about
> executions that simply turn on conscious pain...

Cancer patients doped out on morphine are still conscious. Patients
who undergo major surgery do not complain about any pain
occurring during the operation (unless they are unfortunate enough to
become conscious during the operation!)

Therefore how can you have pain without consciousness?  Or, at least,
how can you know that there is pain without consciousness?

You can have similar nerve impulses in conscious and unconscious
people but perhaps there is also a brain state needed to register
these impulses as pain.

On 20 Jan, 15:04, Paul Grieg  wrote:
> On Jan 20, 1:53 am, Dave Smith  wrote:
>
>
>
>
>
> > On 19 Jan, 09:50, Lance  wrote:
>
> > > Dave Smith wrote:
> > > > On 18 Jan, 09:04, Lance  wrote:
> > > > > On Jan 18, 1:53�am, Dave Smith  wrote:
>
> > > > > > On 17 Jan, 13:57, Lance  wrote:
>
> > > > > > > The Philosophy of Pain
>
> > > > > > > Scientific ethics dealing with experimentation is dominated by the
> > > > > > > need to minimize or avoiding inflicting pain on animals or humans.
>
> > > > > > > The pain is conscious pain. Peter Asbhy has suggested in a new> > > > > > > scientist letter that the experience of pain requires a brain - so
> > > > > > > apparent suffering when an animal only has a spinal cord doesn't
> > > > > > > count.
>
> > > > > > > Conscious pain means that suffering when a person or animal is> > > > > > > unconscious doesn't count. I can remember watching my grandmother on
> > > > > > > her deathbed. She was unconscious but seemed to be in great pain.
> > > > > > > Still if she was unconscious that doesn't count.
>
> > > > > > > Pain has to be immediately experienced, not remembered, in order to be
> > > > > > > minimized. Since our human experience of time is a tensed one, an
> > > > > > > experience of living in a short now, it is the pain experienced in the
> > > > > > > short now that counts. Still for learning and for an impact on> > > > > > > character pain has to be remembered. Daniel Kahneman has discovered
> > > > > > > that remembered pain differs from experienced pain in a number of
> > > > > > > ways. The absolute magnitude of the pain (a difficult concept) seems
> > > > > > > less important that the change in pain when one remembers pain. So a
> > > > > > > surgeon who deliberately inflicts more pain in order that the
> > > > > > > reduction of pain is greater when he applies an anaesthetic will
> > > > > > > produce a better memory than a surgeon who inflicts less pain but
> > > > > > > where the reduction in pain is smaller when an anaesthetic is
> > > > > > > applied.
>
> > > > > > > Some questions. Is the ethical imperative to minimize pain a last
> > > > > > > bastion of dualism? For example, why do we worry less about the sort
> > > > > > > of pain my grandmother was so obviously experiencing just because she
> > > > > > > was unconscious? Clearly the pain areas of her brain were working even
> > > > > > > if she was not conscious. So, given that the physical realization of
> > > > > > > pain was present, why the emphasis on consciousness if not for> > > > > > > dualistic reasons?
>
> > > > > > > What is the relation between pain and memory? Should we concentrate
> > > > > > > only on the immediate experience or should we also be concerned with
> > > > > > > the longer impact of the pain as it endures in memory? If we must
> > > > > > > focus only on the immediate experience of pain, is that also a> > > > > > > decision motivated by dualistic concerns?
>
> > > > > > > Lance
>
> > > > > > I think ethics is more concerned with suffering than with pain.
> > > > > > Anticipation of pain, remembering pain and witnessing the pain of
> > > > > > others cause unpleasant emotions, but not (at least to the same
> > > > > > extent) �pain sensations. �I have read that brain scans and other
> > > > > > studies of brain activity indicate that to some extent different areas
> > > > > > of the brain are involved in pain sensation and pain affect. Damasio
> > > > > > argues that pain is a feeling and therefore entails consciousness.
> > > > > > Certainly, it doesn't seem to make much sense to say that a person is
> > > > > > in pain but doesn't feel it. �Hopefully, in your example, your
> > > > > > grandmother appeared to be in pain but wasn't. �I think, taking a dual
> > > > > > aspect point of view, it would depend on which areas of her brain were
> > > > > > active at the time.
>
> > > > > > Dave- Hide quoted text -
>
> > > > > > - Show quoted text -
>
> > > > > "Damasio argues that pain is a feeling and therefore entails
> > > > > consciousness."
>
> > > > > I am not sure. Much research now shows that some visual syimuli are
> > > > > processed in the brain but are never made consious. Ditto for sound,
> > > > > and the other modalities.
>
> > > > > Pain is not a simple sensation with no meaning (qualia). I am not sure
> > > > > that such a thing as qualia actually exists. Pain has meaning - it> > > > > tells about the type injury, the location of the injury, etc., and it
> > > > > has powerful motivational properties. So I think pain is not different
> > > > > from sight and hearing and the like. It is a mode of perception.
>
> > > > > I am certain that my grandmother is not unique. Go watch the patients
> > > > > in a cancer ward - even those most heavily sedated are often in
> > > > > obvious pain. So just as sight can be processed when one is not
> > > > > conscious I think pain can be processed when one is not conscious.> > > > > This leads me back to the point. I seems dualistic to me to worry
> > > > > about pain, but only the conscious moment of pain, not the existence
> > > > > of pain. I think suffering as a broader category than pain increases
> > > > > this problem, rather than diminishes it.
>
> > > > > Lance- Hide quoted text -
>
> > > > > - Show quoted text -
>
> > > > I'm not clear what type of dualism  you are trying to avoid,  nor how
> > > > you would define pain except as a subjective experience.
>
> > > > Dave
>
> > > Strange - the above seems absolutely dualistic to me.
>
> > > There is a long discussion in Wittgenstein on this issue arguing
> > > against your position.
>
> Are you sure? Everybody seems to read different things into much of
> Wittgenstein -- his writings are so cryptic. So a statement like this
> is just dodging the issue, and leaves the poor chap to wrestle with
> Wittgenstein. Come on, instead if hiding behind Wittgenstein make the
> argument! Perhaps, unlike Wittgenstein, you will even make it lucid.
>
> > Admittedly, I have only considered Wittgenstein's ideas superficially,
> > but I'm unconvinced by his later views about mental phenomena.
> > Grayling's recent 'very short introduction' to his work is politely
> > but seriously critical.
>
> That's a good book. Everybody should read it then they might stop
> finding Wittgenstein worth name dropping. Forget the names let's have
> the arguments!
>
>
>
>
>
> > Velmans commented  ( 'Understanding Consciousness', page 259):
>
> > "Leaving our physical and functional structure intact, we can, in our
> > imagination, strip consciousness away. If we do, the lights go out.
> > Although we would continue to inhabit and interact with a world, we
> > would not EXPERIENCE ourselves to be living in a world.  While
> > retaining perfect, functional 'blindsight', without visual experience
> > we would not see the shape of the earth or the light and colour of the
> > sky.  While retaining the ability to recognise auditory patterns, we
> > would hear no sound of the wind or of human voices. While maintaining
> > our survival skills, we would feel neither pain nor bodily pleasure.
> > And although we might have a 'self-model' that distinguished us from
> > other creatures and located us in surrounding space, we would have no
> > awareness of ourselves. We would experience no thoughts or emotions,
> > and we would dream no dreams. No greater loss is imaginable.  But in a
> > purely physical, functional world this would be no loss at all."
>
> That's better :-)
>
> > Velmans didn't argue for ontological dualism, though, but for
> > epistemological dualism.  He suggested that our knowledge of the one
> > reality is of two kinds. depending on whether the representations are
> > of phenomena external to ourselves or internal to ourselves.  From an
> > objective/external point of view, pain is a complicated network of
> > neural processes, and from a subjective/internal point of view it is
> > an unpleasant feeling.
>
> This view wasn't invented by Velman's. It goes back at least to
> Schopenhauer and perhaps to Spinoza.
>
> > ... Thomas Nagel, has also argued for a
> > double aspect approach
>
> Bryan Magee has as well, but he at least acknowledges that
> Schopenhauer (or Spinoza?) gave him the idea :-)
>
> > "My own philosophical position about consciousness accords with the
> > view proposed by ... Bertrand Russell, that there is no separate 'mind
> > stuff' and 'physical stuff' in the universe: the two are one and the
> > same. (The formal term for this is neutral monism.)  Perhaps mind and
> > matter are like two sides of a Mobius strip that appear different but
> > are in fact the same."
>
> Ho hum, now its supposedly Russell who propounded it! These guys
> should try doing some scholarship before putting pen to paper.- Hide quoted text -
>
> - Show quoted text -- Hide quoted text -
>
> - Show quoted text -

I find your posts more difficult to reply to when they take the form
of annotations --  the discussion tends to become rather fragmented.
Also, in the above you comment on posts by Lance and myself, maybe
producing some confusion concerning 'who wrote what'.

Of course, the authors I mentioned have referred to the work of their
predecessors.  Damasio even entitled one of his books 'Looking for
Spinoza'.

Dave

On 20 Jan, 12:43, Lance  wrote:
> On Jan 20, 3:53 am, Dave Smith  wrote:
>
>
>
>
>
> > On 19 Jan, 09:50, Lance  wrote:
>
> > > Dave Smith wrote:
> > > > On 18 Jan, 09:04, Lance  wrote:
> > > > > On Jan 18, 1:53�am, Dave Smith  wrote:
>
> > > > > > On 17 Jan, 13:57, Lance  wrote:
>
> > > > > > > The Philosophy of Pain
>
> > > > > > > Scientific ethics dealing with experimentation is dominated by the
> > > > > > > need to minimize or avoiding inflicting pain on animals or humans.
>
> > > > > > > The pain is conscious pain. Peter Asbhy has suggested in a new> > > > > > > scientist letter that the experience of pain requires a brain - so
> > > > > > > apparent suffering when an animal only has a spinal cord doesn't
> > > > > > > count.
>
> > > > > > > Conscious pain means that suffering when a person or animal is> > > > > > > unconscious doesn't count. I can remember watching my grandmother on
> > > > > > > her deathbed. She was unconscious but seemed to be in great pain.
> > > > > > > Still if she was unconscious that doesn't count.
>
> > > > > > > Pain has to be immediately experienced, not remembered, in order to be
> > > > > > > minimized. Since our human experience of time is a tensed one, an
> > > > > > > experience of living in a short now, it is the pain experienced in the
> > > > > > > short now that counts. Still for learning and for an impact on> > > > > > > character pain has to be remembered. Daniel Kahneman has discovered
> > > > > > > that remembered pain differs from experienced pain in a number of
> > > > > > > ways. The absolute magnitude of the pain (a difficult concept) seems
> > > > > > > less important that the change in pain when one remembers pain. So a
> > > > > > > surgeon who deliberately inflicts more pain in order that the
> > > > > > > reduction of pain is greater when he applies an anaesthetic will
> > > > > > > produce a better memory than a surgeon who inflicts less pain but
> > > > > > > where the reduction in pain is smaller when an anaesthetic is
> > > > > > > applied.
>
> > > > > > > Some questions. Is the ethical imperative to minimize pain a last
> > > > > > > bastion of dualism? For example, why do we worry less about the sort
> > > > > > > of pain my grandmother was so obviously experiencing just because she
> > > > > > > was unconscious? Clearly the pain areas of her brain were working even
> > > > > > > if she was not conscious. So, given that the physical realization of
> > > > > > > pain was present, why the emphasis on consciousness if not for> > > > > > > dualistic reasons?
>
> > > > > > > What is the relation between pain and memory? Should we concentrate
> > > > > > > only on the immediate experience or should we also be concerned with
> > > > > > > the longer impact of the pain as it endures in memory? If we must
> > > > > > > focus only on the immediate experience of pain, is that also a> > > > > > > decision motivated by dualistic concerns?
>
> > > > > > > Lance
>
> > > > > > I think ethics is more concerned with suffering than with pain.
> > > > > > Anticipation of pain, remembering pain and witnessing the pain of
> > > > > > others cause unpleasant emotions, but not (at least to the same
> > > > > > extent) �pain sensations. �I have read that brain scans and other
> > > > > > studies of brain activity indicate that to some extent different areas
> > > > > > of the brain are involved in pain sensation and pain affect. Damasio
> > > > > > argues that pain is a feeling and therefore entails consciousness.
> > > > > > Certainly, it doesn't seem to make much sense to say that a person is
> > > > > > in pain but doesn't feel it. �Hopefully, in your example, your
> > > > > > grandmother appeared to be in pain but wasn't. �I think, taking a dual
> > > > > > aspect point of view, it would depend on which areas of her brain were
> > > > > > active at the time.
>
> > > > > > Dave- Hide quoted text -
>
> > > > > > - Show quoted text -
>
> > > > > "Damasio argues that pain is a feeling and therefore entails
> > > > > consciousness."
>
> > > > > I am not sure. Much research now shows that some visual syimuli are
> > > > > processed in the brain but are never made consious. Ditto for sound,
> > > > > and the other modalities.
>
> > > > > Pain is not a simple sensation with no meaning (qualia). I am not sure
> > > > > that such a thing as qualia actually exists. Pain has meaning - it> > > > > tells about the type injury, the location of the injury, etc., and it
> > > > > has powerful motivational properties. So I think pain is not different
> > > > > from sight and hearing and the like. It is a mode of perception.
>
> > > > > I am certain that my grandmother is not unique. Go watch the patients
> > > > > in a cancer ward - even those most heavily sedated are often in
> > > > > obvious pain. So just as sight can be processed when one is not
> > > > > conscious I think pain can be processed when one is not conscious.> > > > > This leads me back to the point. I seems dualistic to me to worry
> > > > > about pain, but only the conscious moment of pain, not the existence
> > > > > of pain. I think suffering as a broader category than pain increases
> > > > > this problem, rather than diminishes it.
>
> > > > > Lance- Hide quoted text -
>
> > > > > - Show quoted text -
>
> > > > I'm not clear what type of dualism  you are trying to avoid,  nor how
> > > > you would define pain except as a subjective experience.
>
> > > > Dave
>
> > > Strange - the above seems absolutely dualistic to me.
>
> > > There is a long discussion in Wittgenstein on this issue arguing
> > > against your position.
>
> > > I am certain that there are neural responses and structures that would> > > give a more than adequate understanding of pain without reference to
> > > subjective experience.
>
> > > The possibility of blind sight and of subliminal perception shows that> > > perception need not be tied to subjectivity.
>
> > > Lance
>
> > Admittedly, I have only considered Wittgenstein's ideas superficially,
> > but I'm unconvinced by his later views about mental phenomena.
> > Grayling's recent 'very short introduction' to his work is politely
> > but seriously critical.
>
> > Physical and functional explanations are adequate for many scientific
> > purposes, but without consciousness it seems to me we might as well be
> > dead. Velmans commented  ( 'Understanding Consciousness', page 259)> > "Leaving our physical and functional structure intact, we can, in our
> > imagination, strip consciousness away. If we do, the lights go out.
> > Although we would continue to inhabit and interact with a world, we
> > would not EXPERIENCE ourselves to be living in a world.  While
> > retaining perfect, functional 'blindsight', without visual experience
> > we would not see the shape of the earth or the light and colour of the
> > sky.  While retaining the ability to recognise auditory patterns, we
> > would hear no sound of the wind or of human voices. While maintaining
> > our survival skills, we would feel neither pain nor bodily pleasure.
> > And although we might have a 'self-model' that distinguished us from
> > other creatures and located us in surrounding space, we would have no
> > awareness of ourselves. We would experience no thoughts or emotions,
> > and we would dream no dreams. No greater loss is imaginable.  But in a
> > purely physical, functional world this would be no loss at all."
>
> > Velmans didn't argue for ontological dualism, though, but for
> > epistemological dualism.  He suggested that our knowledge of the one
> > reality is of two kinds. depending on whether the representations are
> > of phenomena external to ourselves or internal to ourselves.  From an
> > objective/external point of view, pain is a complicated network of
> > neural processes, and from a subjective/internal point of view it is
> > an unpleasant feeling.  Edelman has made a somewhat similar
> > distinction between knowing by description and knowing by being .  In
> > recent times, the philosopher, Thomas Nagel, has also argued for a
> > double aspect approach, as have the neuroscientists Damasio and
> > Ramachandran.  The latter, Ramachandran, has written ('The Emerging> > Mind', pages 36-37):
>
> > "My own philosophical position about consciousness accords with the
> > view proposed by ... Bertrand Russell, that there is no separate 'mind
> > stuff' and 'physical stuff' in the universe: the two are one and the
> > same. (The formal term for this is neutral monism.)  Perhaps mind and
> > matter are like two sides of a Mobius strip that appear different but
> > are in fact the same."
>
> > Accordingly, it seems to me that a comprehensive view of human nature
> > must take account of experience as well as function, but that such an
> > approach doesn't necessarily entail a commitment to (ontological)
> > dualism.  I think it does, however, call for some revision of our
> > scientific understanding of physical reality.  As Nagel remarked in> > his essay 'What is it like to be a bat?:  "If mental processes are
> > indeed physical processes, then there is something it is like ,
> > intrinsically, to undergo certain physical processes.".- Hide quoted text -
>
> > - Show quoted text -
>
> I don't disagree with anything you wrote.
>
> The only point I am making is that just as you can see without
> consciousness so you can have pain without consciousness. I think
> consciousness does indeed make up the world we value, but to think it
> constitutes all that is the mind is a mistake. Many of our decisions,
> and many of our motives, and many of our perceptions never get
> considered in the arena of consciousness. That doesn't make them
> unimportant though. And I think anyone who has watched cancer patients
> in their final days will tell you that there is considerable suffering
> happening even though the pateints are doped out on morphine. So I
> don't think we should place too much reliance on arguments about
> executions that simply turn on conscious pain...
>
> Lance- Hide quoted text -
>
> - Show quoted text -

Yes, it's possible to define pain in various ways, and different
definitions may be appropriate for different purposes.  From Damasio's
brief account of the physiology of pain, on pages 71-76 of 'The
Feeling of What Happens',  it seems differentiation between pain
sensation, pain affect, and consciousness of pain may be helpful.

I'm not sure, however, how much confidence we can have in assessments
of pain and suffering which are based solely on 'watching'.   Animals
can be seen writhing after they have been supposedly killed and hung
up on hooks in slaughterhouses, for instance.  I would rather know
from brain scans etc. what neural activity is occurring.

On Jan 20, 5:16 pm, Paul Grieg  wrote:
> > The only point I am making is that just as you can see without
> > consciousness so you can have pain without consciousness. I think
> > consciousness does indeed make up the world we value ... many of our
> >  perceptions never get considered in the arena of consciousness. That
> > doesn't make them unimportant though. And I think anyone who has watched> > cancer patients
> > in their final days will tell you that there is considerable suffering
> > happening even though the pateints are doped out on morphine. So I
> > don't think we should place too much reliance on arguments about
> > executions that simply turn on conscious pain...
>
> Cancer patients doped out on morphine are still conscious. Patients
> who undergo major surgery do not complain about any pain
> occurring during the operation (unless they are unfortunate enough to
> become conscious during the operation!)
>
That doesn't mean the pain doesn't affect them. Aneastheisia is rather
poorly understood.

> Therefore how can you have pain without consciousness?  Or, at least,
> how can you know that there is pain without consciousness?
>
> You can have similar nerve impulses in conscious and unconscious
> people but perhaps there is also a brain state needed to register
> these impulses as pain.


What does register mean? We can show that particular messages flashed
on a screen affect your behaviour even though you can't report seeing
them or say what they were. Did these messages "register"?

lance

On Jan 21, 1:33 am, Dave Smith  wrote:
> On 20 Jan, 12:43, Lance  wrote:
>
> > On Jan 20, 3:53 am, Dave Smith  wrote> > > On 19 Jan, 09:50, Lance  wrote:
>
> > > > Dave Smith wrote:
> > > > > On 18 Jan, 09:04, Lance  wrote:
> > > > > > On Jan 18, 1:53�am, Dave Smith  wrote:
>
> > > > > > > On 17 Jan, 13:57, Lance  wrote:
>
> > > > > > > > The Philosophy of Pain
>
> > > > > > > > Scientific ethics dealing with experimentation is dominated by the
> > > > > > > > need to minimize or avoiding inflicting pain on animals or humans.
>
> > > > > > > > The pain is conscious pain. Peter Asbhy has suggested in a new
> > > > > > > > scientist letter that the experience of pain requires a brain - so
> > > > > > > > apparent suffering when an animal only has a spinal cord doesn't
> > > > > > > > count.
>
> > > > > > > > Conscious pain means that suffering when a person or animal is
> > > > > > > > unconscious doesn't count. I can remember watching my grandmother on
> > > > > > > > her deathbed. She was unconscious but seemed to be in great pain.
> > > > > > > > Still if she was unconscious that doesn't count.
>
> > > > > > > > Pain has to be immediately experienced, not remembered, in order to be
> > > > > > > > minimized. Since our human experience of time is a tensed one, an
> > > > > > > > experience of living in a short now, it is the pain experienced in the
> > > > > > > > short now that counts. Still for learning and for an impact on
> > > > > > > > character pain has to be remembered. Daniel Kahneman has discovered
> > > > > > > > that remembered pain differs from experienced pain in a number of
> > > > > > > > ways. The absolute magnitude of the pain (a difficult concept) seems
> > > > > > > > less important that the change in pain when one remembers pain. So a
> > > > > > > > surgeon who deliberately inflicts more pain in order that the
> > > > > > > > reduction of pain is greater when he applies an anaesthetic will
> > > > > > > > produce a better memory than a surgeon who inflicts less pain but
> > > > > > > > where the reduction in pain is smaller when an anaesthetic is
> > > > > > > > applied.
>
> > > > > > > > Some questions. Is the ethical imperative to minimize pain a last
> > > > > > > > bastion of dualism? For example, why do we worry less about the sort
> > > > > > > > of pain my grandmother was so obviously experiencing just because she
> > > > > > > > was unconscious? Clearly the pain areas of her brain were working even
> > > > > > > > if she was not conscious. So, given that the physical realization of
> > > > > > > > pain was present, why the emphasis on consciousness if not for
> > > > > > > > dualistic reasons?
>
> > > > > > > > What is the relation between pain and memory? Should we concentrate
> > > > > > > > only on the immediate experience or should we also be concerned with
> > > > > > > > the longer impact of the pain as it endures in memory? If we must
> > > > > > > > focus only on the immediate experience of pain, is that also a
> > > > > > > > decision motivated by dualistic concerns?
>
> > > > > > > > Lance
>
> > > > > > > I think ethics is more concerned with suffering than with pain> > > > > > > Anticipation of pain, remembering pain and witnessing the pain of
> > > > > > > others cause unpleasant emotions, but not (at least to the same
> > > > > > > extent) �pain sensations. �I have read that brain scans and other
> > > > > > > studies of brain activity indicate that to some extent different areas
> > > > > > > of the brain are involved in pain sensation and pain affect. Damas