Georgian Fantasies: Where are the Americans?

Doug Bandow
August 29, 2008

http://www.antiwar.com/bandow/?articleid=13377

It's still not certain what motivated the Georgian government to launch its
attack on South Ossetia in the face of ongoing Russian hostility and recent
military maneuvers which all-but guaranteed a swift and devastating
response. Georgia's Deputy Defense Minister Batu Kutelia said simply: "We
did not prepare for this kind of eventuality."

His government was extraordinarily foolish, if not demented. Acknowledging
that the Georgian military lacked sufficient anti-aircraft and anti-tank
weapons to protect its ground forces, Kutelia said he "didn't think it
likely that a member of the UN Security Council and the [Organization for
Security and Co-operation in Europe] would react like this." Moreover, the
government in Tbilisi seemed to believe that being an informal American
ally, with its military financed and trained by Washington – even if
Georgia was not formally part of NATO – would deter any Russian attack. And
that the U.S., with precisely zero interest in promoting Georgia's
territorial ambitions and even less in fighting Russia, nevertheless would
backstop Tbilisi's assault on the separatist enclave.

After giving Moscow the perfect excuse to intervene and suffering the horrid
consequences of doing so, Georgians automatically turned to America. Save
us, cried everyone from President Mikheil Saakashvili to combat soldiers to
fleeing refugees. Where is America, they screamed?

Shouting the loudest was Saakashvili, the author of Georgia's present
distress. Nationalist, mercurial, authoritarian, he desperately wanted his
nation to join NATO and he regularly criticized the Europeans for not doing
more to aid his distant country, nestled between the Black Sea and Caspian
Sea amidst the Caucasus Mountains. Having invested in Washington's war
against Iraq (providing 2000 soldiers for the occupation) and in American
politicians (paying the lobbying firm of John McCain's foreign policy
adviser, Randy Scheunemann, nearly $1 million), Saakashvili expected a
return on his country's investment.

Did he assume the pay-off would be automatic, or did he consult with his
American friends? If we take the administration at its word that it
discouraged Georgian adventurism, any encouragement would have had to come
from others. On the Huffington PostDavid Bromwich observes: "if there was a
single Western luminary [Saakashvili] would have wanted to consult, it was
surely his old lobbyist and personal adviser Randy Scheunemann. The
calculation by Scheunemann must have been that even if things went badly at
first, for Georgia, the result of Russian suppression would be good for
John McCain. Besides, McCain, as president, could eventually rescue
Saakashvili by another path."

Scheunemann isn't talking, but Saakashvili's expectations obviously were
high. In March he declared: "I have to thank you, Mr. President, for your
unwavered [sic] support for our freedom, for our democracy, for our
territorial sovereignty and for protecting Georgia's borders and for
Georgia's NATO aspirations." Although Saakashvili didn't say in what form
he expected that protection, it would be surprising if he did not hope for
more than anguished facial expressions and dramatic hand-wringing.

When the American legions didn't appear to battle the Russians, he launched
a charm offensive through interviews with the Western press, seeking U.S.
intervention. He affirmed that he holds "American values" and
pleaded: "Please wake up everybody. And please make your position and speak
with one united voice." He told CNN: "It's not about Georgia anymore. It's
about America, its values. We are a freedom-loving nation that is right now
under attack." He told a German newspaper that President Bush "understands
that it's not really about Georgia but in a certain sense it's also an
aggression against America." Saakashvili tried the same tactic with the
Europeans, warning that "Unless Russia is stopped … tomorrow Russian tanks
might enter any European capital." He quoted Sen. John McCain's "we are all
Georgians" line to applauding crowds in Tbilisi.

For a time the administration refused to rule out use of military force
against Russia's forces. Deputy National Security Adviser James F. Jeffrey
said "Right now our focus is on working with both sides, with the Europeans
and with a whole variety of international institutions and organizations,
to get the fighting to stop." But that option probably was never seriously
considered. A top State Department official told the New York Times: "There
is no possibility of drawing NATO or the international community into
this." Forget the fraternal expressions of friendship. It was realpolitik
time.

But Saakashvili still didn't get the message. Once the fighting stopped and
Washington announced plans to send humanitarian aid, he said the step
was "very strong," even though "long overdue." "This is a turning point,"
he declared to Western reporters. He exulted that "we will see U.S.
military ships entering Georgian ports despite Russian blocking [sic] it."
They "will be serious military ships," he added. He told Georgians in a TV
address that the U.S. military would be taking control of his country's
airports and ports, protecting them from the Russians. Secretary of State
Condoleezza Rice was forced to explain that "It's not the intention of the
U.S. to take control of facilities." Pentagon Press Secretary Geoff Morrell
added: "We are not looking to, nor do we need to, take control of any air
or sea ports to conduct this mission."

Saakashvili's attempt to ensnare America did not stop at the war's end. With
Russian troops continuing to occupy Georgian territory outside of Abkhazia
and South Ossetia, Saakashvili pointed to Washington and the European
Union, proclaiming: "They must make Russia leave Georgian territory." He
went on to say: "We must ensure that the Russians do not get away with it
just like that," meaning, of course, that the U.S. must punish Moscow,
since Tbilisi had no power to do so.

And, of course, he insisted that it is America's job to rearm Georgia.
Saakashvili, never at a loss for words, explained: "We need to rebuild the
military. We will work very closely with the U.S. to get all of this
[equipment]." With the war over, he is even more anxious to get into NATO.
He says that Moscow would never have dared attack if only Tbilisi was on
the alliance roster.

Many Georgians appeared to share their president's extravagant expectations
of Washington. Parliamentarian Gia Tortladze acknowledged that "The
Americans never promised to send troops to Georgia," but he admitted, "I
hope the Americans will do more." Foreign policy analyst Archil Gegeshidze
complained: "The West's reaction was slow and inadequate," though he
thought allied protests might have caused the Russians to halt their
advance.

The New York Times quoted one soldier: "We killed as many of them as we
could. But where are our friends?" Complained another one, "If Americans
could do something, why didn't they help us?" He told the reporter: "Don't
ask us questions. Go ask your president." Another soldier complained
that "America and the European Union are spitting on us."

A refugee told McClatchy Newspapers: "The only way out is the help of
America." Another one affirmed: "The only things we can rely on are God and
the Americans." Similarly, a man who fled with his family to Tbilisi opined
that "America is the only light left for Georgia." But frustration with
Washington appeared to be widespread. One refugee asked a reporter for the
Los Angeles Times: "Will the Americans help us out?" Another one argued "If
you had said something stronger, we would not be in this. He admitted being
angry with the U.S.: "If you want to help, you have to help the end." A
farmer asked: "Why won't America and NATO help us? If they won't help us,
why did we help them in Iraq?" Some refugees, however, believed that the
U.S. had at least saved Tbilisi from Russian occupation: "Bush and McCain
have been very good for us," said one.

The incessant Georgian demands for assistance were made particularly
striking by the fact that Tbilisi paid not the slightest attention to
Washington's advice to avoid a conflict in the Caucasus. The State
Department's Matt Bryza, a professed friend of Georgia who was sent to
Tbilisi after Saakashvili triggered the war, explained: "Our message was
consistent to our Georgian colleagues … ‘Avoid a direct military
confrontation with Russia at all costs. You cannot prevail. It simply is
not possible.'" But that message apparently wasn't received or believed.

It may be that, as suggested by Minister Kutelia, the government simply
didn't believe Russia would react, especially given Georgia's close
relationship to the U.S. Or Saakashvili might have figured America would
bail his government out of any difficulties that resulted from his
aggressive military move. Never mind what the U.S. said. Presented with a
Georgian fait accompli, and the potential for a humiliating geopolitical
defeat if Moscow triumphed, the Bush administration would have no choice
but to embrace Tbilisi's attempt at territorial aggrandizement.

Indeed, there was ample reason for Saakashvili to expect support. U.S.
behavior provided an almost perfect example of a mixed message. The Bush
administration counseled caution, yes, but also meddled in Georgian affairs
to promote Saakashvili's rise to power through the Rose Revolution, helped
arm and train his military, provided abundant economic and military aid,
championed his nation's candidacy for NATO, lavished praise on him for
being a wonderful democrat and friend of America, and sent President Bush
to Tbilisi. Says Charles Kupchan of the Council on Foreign
Relations, "Through private channels [the U.S.] was saying: ‘You have to
behave' but publicly it was portraying him as a knight in shining armor, a
beacon of freedom." The result, notes Jon Sawyer of the Pulitzer Center for
Crisis Reporting, was "that Mikheil Saakashvili approached this thinking
that he could be an extension of the West, a partner of the United States."
In July Secretary Rice visited Tbilisi and declared, with Saakashvili next
to her: "Mr. President, we always fight for our friends." During the war
Vice President Richard Cheney told Saakashvili that "Russian aggression
must not go unanswered."

None of these actions or statements formally committed the U.S. to go to
war, but they could easily have been interpreted that way by an
authoritarian populist used to getting his own way and a man desperate to
fulfill his campaign promise to reconquer lost territory. Certainly he
wanted to believe Washington's expansive professions of comradeship.
Observes Kupchan, U.S. policy made Saakashvili "overreach, it made him feel
at the end of the day that the West would come to his assistance if he got
into trouble." Former Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage observed
that Saakashvili "for some reason seems to think he has a hall pass from
this administration."

Moreover, even some Americans believed Washington owed Georgia a defense.
Bill Kristol, who advocates U.S. military action almost everywhere against
almost everyone, wrote: "But Georgia, a nation of about 4.6 million, has
had the third-largest military presence – about 2,000 troops – fighting
along with U.S. soldiers and marines in Iraq. For this reason alone, we owe
Georgia a serious effort to defend its sovereignty."

It's a truly extraordinary argument. First, President Saakashvili joined the
U.S. in Iraq not to fight the scourge of Islamo-fascism, spread democracy,
or do whatever else Kristol believes America to have achieved by invading
Iraq, but to win American support for his own plans, including forcibly
regaining control of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. At least Georgia put in a
real troop contingent, in contrast to, say, Estonia, which nevertheless
preened for the cameras and seemed to believe that it deserved similar
solicitude from Washington. Estonian Foreign Minister Urmas Paet claimed
that his country's 40-man contingent in Iraq was part of
Estonia's "important partnership" with America. The Estonians naturally
scurried to Washington for support in the midst of a dispute with Moscow
over moving a World War II monument last year.

Second, even had Georgia sent far more soldiers to Iraq there would have
been no warrant for a commitment to confront a nuclear armed power over the
dubious territorial ambitions of its smaller neighbor. It's a bit like
Moscow promising to defend Mexico in a dispute with the U.S. over the
efforts of American-born secessionists in Baja California. The policy would
be insane, whether or not Mexico had contributed troops to a Russian
peacekeeping mission in, oh, South Ossetia.

Yet for the Georgians hope consistently triumphed experience. "Bush knows
what to do," declared one refugee. But President Bush didn't know what to
do. He offered valiant rhetoric: "The people of Georgia have cast their lot
with the free world, and we will not cast them aside." But all they got was
more rhetoric.

Sadly, Georgians failed to learn from history. James J. Townsend, Jr. of the
Atlantic Council argues that what happened to Georgia is essentially "what
happened to Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968." Americans and
Europeans enthusiastically welcomed upheaval in the Soviet bloc, but none
of them seriously contemplated igniting a likely world war against a
nuclear-armed superpower, no matter how strong their sympathies with
genuine freedom fighters.

Who to blame for such misunderstandings, even today? Both sides are at
fault.

Washington policymakers tend to overplay their hand, providing lavish public
expressions of support without intending to do anything serious in return.
The Bush administration is no different. Leslie H. Gelb, former president
of the Council on Foreign Relations, complains that Washington should
not "jeopardize these nascent democracies by letting them think that they
can put themselves in this kind of situation and survive. You are not just
putting democracy on the line in Georgia, you are putting all of these
places in that neighborhood on the line." Alas, it is likely to get worse
if Sen. John McCain wins the presidency. He still believes in the
neoconservative fantasy of U.S. omnipotence, able to direct world events
with the flick of a finger. But he, too, would soon find out very painfully
that it doesn't work that way.

Moreover, smaller countries tend to look at an American expression of
fraternity and friendship and imagine military intervention and security
guarantees. Notes Townsend, "I have seen it over and over again be
misconstrued by nations not used to dealing with us. I think they
misunderstand our eagerness and enthusiasm and think we are going to be
behind them for anything." Certainly the Georgian president believed in the
Bush administration's pretensions, and his people are paying a high price
as a result.

Ironically, the one person who truly understands Mikheil Saakashvili appears
to be Vladimir Putin. Nasty autocrat he might be, but he recognized
that "Georgia's aspiration to join NATO … is driven by its attempt to drag
other nations and peoples into its bloody adventures." Saakashvili is many
things, but friend of the U.S. he is not. His overriding objective is to
make Washington the military guarantor of his nation and its territorial
ambitions, even if that requires the U.S. to risk war with nuclear-armed
Russia in the latter's backyard. With friends like that, America really
doesn't need any enemies.

The Georgian fiasco provides the U.S. government with an opportunity to
reverse its tendency to mislead friendly nations into taking outrageous
geopolitical risks in the expectation of receiving American military
support. The first step is to say no to Georgia – no U.S. forces stationed
in Georgia, no rebuilding of Georgia's military, no membership in NATO. And
no, Globocop America won't be coming if Tbilisi makes another grab for
Abkhazia or South Ossetia and gets in another war with Russia.

More broadly, Washington needs to put defense back into its defense policy.
The U.S. should announce that it will be conducting no more crusades for
democracy and no more preventive wars against theoretical threats. It will
no longer spend American resources and risk American lives to protect
populous and prosperous states or rebuild failed societies. And it
certainly won't use military force to sort out messy ethnic squabbles in
distant lands which are of much greater concern to other powers, including
ones with nuclear weapons.
 
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