Part 3 of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 legally
obliges us to reveal encryption keys to the powers that be should they
require it from us for:

http://www.opsi.gov.uk/acts/acts2000/ukpga_20000023_en_8#pt3-pb1-l1g49
(3) A disclosure requirement in respect of any protected information
is necessary on grounds falling within this subsection if it is
necessary—
(a) in the interests of national security;
(b) for the purpose of preventing or detecting crime; or
(c) in the interests of the economic well-being of the United
Kingdom.

What a general set of catch-all phrases!

What happens if a person is unable to give a working decryption key
because:
1) They forgot, or pretend to forget
2) There is a tamper proof program/device that corrupts/destroys the
data should heartbeats to an authentication daemon or server fail to
return the correct value.
3) The encrypted file is split between two or more parties, where at
least one is offshore. No single person, even with the right
passphrase, can decrypt the file without the co-operation of everyone.
Decrypting the file requires all the parts to be combined.
4) They claim to have the encrypted file split between two or more
parties, where at least one is offshore. (Are you legally obliged to
identify these persons?)
5) Any other method you can think of.

Has there been any case law regarding this particular section of RIPA
of late?

In addition to the consequences laid out in Section 53:
(5) A person guilty of an offence under this section shall be liable—
(a) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not
exceeding two years or to a fine, or to both;
(b) on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding
six months or to a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum, or to
both.

will the person be possibly guilty of contempt of court if they defy a
court request via (1) - (5) above to provide an encryption key?

On Wed, 8 Apr 2009 02:19:18 -0700 (PDT), Oppressed Subject wrote:

> Part 3 of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 legally
> obliges us to reveal encryption keys to the powers that be should they
> require it from us for:
> 
> http://www.opsi.gov.uk/acts/acts2000/ukpga_20000023_en_8#pt3-pb1-l1g49
> (3) A disclosure requirement in respect of any protected information
> is necessary on grounds falling within this subsection if it is
> necessary¡X
> (a) in the interests of national security;
> (b) for the purpose of preventing or detecting crime; or
> (c) in the interests of the economic well-being of the United
> Kingdom.
> 
> What a general set of catch-all phrases!
> 
> What happens if a person is unable to give a working decryption key
> because:
> 1) They forgot, or pretend to forget

Blow torch and a pair of pliers! 

> 2) There is a tamper proof program/device that corrupts/destroys the
> data should heartbeats to an authentication daemon or server fail to
> return the correct value.
> 3) The encrypted file is split between two or more parties, where at
> least one is offshore. No single person, even with the right
> passphrase, can decrypt the file without the co-operation of everyone.
> Decrypting the file requires all the parts to be combined.
> 4) They claim to have the encrypted file split between two or more
> parties, where at least one is offshore. (Are you legally obliged to
> identify these persons?)
> 5) Any other method you can think of.
> 
> Has there been any case law regarding this particular section of RIPA
> of late?
> 
> In addition to the consequences laid out in Section 53:
> (5) A person guilty of an offence under this section shall be liable¡X
> (a) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not
> exceeding two years or to a fine, or to both;
> (b) on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding
> six months or to a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum, or to
> both.
> 
> will the person be possibly guilty of contempt of court if they defy a
> court request via (1) - (5) above to provide an encryption key?

On Apr 8, 9:19 pm, Oppressed Subject  wrote:
> Part 3 of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 legally
> obliges us to reveal encryption keys to the powers that be should they
> require it from us for:
>
> http://www.opsi.gov.uk/acts/acts2000/ukpga_20000023_en_8#pt3-pb1-l1g49
> (3) A disclosure requirement in respect of any protected information
> is necessary on grounds falling within this subsection if it is
> necessary—
> (a) in the interests of national security;
> (b) for the purpose of preventing or detecting crime; or
> (c) in the interests of the economic well-being of the United
> Kingdom.
>
> What a general set of catch-all phrases!
>
> What happens if a person is unable to give a working decryption key
> because:
> 1) They forgot, or pretend to forget

A spell in the water dungeon at the Tower will do wonders for such
forgetfulness.

There are no doubt various racks and thumbscrews around the country
that can be pressed into service.

In article <fkfj1snd9fno.dlg@butter.yermuffin.sweety>, 
moralNOTmaze@tiscali.co.uk says...
> 
> On Wed, 8 Apr 2009 02:19:18 -0700 (PDT), Oppressed Subject wrote:

A load of crap, all snipped.

I see that schools have broken up for Easter.

On Apr 8, 10:19 am, Oppressed Subject 
wrote:
> Part 3 of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 legally
> obliges us to reveal encryption keys to the powers that be should they
> require it from us for:
>
> http://www.opsi.gov.uk/acts/acts2000/ukpga_20000023_en_8#pt3-pb1-l1g49
> (3) A disclosure requirement in respect of any protected information
> is necessary on grounds falling within this subsection if it is
> necessary—
> (a) in the interests of national security;
> (b) for the purpose of preventing or detecting crime; or
> (c) in the interests of the economic well-being of the United
> Kingdom.
>
> What a general set of catch-all phrases!
>
> What happens if a person is unable to give a working decryption key
> because:
> 1) They forgot, or pretend to forget
> 2) There is a tamper proof program/device that corrupts/destroys the
> data should heartbeats to an authentication daemon or server fail to
> return the correct value.
> 3) The encrypted file is split between two or more parties, where at
> least one is offshore. No single person, even with the right
> passphrase, can decrypt the file without the co-operation of everyone.
> Decrypting the file requires all the parts to be combined.
> 4) They claim to have the encrypted file split between two or more
> parties, where at least one is offshore. (Are you legally obliged to
> identify these persons?)
> 5) Any other method you can think of.
>
> Has there been any case law regarding this particular section of RIPA
> of late?
>
> In addition to the consequences laid out in Section 53:
> (5) A person guilty of an offence under this section shall be liable—
> (a) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not
> exceeding two years or to a fine, or to both;
> (b) on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding
> six months or to a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum, or to
> both.
>
> will the person be possibly guilty of contempt of court if they defy a
> court request via (1) - (5) above to provide an encryption key?

... at least "to protect morals etc" is not there.

WM
www.critest.com

On 8 Apr, 10:19, Oppressed Subject  wrote:
> Part 3 of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 legally
> obliges us to reveal encryption keys to the powers that be should they
> require it from us for:
>
> http://www.opsi.gov.uk/acts/acts2000/ukpga_20000023_en_8#pt3-pb1-l1g49
> (3) A disclosure requirement in respect of any protected information
> is necessary on grounds falling within this subsection if it is
> necessary—
> (a) in the interests of national security;
> (b) for the purpose of preventing or detecting crime; or
> (c) in the interests of the economic well-being of the United
> Kingdom.
>
> What a general set of catch-all phrases!
>
> What happens if a person is unable to give a working decryption key
> because:
> 1) They forgot, or pretend to forget
> 2) There is a tamper proof program/device that corrupts/destroys the
> data should heartbeats to an authentication daemon or server fail to
> return the correct value.
> 3) The encrypted file is split between two or more parties, where at
> least one is offshore. No single person, even with the right
> passphrase, can decrypt the file without the co-operation of everyone.
> Decrypting the file requires all the parts to be combined.
> 4) They claim to have the encrypted file split between two or more
> parties, where at least one is offshore. (Are you legally obliged to
> identify these persons?)
> 5) Any other method you can think of.
>
> Has there been any case law regarding this particular section of RIPA
> of late?
>
> In addition to the consequences laid out in Section 53:
> (5) A person guilty of an offence under this section shall be liable—
> (a) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not
> exceeding two years or to a fine, or to both;
> (b) on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding
> six months or to a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum, or to
> both.
>
> will the person be possibly guilty of contempt of court if they defy a
> court request via (1) - (5) above to provide an encryption key?

This seems to be a better option:
http://www.truecrypt.org/docs/?s=hidden-volume

--
Remember Dr Folkman

On Apr 8, 11:47 am, "dpydot...@hotmail.com" 
wrote:
> On 8 Apr, 10:19, Oppressed Subject  wrote:
>
>
>
>
>
> > Part 3 of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 legally
> > obliges us to reveal encryption keys to the powers that be should they
> > require it from us for:
>
> >http://www.opsi.gov.uk/acts/acts2000/ukpga_20000023_en_8#pt3-pb1-l1g49
> > (3) A disclosure requirement in respect of any protected information
> > is necessary on grounds falling within this subsection if it is
> > necessary—
> > (a) in the interests of national security;
> > (b) for the purpose of preventing or detecting crime; or
> > (c) in the interests of the economic well-being of the United
> > Kingdom.
>
> > What a general set of catch-all phrases!
>
> > What happens if a person is unable to give a working decryption key
> > because:
> > 1) They forgot, or pretend to forget
> > 2) There is a tamper proof program/device that corrupts/destroys the
> > data should heartbeats to an authentication daemon or server fail to
> > return the correct value.
> > 3) The encrypted file is split between two or more parties, where at
> > least one is offshore. No single person, even with the right
> > passphrase, can decrypt the file without the co-operation of everyone.
> > Decrypting the file requires all the parts to be combined.
> > 4) They claim to have the encrypted file split between two or more
> > parties, where at least one is offshore. (Are you legally obliged to
> > identify these persons?)
> > 5) Any other method you can think of.
>
> > Has there been any case law regarding this particular section of RIPA
> > of late?
>
> > In addition to the consequences laid out in Section 53:
> > (5) A person guilty of an offence under this section shall be liable—
> > (a) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not
> > exceeding two years or to a fine, or to both;
> > (b) on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding
> > six months or to a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum, or to
> > both.
>
> > will the person be possibly guilty of contempt of court if they defy a
> > court request via (1) - (5) above to provide an encryption key?
>
> This seems to be a better option:http://www.truecrypt.org/docs/?s=hidden-volume
>
> --
> Remember Dr Folkman- Hide quoted text -
>
> - Show quoted text -

Thanks, I am aware of TC and its features.

That said...
1) Do the police have to demonstrate a file is an encrypted one and
not say a corrupted one for them to compel you to give them the
decryption key?

2) Do the police have to demonstrate the existence of a hidden volume
for them to compel you to give them its decryption key as well?

On Apr 8, 11:44 am, Webmanager_CritEst  wrote:
> On Apr 8, 10:19 am, Oppressed Subject 
> wrote:
>
>
>
>
>
> > Part 3 of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 legally
> > obliges us to reveal encryption keys to the powers that be should they
> > require it from us for:
>
> >http://www.opsi.gov.uk/acts/acts2000/ukpga_20000023_en_8#pt3-pb1-l1g49
> > (3) A disclosure requirement in respect of any protected information
> > is necessary on grounds falling within this subsection if it is
> > necessary—
> > (a) in the interests of national security;
> > (b) for the purpose of preventing or detecting crime; or
> > (c) in the interests of the economic well-being of the United
> > Kingdom.
>
> > What a general set of catch-all phrases!
>
> > What happens if a person is unable to give a working decryption key
> > because:
> > 1) They forgot, or pretend to forget
> > 2) There is a tamper proof program/device that corrupts/destroys the
> > data should heartbeats to an authentication daemon or server fail to
> > return the correct value.
> > 3) The encrypted file is split between two or more parties, where at
> > least one is offshore. No single person, even with the right
> > passphrase, can decrypt the file without the co-operation of everyone.
> > Decrypting the file requires all the parts to be combined.
> > 4) They claim to have the encrypted file split between two or more
> > parties, where at least one is offshore. (Are you legally obliged to
> > identify these persons?)
> > 5) Any other method you can think of.
>
> > Has there been any case law regarding this particular section of RIPA
> > of late?
>
> > In addition to the consequences laid out in Section 53:
> > (5) A person guilty of an offence under this section shall be liable—
> > (a) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not
> > exceeding two years or to a fine, or to both;
> > (b) on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding
> > six months or to a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum, or to
> > both.
>
> > will the person be possibly guilty of contempt of court if they defy a
> > court request via (1) - (5) above to provide an encryption key?
>
> ... at least "to protect morals etc" is not there.
>
> WMwww.critest.com- Hide quoted text -
>
> - Show quoted text -

Doesn't have to be. I can't think of any scenario where the police
can't argue it isn't in the economic well being of the UK for you to
release the decryption key.

They can say "Give it to us now or you'll be wasting police time,
hence taxpayer money, hence it is in the economic well being of the UK
that you co-operate immediately."

On 8 Apr, 13:02, Oppressed Subject  wrote:

> Thanks, I am aware of TC and its features.
>
> That said...
> 1) Do the police have to demonstrate a file is an encrypted one and
> not say a corrupted one for them to compel you to give them the
> decryption key?
>
> 2) Do the police have to demonstrate the existence of a hidden volume
> for them to compel you to give them its decryption key as well?

On (1) I guess it would be a question of who the court believes.
Presumably a file which is merely corrupted has recognisable non-
random strings of data. An encrpyted file would have a completely
different fingerprint. It would be hard to explain to a magistrate (or
jury if you were being prosecuted for noncompliance) why you had a
file of completely random bits and bytes on your hard-drive.

As for (2) I thought the whole point of Truecrypt "plausible
deniability" was that it is impossible to tell whether the empty space
within an encrypted file which has been partially decrypted is more
data or just noise.

On 8 Apr, 13:04, Oppressed Subject  wrote:
>
> I can't think of any scenario where the police can't
> argue it isn't in the economic well being of the UK for
> you to release the decryption key.
>
> They can say "Give it to us now or you'll be wasting police time,
> hence taxpayer money, hence it is in the economic well being of the UK
> that you co-operate immediately."

The police can argue that. The question is whether a court would
accept it. Under s.6 HRA the court has to apply the doctrine of
proportionality and decide whether the interference with your Art 8
right to privacy is necessary in a democratic society to save a small
sum of public money. I don't think it would.

--
Remember Dr Folkman

On Apr 8, 12:40 pm, "dpydot...@hotmail.com" 
wrote:
> On 8 Apr, 13:02, Oppressed Subject  wrote:
>
> > Thanks, I am aware of TC and its features.
>
> > That said...
> > 1) Do the police have to demonstrate a file is an encrypted one and
> > not say a corrupted one for them to compel you to give them the
> > decryption key?
>
> > 2) Do the police have to demonstrate the existence of a hidden volume
> > for them to compel you to give them its decryption key as well?
>
> On (1) I guess it would be a question of who the court believes.
> Presumably a file which is merely corrupted has recognisable non-
> random strings of data. An encrpyted file would have a completely
> different fingerprint. It would be hard to explain to a magistrate (or
> jury if you were being prosecuted for noncompliance) why you had a
> file of completely random bits and bytes on your hard-drive.

Swapfiles and virtual memory might have something close to a jumble of
apparently random data. Also bear in mind not only do most O/Ses
create these files, some programs do as well in the course of their
execution. If the programs or O/S was hastily shut down (in the event
of say a police raid), it is quite possible that these files would
still exist on the hard drive and be scrambled.

> As for (2) I thought the whole point of Truecrypt "plausible
> deniability" was that it is impossible to tell whether the empty space
> within an encrypted file which has been partially decrypted is more
> data or just noise.

For the authorities to prove the existence of a hidden TC volume:
1) Hidden room cameras
2) Telephoto lenses from across the street
3) Sufficiently sophisticated trojans

For the authorities to provide evidence of the strong possibility of a
hidden TC volume:
1) Your website visiting history, now stored by your ISP, and visiting
links such as the precise one you provided.
2) The presence of a large TC file with an apparently small amount of
protected data, once you reveal the standard encryption key.

How can you prove your TC volume didn't have a hidden compartment if
the police demonstrate to the court that they have reasons to believe
it has?

On 8 Apr, 14:36, Oppressed Subject  wrote:
> On Apr 8, 12:40 pm, "dpydot...@hotmail.com" 
> wrote:
>
> > > 1) Do the police have to demonstrate a file is an encrypted one and
> > > not say a corrupted one for them to compel you to give them the
> > > decryption key?
>
> > > 2) Do the police have to demonstrate the existence of a hidden volume
> > > for them to compel you to give them its decryption key as well?
>
> > On (1) I guess it would be a question of who the court believes.
> > Presumably a file which is merely corrupted has recognisable non-
> > random strings of data. An encrpyted file would have a completely
> > different fingerprint. It would be hard to explain to a magistrate (or
> > jury if you were being prosecuted for noncompliance) why you had a
> > file of completely random bits and bytes on your hard-drive.
>
> Swapfiles and virtual memory might have something close to a jumble of
> apparently random data. Also bear in mind not only do most O/Ses
> create these files, some programs do as well in the course of their
> execution. If the programs or O/S was hastily shut down (in the event
> of say a police raid), it is quite possible that these files would
> still exist on the hard drive and be scrambled.

'Close to a jumble of apparently random data' is a long way from
random data. It would be very easy to analsyse corrupted or scrambled
files and find recognisable non-random bits of data within them.

> > As for (2) I thought the whole point of Truecrypt "plausible
> > deniability" was that it is impossible to tell whether the empty space
> > within an encrypted file which has been partially decrypted is more
> > data or just noise.
>
> For the authorities to prove the existence of a hidden TC volume:
> 1) Hidden room cameras
> 2) Telephoto lenses from across the street
> 3) Sufficiently sophisticated trojans
>
> For the authorities to provide evidence of the strong possibility of a
> hidden TC volume:
> 1) Your website visiting history, now stored by your ISP, and visiting
> links such as the precise one you provided.
> 2) The presence of a large TC file with an apparently small amount of
> protected data, once you reveal the standard encryption key.
>
> How can you prove your TC volume didn't have a hidden compartment if
> the police demonstrate to the court that they have reasons to believe
> it has?

'Strong possibility' and 'reasons to believe' are not enough. The
criminal standard of proof is beyond reasonable doubt. Even is the
prosecution produced both pieces of evidence which you suggest there
would still be room for reasonable doubt that you have a hidden file.

--
Remember Dr Folkman

On Apr 8, 2:51 pm, "dpydot...@hotmail.com" 
wrote:
> On 8 Apr, 14:36, Oppressed Subject  wrote:
>
>
>
>
>
> > On Apr 8, 12:40 pm, "dpydot...@hotmail.com" 
> > wrote:
>
> > > > 1) Do the police have to demonstrate a file is an encrypted one and
> > > > not say a corrupted one for them to compel you to give them the
> > > > decryption key?
>
> > > > 2) Do the police have to demonstrate the existence of a hidden volume
> > > > for them to compel you to give them its decryption key as well?
>
> > > On (1) I guess it would be a question of who the court believes.
> > > Presumably a file which is merely corrupted has recognisable non-
> > > random strings of data. An encrpyted file would have a completely
> > > different fingerprint. It would be hard to explain to a magistrate (or
> > > jury if you were being prosecuted for noncompliance) why you had a
> > > file of completely random bits and bytes on your hard-drive.
>
> > Swapfiles and virtual memory might have something close to a jumble of
> > apparently random data. Also bear in mind not only do most O/Ses
> > create these files, some programs do as well in the course of their
> > execution. If the programs or O/S was hastily shut down (in the event
> > of say a police raid), it is quite possible that these files would
> > still exist on the hard drive and be scrambled.
>
> 'Close to a jumble of apparently random data' is a long way from
> random data. It would be very easy to analsyse corrupted or scrambled
> files and find recognisable non-random bits of data within them.
>
>
>
>
>
> > > As for (2) I thought the whole point of Truecrypt "plausible
> > > deniability" was that it is impossible to tell whether the empty space
> > > within an encrypted file which has been partially decrypted is more
> > > data or just noise.
>
> > For the authorities to prove the existence of a hidden TC volume:
> > 1) Hidden room cameras
> > 2) Telephoto lenses from across the street
> > 3) Sufficiently sophisticated trojans
>
> > For the authorities to provide evidence of the strong possibility of a
> > hidden TC volume:
> > 1) Your website visiting history, now stored by your ISP, and visiting
> > links such as the precise one you provided.
> > 2) The presence of a large TC file with an apparently small amount of
> > protected data, once you reveal the standard encryption key.
>
> > How can you prove your TC volume didn't have a hidden compartment if
> > the police demonstrate to the court that they have reasons to believe
> > it has?
>
> 'Strong possibility' and 'reasons to believe' are not enough. The
> criminal standard of proof is beyond reasonable doubt. Even is the
> prosecution produced both pieces of evidence which you suggest there
> would still be room for reasonable doubt that you have a hidden file.
>
> --
> Remember Dr Folkman- Hide quoted text -
>
> - Show quoted text -- Hide quoted text -
>
> - Show quoted text -

Alright, thanks for your input.

On 8 Apr, 16:34, Oppressed Subject  wrote:

> Alright, thanks for your input.

You're welcome - don't forget Dr Folkman

--
Remember Dr Folkman

On Wed, 8 Apr 2009 05:40:08 -0700 (PDT), "dpydotsmw@hotmail.com"
 wrote:

>On (1) I guess it would be a question of who the court believes.
>Presumably a file which is merely corrupted has recognisable non-
>random strings of data. An encrpyted file would have a completely
>different fingerprint. It would be hard to explain to a magistrate (or
>jury if you were being prosecuted for noncompliance) why you had a
>file of completely random bits and bytes on your hard-drive.

Data that has been compressed using an efficient compression algorithm
will also appear to be random data.  Any recognisable patterns in the
data means that there was scope for further compression.

As data files become larger and larger to accomodate high quality
audio and visual media, so the number of files containing efficiently
compressed data increases.  There are over 50 different compression
formats for video files alone, and computer games may well contain
lengthy video sequences in proprietry compressed formats.

Then, with the advent of DRM came huge numbers of encrypted media
files that the user cannot render into a decrypted format - and indeed
in many cases is unable to decrypt in any way at all.

Therefore the presence of a corrupted file that contains apparently
random data should not be that suspicious.  In addition, few people
are aware of, or have the slightest idea of the function of the vast
majority of files on their computer system, so don't think the suspect
is lying because s/he claims to have no knowlege of the suspect file.

On my C drive root I once came across a several hundred MB file called
"File0000.chk" or similar.  Almost certainly a reconstructed file from
a broken directory chain caused by a power failure whilst I was
encoding a DVD movie.  Its data was no clue as to its origin and
appeared to be random.

-- 
Cynic

On Wed, 8 Apr 2009 07:51:20 -0700 (PDT), "dpydotsmw@hotmail.com"
 wrote:

>'Strong possibility' and 'reasons to believe' are not enough. The
>criminal standard of proof is beyond reasonable doubt. Even is the
>prosecution produced both pieces of evidence which you suggest there
>would still be room for reasonable doubt that you have a hidden file.

OK, how's this:

1) Large container, but only small amount of data using the key the
suspect provided.
2) ISP logs show many visits to "iffy" sites and Google searches using
"iffy" search terms.
3) Recent files list of certain applications shows that files with
suggestive names were opened on volumes that are not physically
present on the PC or the container offered by the defendent.

Are you confident a jury would not convict on that evidence?

-- 
Cynic

On Thu, 09 Apr 2009 19:39:22 +0100, Cynic wrote:

> On Wed, 8 Apr 2009 07:51:20 -0700 (PDT), "dpydotsmw@hotmail.com"
>  wrote:
> 
>>'Strong possibility' and 'reasons to believe' are not enough. The
>>criminal standard of proof is beyond reasonable doubt. Even is the
>>prosecution produced both pieces of evidence which you suggest there
>>would still be room for reasonable doubt that you have a hidden file.
> 
> OK, how's this:
> 
> 1) Large container, but only small amount of data using the key the
> suspect provided.
> 2) ISP logs show many visits to "iffy" sites and Google searches using
> "iffy" search terms.
> 3) Recent files list of certain applications shows that files with
> suggestive names were opened on volumes that are not physically present
> on the PC or the container offered by the defendent.
> 
> Are you confident a jury would not convict on that evidence?

Intercept evidence is not yet acceptable in an an English court.


-- 
William Black

On Apr 9, 7:53 pm, William Black  wrote:
> On Thu, 09 Apr 2009 19:39:22 퍝, Cynic wrote:
> > On Wed, 8 Apr 2009 07:51:20 -0700 (PDT), "dpydot...@hotmail.com"
> >  wrote:
>
> >>'Strong possibility' and 'reasons to believe' are not enough. The
> >>criminal standard of proof is beyond reasonable doubt. Even is the
> >>prosecution produced both pieces of evidence which you suggest there
> >>would still be room for reasonable doubt that you have a hidden file.
>
> > OK, how's this:
>
> > 1) Large container, but only small amount of data using the key the
> > suspect provided.
> > 2) ISP logs show many visits to "iffy" sites and Google searches using
> > "iffy" search terms.
> > 3) Recent files list of certain applications shows that files with
> > suggestive names were opened on volumes that are not physically present
> > on the PC or the container offered by the defendent.
>
> > Are you confident a jury would not convict on that evidence?
>
> Intercept evidence is not yet acceptable in an an English court.
>
> --
> William Black

Where does he mention intercept data?

WM

"Webmanager_CritEst"  wrote in message 
news:658fe572-8503-4347-910b-6b6a1727ce6f@r34g2000vba.googlegroups.com...
On Apr 9, 7:53 pm, William Black  wrote:
> On Thu, 09 Apr 2009 19:39:22 +0100, Cynic wrote:
> > On Wed, 8 Apr 2009 07:51:20 -0700 (PDT), "dpydot...@hotmail.com"
> >  wrote:
>
> >>'Strong possibility' and 'reasons to believe' are not enough. The
> >>criminal standard of proof is beyond reasonable doubt. Even is the
> >>prosecution produced both pieces of evidence which you suggest there
> >>would still be room for reasonable doubt that you have a hidden file.
>

Doesn't wiping the hdd fill it with random data ?

On Thu, 09 Apr 2009 12:29:26 -0700, Webmanager_CritEst wrote:

> On Apr 9, 7:53 pm, William Black  wrote:
>> On Thu, 09 Apr 2009 19:39:22 +0100, Cynic wrote:
>> > On Wed, 8 Apr 2009 07:51:20 -0700 (PDT), "dpydot...@hotmail.com"
>> >  wrote:
>>
>> >>'Strong possibility' and 'reasons to believe' are not enough. The
>> >>criminal standard of proof is beyond reasonable doubt. Even is the
>> >>prosecution produced both pieces of evidence which you suggest there
>> >>would still be room for reasonable doubt that you have a hidden file.
>>
>> > OK, how's this:
>>
>> > 1) Large container, but only small amount of data using the key the
>> > suspect provided.
>> > 2) ISP logs show many visits to "iffy" sites and Google searches
>> > using "iffy" search terms.
>> > 3) Recent files list of certain applications shows that files with
>> > suggestive names were opened on volumes that are not physically
>> > present on the PC or the container offered by the defendent.
>>
>> > Are you confident a jury would not convict on that evidence?
>>
>> Intercept evidence is not yet acceptable in an an English court.
>>
>> --
>> William Black
> 
> Where does he mention intercept data?

I though all RIPA information was considered 'intercept data'.



-- 
William Black

On Thu, 09 Apr 2009 20:30:57 +0100, Airmax wrote:

> "Webmanager_CritEst"  wrote in message
> 
news:658fe572-8503-4347-910b-6b6a1727ce6f@r34g2000vba.googlegroups.com...
> On Apr 9, 7:53 pm, William Black  wrote:
>> On Thu, 09 Apr 2009 19:39:22 +0100, Cynic wrote:
>> > On Wed, 8 Apr 2009 07:51:20 -0700 (PDT), "dpydot...@hotmail.com"
>> >  wrote:
>>
>> >>'Strong possibility' and 'reasons to believe' are not enough. The
>> >>criminal standard of proof is beyond reasonable doubt. Even is the
>> >>prosecution produced both pieces of evidence which you suggest there
>> >>would still be room for reasonable doubt that you have a hidden file.
>>
>>
> Doesn't wiping the hdd fill it with random data ?

Not unless you use a clever erasure program.

It just deletes the file headers.

You can buy recovery software to get it all back.




-- 
William Black

On Apr 9, 8:36 pm, William Black  wrote:
> On Thu, 09 Apr 2009 12:29:26 -0700, Webmanager_CritEst wrote:
> > On Apr 9, 7:53 pm, William Black  wrote:
> >> On Thu, 09 Apr 2009 19:39:22 퍝, Cynic wrote:
> >> > On Wed, 8 Apr 2009 07:51:20 -0700 (PDT), "dpydot...@hotmail.com"
> >> >  wrote:
>
> >> >>'Strong possibility' and 'reasons to believe' are not enough. The
> >> >>criminal standard of proof is beyond reasonable doubt. Even is the
> >> >>prosecution produced both pieces of evidence which you suggest there
> >> >>would still be room for reasonable doubt that you have a hidden file> >> > OK, how's this:
>
> >> > 1) Large container, but only small amount of data using the key the
> >> > suspect provided.
> >> > 2) ISP logs show many visits to "iffy" sites and Google searches
> >> > using "iffy" search terms.
> >> > 3) Recent files list of certain applications shows that files with
> >> > suggestive names were opened on volumes that are not physically
> >> > present on the PC or the container offered by the defendent.
>
> >> > Are you confident a jury would not convict on that evidence?
>
> >> Intercept evidence is not yet acceptable in an an English court.
>
> >> --
> >> William Black
>
> > Where does he mention intercept data?
>
> I though all RIPA information was considered 'intercept data'.
>
> --
> William Black

Oh, no, no, no ....

RIPA ruling closes encryption key loophole
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2008/10/14/ripa_self_incrimination_ruling/

WM

William Black wrote:

> On Thu, 09 Apr 2009 20:30:57 +0100, Airmax wrote:
> 
> > "Webmanager_CritEst"  wrote in message
> > 
> news:658fe572-8503-4347-910b-6b6a1727ce6f@r34g2000vba.googlegroups.com
> ...
> > On Apr 9, 7:53 pm, William Black 
> > wrote:
> >> On Thu, 09 Apr 2009 19:39:22 +0100, Cynic wrote:
> >> > On Wed, 8 Apr 2009 07:51:20 -0700 (PDT), "dpydot...@hotmail.com"
> >> >  wrote:
> > > 
> >> >>'Strong possibility' and 'reasons to believe' are not enough. The
> >> >>criminal standard of proof is beyond reasonable doubt. Even is
> the >> >>prosecution produced both pieces of evidence which you
> suggest there >> >>would still be room for reasonable doubt that you
> have a hidden file.
> > > 
> > > 
> > Doesn't wiping the hdd fill it with random data ?
> 
> Not unless you use a clever erasure program.
> 
> It just deletes the file headers.
> 
> You can buy recovery software to get it all back.

Well, the chances of 'all' decreases as further use increases.

WM

--