what a load of bollocks, I thought at the time, and I still think this now, 
if all the drivers knew the signal could not be seen well, surely they 
should have been extra careful, if I went through a red traffic light and 
told the police I couldn't see it properly they'd laugh at me, and quite 
rightly
james

However, if a number of drivers repeatedly said the same thing, the traffic 
light would've been moved.

I wasn't entirely convinced by the demonising of Corbett, though.   More 
complex than that.

SiC

"John Doe"  wrote in message 
news:Bw%Xe.16582$6p.11660@newsfe4-gui.ntli.net...

> what a load of bollocks, I thought at the time, and I still think this 
> now, if all the drivers knew the signal could not be seen well, surely 
> they should have been extra careful, if I went through a red traffic light 
> and told the police I couldn't see it properly they'd laugh at me, and 
> quite rightly
> james
> 

On Tue, 20 Sep 2005 21:52:33 GMT, "John Doe" 
wrote:


>what a load of bollocks, I thought at the time, and I still think this now, 
>if all the drivers knew the signal could not be seen well, surely they 
>should have been extra careful, if I went through a red traffic light and 
>told the police I couldn't see it properly they'd laugh at me, and quite 
>rightly
>

Let them laugh, guilt and verdicts are decided by the courts not by
the police despite the recent rantings of a certain senior police
officer who seems to be having the same delusions of omnipotence as
his Prime Minister namesake; the offence is disobeying the traffic
light not driving past it, if it cannot be seen then you cannot obey
or disobey it. If a signal cannot be seen clearly then the blame lies
with whoever has caused or allowed it to be so, not with those who
cannot see it.
-- 
                                                             _______
 +---------------------------------------------------+      |\\   //|
 | Charles Ellson: charles@e11son.demon.co.uk        |      | \\ // |
 +---------------------------------------------------+      |  > <  |
                                                            | // \\ |
                                              Alba gu brath |//___\\|

It was interesting to see that they (the producers of Derailed)
suggested the track in advance of SN109 was straight on (Down) with a
crossover onto the Up Main.

Never actually seen the track layout but I was told by several people
that there is no crossover, it is just a left hand curve, through a
trailing set of points  straight onto the Up Main.

I still believe this is wrong, and there should have been traps or a
sand drag.

If a driver chooses to pass a red signal FOR WHATEVER REASON the only
thing that will stop him is a solicited brake application from a device
of some kind.

It is not safe to assume that a driver will always stop at a red
signal. even though it would be rather good to think along those lines.

Cheers

wrote in message 
news:1127256561.807007.15770@f14g2000cwb.googlegroups.com...

>
> It was interesting to see that they (the producers of Derailed)
> suggested the track in advance of SN109 was straight on (Down) with a
> crossover onto the Up Main.
>
> Never actually seen the track layout but I was told by several people
> that there is no crossover, it is just a left hand curve, through a
> trailing set of points  straight onto the Up Main.
>
> I still believe this is wrong, and there should have been traps or a
> sand drag.
>
> If a driver chooses to pass a red signal FOR WHATEVER REASON the only
> thing that will stop him is a solicited brake application from a device
> of some kind.
>
> It is not safe to assume that a driver will always stop at a red
> signal. even though it would be rather good to think along those lines.


Assuming that the layout shown on the programme was accurate, then yes it is 
negligent for the points to be set to provide a route from SN109 to the 
track where the HST was until the signal is actually cleared to green. ATP 
or not ATP, always plan for the worst case - that a driver will SPAD at a 
signal and will not stop immediately after but will continue. I think I 
remember seeing diagrams at the time of the crash that showed the layout as 
in the programme. I'll have to dig out my copy of the accident report.

I think one of the most horrifying scenes in the programme was cut from the 
track diagram of the Thames train passing the signal to a shot of the 
various signallers appearing to be unconcerned at what had happened, 
followed by the cut to the fireball. I had imagined that in the few seconds 
between the SPAD and the collision, the signallers would be going frantic 
trying to find every possible way of stopping the trains. It was very 
telling that the signaller at the inquiry said that about 25 seconds elapsed 
between the SPAD and him putting the HST's signal to red, and that the 
Signal On button was not intended as an emergency stop because of the time 
it would take to untangle things afterwards.

"Charles Ellson"  wrote in message 
news:cj31j11c0161a1dds8qr2adj9u4mov43lg@4ax.com...

> On Tue, 20 Sep 2005 21:52:33 GMT, "John Doe" 
> wrote:
>
>>what a load of bollocks, I thought at the time, and I still think this 
>>now,
>>if all the drivers knew the signal could not be seen well, surely they
>>should have been extra careful, if I went through a red traffic light and
>>told the police I couldn't see it properly they'd laugh at me, and quite
>>rightly
>>
> Let them laugh, guilt and verdicts are decided by the courts not by
> the police despite the recent rantings of a certain senior police
> officer who seems to be having the same delusions of omnipotence as
> his Prime Minister namesake; the offence is disobeying the traffic
> light not driving past it, if it cannot be seen then you cannot obey
> or disobey it. If a signal cannot be seen clearly then the blame lies
> with whoever has caused or allowed it to be so, not with those who
> cannot see it.


Am I wrong in thinking , an unlit signal is the same as one at Danger?

On the roads an unlit signal gives you the right to proceed only when it is 
safe to do so.

To consider blaming the man from "Osram" or similar person is the act of a 
fool.

KW

"SiC"  wrote in message
news:dgq2p3$rug$1@nwrdmz01.dmz.ncs.ea.ibs-infra.bt.com...

> However, if a number of drivers repeatedly said the same thing, the
traffic
> light would've been moved.


What really p***ed me off in "Derailed" was the fact that every single
character used the phrase "running a red light". Now I agree that this
phrase is starting to become more widely used over the last three or four
years, thanks to the media suddenly switching to using it (it must be in the
"how to become a newsreader" manual, 2002 edition), but it was certainly in
very few people's vocabulary in 1999 and even today the majority of people
are more likely to use "going through a red light", "passing a red light" or
some other derivative. Who is it that decides that our language will be
changed by the media, rather than by common usage?

wrote in message 
news:1127256561.807007.15770@f14g2000cwb.googlegroups.com...

>
> It was interesting to see that they (the producers of Derailed)
> suggested the track in advance of SN109 was straight on (Down) with a
> crossover onto the Up Main.
>
> Never actually seen the track layout but I was told by several people
> that there is no crossover, it is just a left hand curve, through a
> trailing set of points  straight onto the Up Main.
>
> I still believe this is wrong, and there should have been traps or a
> sand drag.


There's a diagram of the layout at 
http://www.hse.gov.uk/railways/paddrail/lgri.pdf
-- 
David Biddulph

"Ken Ward"  wrote in message 
news:WL0Ye.29399$Aa1.21442@newsfe5-gui.ntli.net...

>
> "Charles Ellson"  wrote in message 
> news:cj31j11c0161a1dds8qr2adj9u4mov43lg@4ax.com...
>> On Tue, 20 Sep 2005 21:52:33 GMT, "John Doe" 
>> wrote:
>>
>>>what a load of bollocks, I thought at the time, and I still think this 
>>>now,
>>>if all the drivers knew the signal could not be seen well, surely they
>>>should have been extra careful, if I went through a red traffic light and
>>>told the police I couldn't see it properly they'd laugh at me, and quite
>>>rightly
>>>
>> Let them laugh, guilt and verdicts are decided by the courts not by
>> the police despite the recent rantings of a certain senior police
>> officer who seems to be having the same delusions of omnipotence as
>> his Prime Minister namesake; the offence is disobeying the traffic
>> light not driving past it, if it cannot be seen then you cannot obey
>> or disobey it. If a signal cannot be seen clearly then the blame lies
>> with whoever has caused or allowed it to be so, not with those who
>> cannot see it.
>
> Am I wrong in thinking , an unlit signal is the same as one at Danger?
>
> On the roads an unlit signal gives you the right to proceed only when it 
> is safe to do so.
>
> To consider blaming the man from "Osram" or similar person is the act of a 
> fool.


I am reminded of the early GWR instruction about signals (quoted in Rolt's 
"Red for Danger"). "A Signal Ball will be seen at teh entrance to Reading 
Stattion when the Line is right for the Train to go in. If the Ball is not 
visible the Train must not pass it." Applied to the Ladbroke crash, you have 
to be able to see the signal (and be able to distinguish it from all the 
other clutter like bridges, signal/OHLE gantries and signals that don't 
apply to you) in order to know where to stop if you can't see the red light 
on that signal.

As a car driver, if I'm driving a road that I know very well (in railway 
terms, I have "route knowledge"), I know pretty well where the speed limit 
and bend signs are, and where there are traffic lights and junctions. But 
I'd be hard pressed to say *exactly* where they are in relation to other 
landmarks or exactly which order they come in.

Wasn't there a suggestion (not referred to in the programme, AFAIK) that the 
low-angle sun may have shone onto other lights making them appear partly 
illuminated? Or has that theory been discounted?

"David Biddulph"  wrote in message
news:dgq617$6qh$1@nwrdmz01.dmz.ncs.ea.ibs-infra.bt.com...

>  wrote in message
> news:1127256561.807007.15770@f14g2000cwb.googlegroups.com...
>>
>> It was interesting to see that they (the producers of Derailed)
>> suggested the track in advance of SN109 was straight on (Down) with a
>> crossover onto the Up Main.
>>
>> Never actually seen the track layout but I was told by several people
>> that there is no crossover, it is just a left hand curve, through a
>> trailing set of points  straight onto the Up Main.
>>
>> I still believe this is wrong, and there should have been traps or a
>> sand drag.
>
> There's a diagram of the layout at
> http://www.hse.gov.uk/railways/paddrail/lgri.pdf


So, as shown in the programme, there was the option for a SPADding train to
be routed right at points 8059B onto the down relief rather than routed
left into the path of the HST at 8063B. Having the 8059B-8063B route set 
(which would cause a head-on collision in the event of a SPAD) while the 
signal protecting it is a red seems an incredible oversight. Surely that 
route should only be set once the way is clear (ie after the HST has passed) 
as an immediate pre-requisite of clearing SN109. Of course you cannot win: 
the Thames Train could have been diverted onto the Down Relief into the path 
of a train heading west from Paddington: but at least the closing speed 
would have been less.


Looking at the track layout, one thing is very obvious: if the signals on 
Gantry 8 are obscured by Goldbourne Road bridge, there should be some way of 
repeating them on the east side of the bridge to give the driver as much of 
an advanced view as possible.

On Wed, 21 Sep 2005 00:04:27 +0100, "Martin Underwood" 
wrote:


>I think one of the most horrifying scenes in the programme was cut from the 
>track diagram of the Thames train passing the signal to a shot of the 
>various signallers appearing to be unconcerned at what had happened, 
>followed by the cut to the fireball. I had imagined that in the few seconds 
>between the SPAD and the collision, the signallers would be going frantic 
>trying to find every possible way of stopping the trains.


From what I remember of the report there being some concern over the
warning the signallers received, with the SPAD alarm in the IECC
sounding the same as several other indicators of less critical things.
The result of this would be that initially the SPAD warning could have
been passed off as something unimportant. However, I didn't see
today's programme - was the signallers' apparent lack of concern still
there after they had realised that there had been a serious SPAD?

"Jack Taylor">

What really p***ed me off in "Derailed" was the fact that every single

> character used the phrase "running a red light".


It's a common North American phrase, been in use for donkey's years.


--
Cheers
Roger T.

Home of the Great Eastern Railway
http://www.highspeedplus.com/~rogertra/

On Tue, 20 Sep 2005 23:17:10 GMT, "Ken Ward" 
wrote:


>
>"Charles Ellson"  wrote in message 
>news:cj31j11c0161a1dds8qr2adj9u4mov43lg@4ax.com...
>> On Tue, 20 Sep 2005 21:52:33 GMT, "John Doe" 
>> wrote:
>>
>>>what a load of bollocks, I thought at the time, and I still think this 
>>>now,
>>>if all the drivers knew the signal could not be seen well, surely they
>>>should have been extra careful, if I went through a red traffic light and
>>>told the police I couldn't see it properly they'd laugh at me, and quite
>>>rightly
>>>
>> Let them laugh, guilt and verdicts are decided by the courts not by
>> the police despite the recent rantings of a certain senior police
>> officer who seems to be having the same delusions of omnipotence as
>> his Prime Minister namesake; the offence is disobeying the traffic
>> light not driving past it, if it cannot be seen then you cannot obey
>> or disobey it. If a signal cannot be seen clearly then the blame lies
>> with whoever has caused or allowed it to be so, not with those who
>> cannot see it.
>
>Am I wrong in thinking , an unlit signal is the same as one at Danger?
>

On the railway yes, but (in particular at night) the signal's location
has to be apparent/known before it can be recognised as an unlit
signal. On the railway an unlit colour-light signal is a(n extremely?)
rare occurrence due previously to the use of twin-filament lamps and
detection circuits and IMU in more recent times due to the redundancy
inherent in multi-LED replacements. In daylight on stretches of plain
track not involving junctions the presence of a signal (whether lit or
not) is usually self-evident but once other factors such as poor
visibility either of or to the signal or the "crowding" of signals
become involved then the opportunity for not recognising an unlit
signal or incorrectly reading the one beside or behind it is
available.


>On the roads an unlit signal gives you the right to proceed only when it is 
>safe to do so.
>

On the road an unseen and unlit signal is not legally there as it does
not match any of the legally-permitted signs in the Traffic Signs
Regulations and General Directions. OTOH an unlit but otherwise
clearly visible signal obliges a driver to proceed with more caution
than would otherwise apply (other at least the offence of driving
without due care and attention applies), a matter of conditional
permission not a right. No traffic lights ought to be sited in such a
way that their daytime presence is not apparent if no lamps are lit
but accidents, mishaps or idiotic parking will also sometimes
intervene in the case of properly-sited signals.


>To consider blaming the man from "Osram" or similar person is the act of a 
>fool.
>

The "man from Osram" is not the one involved with the planning,
siting, maintenance or occasional unplanned demolition of traffic
lights or railway signals. On the roads you will often find signs and
signals that have clearly not had a post-installation check to prove
that the planned position is a safe and effective position; there are
also examples to be found where the highway authority has clearly
failed to properly inspect signs in their later life (as evinced by
the persistence of obstruction) and thus allowed them to be obstructed
by newer signs, streetlamps and intrusion by trees and roadside
vegetation and structures.
-- 
                                                             _______
 +---------------------------------------------------+      |\\   //|
 | Charles Ellson: charles@e11son.demon.co.uk        |      | \\ // |
 +---------------------------------------------------+      |  > <  |
                                                            | // \\ |
                                              Alba gu brath |//___\\|

"Jack Taylor">

What really p***ed me off in "Derailed" was the fact that every single

> character used the phrase "running a red light".


It's a common North American phrase, been in use for donkey's years.


--
Cheers
Roger T.

Home of the Great Eastern Railway
http://www.highspeedplus.com/~rogertra/

On Wed, 21 Sep 2005 00:04:27 +0100, Martin Underwood wrote:


>  wrote in message 
> news:1127256561.807007.15770@f14g2000cwb.googlegroups.com...
>>
>> It was interesting to see that they (the producers of Derailed)
>> suggested the track in advance of SN109 was straight on (Down) with a
>> crossover onto the Up Main.
>>
>> Never actually seen the track layout but I was told by several people
>> that there is no crossover, it is just a left hand curve, through a
>> trailing set of points  straight onto the Up Main.
>>
>> I still believe this is wrong, and there should have been traps or a
>> sand drag.
>>
>> If a driver chooses to pass a red signal FOR WHATEVER REASON the only
>> thing that will stop him is a solicited brake application from a device
>> of some kind.
>>
>> It is not safe to assume that a driver will always stop at a red
>> signal. even though it would be rather good to think along those lines.
> 
> Assuming that the layout shown on the programme was accurate, then yes it is 
> negligent for the points to be set to provide a route from SN109 to the 
> track where the HST was until the signal is actually cleared to green. ATP 
> or not ATP, always plan for the worst case - that a driver will SPAD at a 
> signal and will not stop immediately after but will continue. I think I 
> remember seeing diagrams at the time of the crash that showed the layout as 
> in the programme. I'll have to dig out my copy of the accident report.
> 

This depends upon which layout is being referred to, the VDU layout or that
drawn by the retired railwayman.  The actual layout is a combination of the
two.  The VDU layout omitted the LH crossover to the Up Main (by which the
Bedwyn train would, under normal running, have crossed to the Down Main
after the passage of the HST), but correctly showed the RH crossover to the
Down Relief beyond this, and beyond which the extension of the
bi-directional line merged into the UM at a single trailing connection.
The sketch however only showed the first LH crossover to the UM, the
implication being that this is the path taken by the Turbo, via one end of
this crossover Reverse (with the other end Normal for the passage of the
HST).

With the layout as drawn in the sketch, flank protection would have been
automatic by virtue of the crossover, and there would have been no need to
add the sand drag as he suggested, as the continuation of the bi-di line
(which isn't actually there) would have provided a safe path (obviously
assuming no further conflicts beyond).



> I think one of the most horrifying scenes in the programme was cut from the 
> track diagram of the Thames train passing the signal to a shot of the 
> various signallers appearing to be unconcerned at what had happened, 
> followed by the cut to the fireball. I had imagined that in the few seconds 
> between the SPAD and the collision, the signallers would be going frantic 
> trying to find every possible way of stopping the trains. 


Having been in a large PSB when a SPAD took place (incidentally pre
Ladbroke Grove), I can say that the reaction of (all) the signalling staff
there was immediate when the SPAD was noticed.  In this instance no
opposing signals were clear so there was nothing that could be done, but
wait.  The train came to a stand several feet from an opposing train
standing in a platform, for which the route had not yet been set.  The
driver of the SPADing train was misled by a phantom aspect in a subsidary
signal, and was completely unconcerned by the train already in the platform
as he though he'd had a Call-on aspect.  

I suspect that the reactions shown in this scene were not typical and were
deliberately underplayed to emphasise the point.



> It was very 
> telling that the signaller at the inquiry said that about 25 seconds elapsed 
> between the SPAD and him putting the HST's signal to red, and that the 
> Signal On button was not intended as an emergency stop because of the time 
> it would take to untangle things afterwards.


AIUI, with SSI (IANAE), the All Signals On typically works by cutting the
power supply to the interlocking, which immediately causes the Trackside
Modules to go to "Red Retaining" due to the lack of communication from the
interlocking.  This fits with the mention of "booting up" afterwards, ie
restarting the interlocking.  Restarting all the trains and timetable would
have been a more onerous task.  

ASO is intended to provide an alternative method of emergency replacement
if the usual control methods aren't available (eg failure in communication
link between panel/VDU and the interlocking).  I don't know exactly what
the 'rules' are, but it is a useful means of "throwing everything back" in
a hurry if need be.  I found the suggestion that signalling staff would be
heavily criticised for using it in this case somewhat strange, although I
can also understand that there would be *some* hesitation before using it. 

It should be understood that in this case SN120 could have been
individually replaced using its normal controls (which is what the
signaller subsequently did).

I can also understand the expectation that the SPAD would be contained,
most of them stop within the overlap.  

Wobbly Bob

Martin Underwood wrote:

>  wrote in message
> news:1127256561.807007.15770@f14g2000cwb.googlegroups.com...

 I'll have to dig out my copy of the accident report.

No need. See http://www.railwaysarchive.co.uk/docSummary.php?docID=55
for track diagram at LB.

On Wed, 21 Sep 2005 01:05:13 +0100 someone who may be "Martin
Underwood"  wrote this:-


>Of course you cannot win: 
>the Thames Train could have been diverted onto the Down Relief into the path 
>of a train heading west from Paddington: but at least the closing speed 
>would have been less.


Would it? I assume that it is possible for trains to be running in
both directions on that bit of line. I don't know but I suspect that
the line speed was the same on all lines at that location.

It is very easy to look at the circumstances of a particular crash.
However, the designers of layouts don't have that luxury and they
must consider all possible crashes. A lot of the proposals people
have made avoid considering the other crashes that might have
happened instead.

I think the designers did the best they could, by providing the
greatest possible distance for a driver to realise their mistake and
stop. That worked, with one exception. Presumably the driver had not
absorbed enough intangible information to realise that he was on a
line he could not be on in normal working. The only thing they might
have done differently was traps leading to a sand drag (assuming
there is space for a sand drag). However, such things have their own
problems.


>Looking at the track layout, one thing is very obvious: if the signals on 
>Gantry 8 are obscured by Goldbourne Road bridge, there should be some way of 
>repeating them on the east side of the bridge to give the driver as much of 
>an advanced view as possible. 


Banner repeaters would probably have helped. ISTR they were
discussed at the circus, but I have no idea if the report mentions
them.


-- 
 David Hansen, Edinburgh | PGP email preferred-key number F566DA0E
 I will always explain revoked keys, unless the UK government
 prevents me by using the RIP Act 2000.

On Wed, 21 Sep 2005 00:15:40 GMT someone who may be 1577+2260
<someone@somewhere.x> wrote this:-


>From what I remember of the report there being some concern over the
>warning the signallers received, with the SPAD alarm in the IECC
>sounding the same as several other indicators of less critical things.
>The result of this would be that initially the SPAD warning could have
>been passed off as something unimportant.


The evidence is that it was an electronic bleep, precisely the same
electronic bleep as was made for anything else happening. ISTR that
there was one of these bleeps at least every couple of minutes,
perhaps more frequently. To find out what the bleep was about one
had to look at the list of events that have caused a bleep, rather
like looking at a log file. Hopefully there will not have been
another bleep, so one can see the particular bleep at one end of the
list. Before the crash I suspect there were several bleeps and log
file entries, as the track circuits were occupied by the local train
without a route having been set.

The programme was deliberately misleading, as it implied that there
was a loud and distinct noise when there was a SPAD. While some
things can be treated with artistic licence this not a thing that
should have been "enhanced".


>However, I didn't see
>today's programme - was the signallers' apparent lack of concern still
>there after they had realised that there had been a serious SPAD?


My recollection of the evidence is that they realised there had been
a SPAD quite quickly, when they saw the track circuit in advance of
the signal show occupied, I assume the headcode did not step forward
either (a common feature of power signalboxes to indicate that there
was a SPAD). They then waited for a short time for the train to come
to a stand (as they had done before) and were surprised to see the
next track circuit become occupied instead. They then realised the
train was running away and replaced the signal for the express to
danger and sent a stop message to the local train by CSR (the latter
cannot be confirmed as the data recording tape was not removed
afterwards and the cab equipment was destroyed).

Most people like to believe that they would instantly leap into
action in such a situation. However, that is with the benefit of
hindsight. I don't know that any more can realistically be expected
of humans, we are talking of seconds. It may be possible to do more
automatically, such as sending stop messages to trains in the area
and replacing likely signals to danger. However, I don't think any
earlier action would have made much difference for the express,
though an earlier stop message may have caused the local train
driver to stop.


-- 
 David Hansen, Edinburgh | PGP email preferred-key number F566DA0E
 I will always explain revoked keys, unless the UK government
 prevents me by using the RIP Act 2000.

On Tue, 20 Sep 2005 21:52:33 GMT someone who may be "John Doe"
 wrote this:-


>I went through a red traffic light and 
>told the police I couldn't see it properly they'd laugh at me


I suspect that every day motorists tell the police that they
couldn't see red signals. The usual excuse seems to be that the sun
was shining. Very few of these cases seem to get to court.


-- 
 David Hansen, Edinburgh | PGP email preferred-key number F566DA0E
 I will always explain revoked keys, unless the UK government
 prevents me by using the RIP Act 2000.

On Wed, 21 Sep 2005 00:30:54 +0100 someone who may be "Martin
Underwood"  wrote this:-


>Wasn't there a suggestion (not referred to in the programme, AFAIK) that the 
>low-angle sun may have shone onto other lights making them appear partly 
>illuminated?


The driving suggests that the driver thought that the signal was not
at danger but showing a proceed aspect. He approached it cautiously,
then applied power and accelerated almost to the point of collision.
There was nothing to intervene if this was the mistake he made. Had
TPWS been ready and installed then it would have intervened. Had
SRAWS not been cancelled then it would have displayed the aspect of
the signal in the cab, applied the brakes if the driver acknowledged
the wrong aspect (having thought the signal was showing a proceed
aspect) and would have applied the brakes at the signal had the
driver acknowledged the correct aspect approaching the signal and
then passed it.


>Or has that theory been discounted?


It is a possibility, but there are others. Nobody knows. It is
possible that at a critical point of the approach the driver saw all
the other signals on the gantry showing danger, but did not see
SN109 at danger because it was hidden behind an insulator. Having
seen this he may have formed an opinion that it was showing a
proceed aspect, perhaps an opinion strengthened by a faint ghosting
that might make the signal appear to be showing a faint yellow or
double yellow at various points as he snaked towards it.


-- 
 David Hansen, Edinburgh | PGP email preferred-key number F566DA0E
 I will always explain revoked keys, unless the UK government
 prevents me by using the RIP Act 2000.

> It is very easy to look at the circumstances of a particular crash.
> However, the designers of layouts don't have that luxury and they
> must consider all possible crashes. A lot of the proposals people
> have made avoid considering the other crashes that might have
> happened instead.
>


From what I remember of an interview with one of the designers, the layout
was designed with automatic train protection in mind. Had they known that
this was not going to be provided, the design would probably not have been
allowed.

>I think one of the most horrifying scenes in the programme was cut from the 
>track diagram of the Thames train passing the signal to a shot of the 
>various signallers appearing to be unconcerned at what had happened, 
>followed by the cut to the fireball. I had imagined that in the few seconds 
>between the SPAD and the collision, the signallers would be going frantic 
>trying to find every possible way of stopping the trains. It was very 
>telling that the signaller at the inquiry said that about 25 seconds elapsed 
>between the SPAD and him putting the HST's signal to red, and that the 
>Signal On button was not intended as an emergency stop because of the time 
>it would take to untangle things afterwards. 
>
>


I wonder if this would have been different before the advent of the
modern privatised railway?, in that the signallers would have hit the
stop everything mode?. Not having to worry about the pressure to keep
everything moving?....
-- 
Tony Sayer

In article <9d8Ye.112466$G8.30403@text.news.blueyonder.co.uk>, Anon
<anon@invalid.org-nospam> writes

>
>> It is very easy to look at the circumstances of a particular crash.
>> However, the designers of layouts don't have that luxury and they
>> must consider all possible crashes. A lot of the proposals people
>> have made avoid considering the other crashes that might have
>> happened instead.
>>
>
>From what I remember of an interview with one of the designers, the layout
>was designed with automatic train protection in mind. Had they known that
>this was not going to be provided, the design would probably not have been
>allowed.
>
>


Pardon my ignorance, was this also the reason that some form of AWS
wasn't in use?.....
-- 
Tony Sayer

David Hansen wrote:


> I suspect that every day motorists tell the police that they
> couldn't see red signals. The usual excuse seems to be that the sun
> was shining. Very few of these cases seem to get to court.


I think I have only genuinely not been able to see a traffic light once 
- this was going into Birmingham on the A45 at the Wheatsheaf junction 
with Hobs Moat Road. At certain times of the year, the sun is in just 
the wrong position meaning that you can't see the lights on the gantry 
opposite. If you know the sequence you can work out when to go by the 
traffic going in the opposite direction, but you could have been 
genuinely stuck if you didn't (until you heard horns from someone behind!).

-- 
Jonathan Stott
Canterbury Weather: http://www.canterburyweather.co.uk/
Reverse my e-mail address to reply by e-mail

On Wed, 21 Sep 2005 07:51:54 +0100, David Hansen wrote:


> On Wed, 21 Sep 2005 01:05:13 +0100 someone who may be "Martin
> Underwood"  wrote this:-
> 
>>Of course you cannot win: 
>>the Thames Train could have been diverted onto the Down Relief into the path 
>>of a train heading west from Paddington: but at least the closing speed 
>>would have been less.
> 
> Would it? I assume that it is possible for trains to be running in
> both directions on that bit of line. I don't know but I suspect that
> the line speed was the same on all lines at that location.
> 


The DR here is unidirectional, so any collision would 'only' have been a
sidelong one, albeit with the possibility of consequential fouling of the
Up Relief.
(see: <http://www.railwaysarchive.co.uk/documents/HSE_Lad_Track001.pdf> )


> It is very easy to look at the circumstances of a particular crash.
> However, the designers of layouts don't have that luxury and they
> must consider all possible crashes. A lot of the proposals people
> have made avoid considering the other crashes that might have
> happened instead.
> 


Since the portion of line between 8059B & 8063A is exclusively Up
direction, used only by trains coming off the Up Main then, IMO, it would
have made more sense for 8059B to have formed a crossover with 8063
instead, 8059A then being single ended.  This would have formed an inherent
trap (flank protection) for the Up Main.  


> I think the designers did the best they could, by providing the
> greatest possible distance for a driver to realise their mistake and
> stop. That worked, with one exception. Presumably the driver had not
> absorbed enough intangible information to realise that he was on a
> line he could not be on in normal working. 


But this only applies to the portion of line West of 8059B, the rest of the
line from there back to SN109 is bi-directional.  So this gives very little
thinking time (at 50MPH) before the Up Main is fouled.

<snip>


> Banner repeaters would probably have helped. ISTR they were
> discussed at the circus, but I have no idea if the report mentions
> them.


Agreed.  The natural sighting of those partcular signals would appear to be
spectacularly bad, as shown by the need (or at least the decision) to adopt
the 'reverse L' aspect layout which vertically separated the Red from the
others.  This probably falls under "it seemed like a good idea at the
time".


Wobbly Bob

On Tue, 20 Sep 2005 17:41:48 -0700, "Roger T."
 wrote:


>
>"Jack Taylor">
>
>What really p***ed me off in "Derailed" was the fact that every single
>> character used the phrase "running a red light".
>
>It's a common North American phrase, been in use for donkey's years.



I think that is his point - we don't call pavements sidewalks etc...
In 1999 I don't think "Running a red light" would have been vernacular

Charles Ellson wrote:

> On Tue, 20 Sep 2005 23:17:10 GMT, "Ken Ward" 
> wrote:
>
> >
> >"Charles Ellson"  wrote in message
> >news:cj31j11c0161a1dds8qr2adj9u4mov43lg@4ax.com...
> >> On Tue, 20 Sep 2005 21:52:33 GMT, "John Doe" 
> >> wrote:
> >>
> >>>what a load of bollocks, I thought at the time, and I still think this
> >>>now,
> >>>if all the drivers knew the signal could not be seen well, surely they
> >>>should have been extra careful, if I went through a red traffic light and
> >>>told the police I couldn't see it properly they'd laugh at me, and quite
> >>>rightly
> >>>
> >> Let them laugh, guilt and verdicts are decided by the courts not by
> >> the police despite the recent rantings of a certain senior police
> >> officer who seems to be having the same delusions of omnipotence as
> >> his Prime Minister namesake; the offence is disobeying the traffic
> >> light not driving past it, if it cannot be seen then you cannot obey
> >> or disobey it. If a signal cannot be seen clearly then the blame lies
> >> with whoever has caused or allowed it to be so, not with those who
> >> cannot see it.
> >
> >Am I wrong in thinking , an unlit signal is the same as one at Danger?
> >
> On the railway yes, but (in particular at night) the signal's location
> has to be apparent/known before it can be recognised as an unlit
> signal. On the railway an unlit colour-light signal is a(n extremely?)
> rare occurrence due previously to the use of twin-filament lamps and
> detection circuits and IMU in more recent times due to the redundancy
> inherent in multi-LED replacements. In daylight on stretches of plain
> track not involving junctions the presence of a signal (whether lit or
> not) is usually self-evident but once other factors such as poor
> visibility either of or to the signal or the "crowding" of signals
> become involved then the opportunity for not recognising an unlit
> signal or incorrectly reading the one beside or behind it is
> available.
>
> >On the roads an unlit signal gives you the right to proceed only when it is
> >safe to do so.
> >
> On the road an unseen and unlit signal is not legally there as it does
> not match any of the legally-permitted signs in the Traffic Signs
> Regulations and General Directions. OTOH an unlit but otherwise
> clearly visible signal obliges a driver to proceed with more caution
> than would otherwise apply (other at least the offence of driving
> without due care and attention applies), a matter of conditional
> permission not a right. No traffic lights ought to be sited in such a
> way that their daytime presence is not apparent if no lamps are lit
> but accidents, mishaps or idiotic parking will also sometimes
> intervene in the case of properly-sited signals.
>
> >To consider blaming the man from "Osram" or similar person is the act of a
> >fool.
> >
> The "man from Osram" is not the one involved with the planning,
> siting, maintenance or occasional unplanned demolition of traffic
> lights or railway signals. On the roads you will often find signs and
> signals that have clearly not had a post-installation check to prove
> that the planned position is a safe and effective position; there are
> also examples to be found where the highway authority has clearly
> failed to properly inspect signs in their later life (as evinced by
> the persistence of obstruction) and thus allowed them to be obstructed
> by newer signs, streetlamps and intrusion by trees and roadside
> vegetation and structures.
> --
>                                                              _______




When someone does "run a red light" on the road (the phrase complained
about before), the implication is that the driver was being selfish and
in a hurry.  It also achieves something, in that the driver might slip
in front of several other vehicles and get to the destination sooner.

It is almost inconceivable that a train driver would try to pass a red
light in order to slip in front of another train.

So in all the technical discussion, is anyone suggesting that the
driver was trying to commit suicide or insanely thought that there was
something to be gained?

So all that matters is that he was somehow fooled into passing the red
signal at a time when he wanted to drive his train normally and
survive.  How he was misled is what needed to be investigated and fixed.

On 21 Sep 2005 02:20:40 -0700 someone who may be "MIG"
 wrote this:-


>It is almost inconceivable that a train driver would try to pass a red
>light in order to slip in front of another train.


Inconceivable in current UK circumstances. It is often, jokingly,
stated that the computers have started printing out the paperwork
before the driver brings the train to a stand.


>So in all the technical discussion, is anyone suggesting that the
>driver was trying to commit suicide or insanely thought that there was
>something to be gained?


They are mentioned as possibilities. However, the former can almost
certainly be ruled out, the latter is even more unlikely. 


>So all that matters is that he was somehow fooled into passing the red
>signal at a time when he wanted to drive his train normally and
>survive.  How he was misled is what needed to be investigated


It was. However, all that people can do is try and understand what
happened. FWIW my own view is that the driver was at the most
dangerous stage of most new tasks. At first it is difficult. Then
there is the most dangerous stage where it seems easy. Then there is
the third stage where one has encountered some of the difficulties
and gained enough experience to appreciate the task properly. More
could have been done in training, but there is a limit to what is
possible.


>and fixed.


There is fixed and fixed. Before this particular crash the problem
with SPADS in the area seemed to be related to flashing yellow
aspects. They removed these and this seemed to have fixed the
problem. No doubt those concerned felt they had undertaken their
task properly and it must have been a shock for them that this crash
then occurred after their efforts.

The precise sequence of events in this particular crash is fixed.
Had it taken place this morning then the TPWS equipment on the local
train would have been activated, probably as the train passed SN109
but it might have been in the rear of (before) the signal depending
on the precise speed at the loops. The local train would then have
been stopped on the line it was on, probably several hundred metres
before the point of collision. 30-45 seconds after it had come to a
standstill the express would have passed it. What would have
happened next is a matter for conjecture.


-- 
 David Hansen, Edinburgh | PGP email preferred-key number F566DA0E
 I will always explain revoked keys, unless the UK government
 prevents me by using the RIP Act 2000.

On Wed, 21 Sep 2005 01:41:53 +0100 someone who may be Charles Ellson
 wrote this:-


>On the railway an unlit colour-light signal is a(n extremely?)
>rare occurrence due previously to the use of twin-filament lamps and
>detection circuits and IMU in more recent times due to the redundancy
>inherent in multi-LED replacements.


In earlier times it was more common, but still rare. Colour light
distants were provided with lamp proving circuits (and the LMS even
went as far as to provide a second yellow lamp/lens that could be
illuminated if the main one failed). In areas with continuous colour
light signalling pre-BR there was (often/always?)no lamp proving and
bulk lamp changing was used instead. This did mean the occasional
black signal, though I only recall one serious crash as a result.
AFAIK none of these installations is still in use, though some
lasted until the 1980s.

Perhaps at the start of BR they went for double filament bulbs and
lamp proving. In a BR designed power box if a filament fails then
the reserve filament is illuminated automatically. There is also an
indication for the technicians, so they can replace it when
convenient. If the reserve filament subsequently fails then the
signal in the rear is automatically placed or maintained at danger.
Note that this will happen whether the signal is displaying a
proceed or danger indication, though the second yellow lamp of a
double yellow indication is not proved.

I gather that the only great difference with modern installations is
that the indication of first filament failure can be seen by the
signalling staff, if they want to call up such things. The LED
signals seem to be a replacement for filament based ones and behave
in much the same way.


-- 
 David Hansen, Edinburgh | PGP email preferred-key number F566DA0E
 I will always explain revoked keys, unless the UK government
 prevents me by using the RIP Act 2000.

On Wed, 21 Sep 2005 08:59:29 +0100 someone who may be tony sayer
 wrote this:-


>Pardon my ignorance, was this also the reason that some form of AWS
>wasn't in use?.....


AWS was in use and the correct operation of it was logged by the
data recorders.




-- 
 David Hansen, Edinburgh | PGP email preferred-key number F566DA0E
 I will always explain revoked keys, unless the UK government
 prevents me by using the RIP Act 2000.

In article , David Hansen
 writes

>On Wed, 21 Sep 2005 08:59:29 +0100 someone who may be tony sayer
> wrote this:-
>
>>Pardon my ignorance, was this also the reason that some form of AWS
>>wasn't in use?.....
>
>AWS was in use and the correct operation of it was logged by the
>data recorders.
>


OK, so why didn't driver Hodder respond to the warning that this was
providing?...

-- 
Tony Sayer

"Roger T."  wrote in message
news:1127263504.709eeb8cf3db591195e3ef70ae82ded8@teranews...

>
> What really p***ed me off in "Derailed" was the fact that every single
> > character used the phrase "running a red light".
>
> It's a common North American phrase, been in use for donkey's years.


I was actually aware of its origins. However, it irritates me intensely that
the meeja decide to force feed the Great (and Stupid) British Public with
these transatlantic terms, whilst they, in turn, lap up anything from the
colonies, such as their dismal, retarded dramas and movies and their
so-called comedy programmes (which are, with the odd exception, only funny
in that they are so execrably bad and you can see the joke coming for about
twenty minutes - and yet the braindead audiences still guffaw wildly). It
irritates me even more when contemporary terminology appears in historical
pieces, such as the example given - the odd usage of the term (perhaps from
someone who had regularly been to the States) might have been forgiven but
for every character to use the term was unreal and inaccurate. Mind you, we
even had a Jane Austen (IIRC) adaptation here last year that included the
word "Cheers" or something like that, which I find it hard to believe would
have been in common parlance in Austen's day!

wrote in message
news:ln72j1tjc7f0rhf2pig4v179dhvtgdi9np@4ax.com...

> On Tue, 20 Sep 2005 17:41:48 -0700, "Roger T."
>  wrote:
> >
> >It's a common North American phrase, been in use for donkey's years.
>
> I think that is his point - we don't call pavements sidewalks etc...
> In 1999 I don't think "Running a red light" would have been vernacular


That was, indeed, my point.

"tony sayer"  wrote in message
news:j9PrxIA1eTMDFwhH@bancom.co.uk...

> OK, so why didn't driver Hodder respond to the warning that this was
> providing?...


That, of course, we will never know for certain.  AWS only tells the driver
whether the signal is green or not, so the warning is exactly the same for
double yellow, yellow or red.  From the fact that he accelerated we have to
assume that for some reason he believed SN109 was double yellow.

Roger

On Wed, 21 Sep 2005 11:36:37 +0100 someone who may be tony sayer
 wrote this:-


>>AWS was in use and the correct operation of it was logged by the
>>data recorders.
>
>OK, so why didn't driver Hodder respond to the warning that this was
>providing?...


He acknowledged it as normal. However, if he had formed the
impression that the signal was displaying a single or double yellow
then it is unlikely to have alerted him. This is an example of the
limitations of AWS and why, in my view, SRAWS should not have been
cancelled. However, that does not mean there was gross negligence by
the railways in not proceeding with SRAWS, it is possible to argue
the subject either way.

Given that they were where they were, the decision to continue with
TPWS (and speed it up by a year) was the right one in my view. TPWS
has already prevented several crashes. It buys the time to install
ETCS in a planned way, rather than rushing into it for political
reasons. After around a century of patchy progress I think things
are now proceeding along the right lines.


-- 
 David Hansen, Edinburgh | PGP email preferred-key number F566DA0E
 I will always explain revoked keys, unless the UK government
 prevents me by using the RIP Act 2000.

On Wed, 21 Sep 2005 09:31:25 +0100 someone who may be Wobbly Bob
 wrote this:-


>Since the portion of line between 8059B & 8063A is exclusively Up
>direction, used only by trains coming off the Up Main then, IMO, it would
>have made more sense for 8059B to have formed a crossover with 8063
>instead, 8059A then being single ended.  This would have formed an inherent
>trap (flank protection) for the Up Main.  


Having taken a good look at the diagram I agree.


>> I think the designers did the best they could, by providing the
>> greatest possible distance for a driver to realise their mistake and
>> stop.
>
>But this only applies to the portion of line West of 8059B, the rest of the
>line from there back to SN109 is bi-directional.  So this gives very little
>thinking time (at 50MPH) before the Up Main is fouled.


It gives less time. However, my recollection is that the only routes
from SN109 were either via 8055 to the relief line or via 8057 to
the main(s), so a more experienced driver would have had rather more
time that it at first appears.


>> Banner repeaters would probably have helped. ISTR they were
>> discussed at the circus, but I have no idea if the report mentions
>> them.
>
>Agreed.  The natural sighting of those partcular signals would appear to be
>spectacularly bad,


My recollection of the evidence is that moving them would have meant
other problems, due to the curves and other bridges. Without reading
the thing again I can't remember precisely what was the objection to
co-acting signals at ground level, but have a vague recollection
that one capable of displaying everything would have been too big to
avoid being struck by trains.


>as shown by the need (or at least the decision) to adopt
>the 'reverse L' aspect layout which vertically separated the Red from the
>others.  This probably falls under "it seemed like a good idea at the
>time".


I entirely agree.


-- 
 David Hansen, Edinburgh | PGP email preferred-key number F566DA0E
 I will always explain revoked keys, unless the UK government
 prevents me by using the RIP Act 2000.

"David Hansen"  wrote

>
> In earlier times it was more common, but still rare. Colour light
> distants were provided with lamp proving circuits (and the LMS even
> went as far as to provide a second yellow lamp/lens that could be
> illuminated if the main one failed). In areas with continuous colour
> light signalling pre-BR there was (often/always?)no lamp proving and
> bulk lamp changing was used instead. This did mean the occasional
> black signal, though I only recall one serious crash as a result.
> AFAIK none of these installations is still in use, though some
> lasted until the 1980s.
>

Are you referring to the collision on the Brighton line (early 1980s? -
shortly before the Three Bridges resignalling)?

Peter

"Jack Taylor"  wrote in message
news:_M0Ye.19951$hQ4.16806@newsfe4-win.ntli.net...

>
> "SiC"  wrote in message
> news:dgq2p3$rug$1@nwrdmz01.dmz.ncs.ea.ibs-infra.bt.com...
> > However, if a number of drivers repeatedly said the same thing, the
> traffic
> > light would've been moved.
>
> What really p***ed me off in "Derailed" was the fact that every single
> character used the phrase "running a red light". Now I agree that this
> phrase is starting to become more widely used over the last three or four
> years, thanks to the media suddenly switching to using it (it must be in
the
> "how to become a newsreader" manual, 2002 edition), but it was certainly
in
> very few people's vocabulary in 1999 and even today the majority of people
> are more likely to use "going through a red light", "passing a red light"
or
> some other derivative. Who is it that decides that our language will be
> changed by the media, rather than by common usage?


On the railway "passing a signal at danger" would be used.

Paul

"Ken Ward"  wrote in message
news:WL0Ye.29399$Aa1.21442@newsfe5-gui.ntli.net...

> Am I wrong in thinking , an unlit signal is the same as one at Danger?


Yes and it would be reported.  Signal lamps have more than one filament and
there are circuits to prove that at least one is working.

>
> On the roads an unlit signal gives you the right to proceed only when it
is
> safe to do so.


Another proof of the inherent lack of safety on the roads.


> To consider blaming the man from "Osram" or similar person is the act of a
> fool.

Quite so.

> KW



Paul

"Roger T."  wrote in message
news:1127263504.709eeb8cf3db591195e3ef70ae82ded8@teranews...

>
> "Jack Taylor">
>
> What really p***ed me off in "Derailed" was the fact that every single
> > character used the phrase "running a red light".
>
> It's a common North American phrase, been in use for donkey's years.
>


...and there's another damn good reason for not using it.

Roger

http://rpm-railpics.fotopic.net/
http://therailwaystationgallery.fotopic.net/
http://therailticketgallery.fotopic.net/

All opinions expressed are my own and do not necessarily reflect the views
or policies of my employer.

On Wed, 21 Sep 2005 12:32:24 +0000 (UTC) someone who may be "Peter
Masson"  wrote this:-


>> This did mean the occasional
>> black signal, though I only recall one serious crash as a result.
>> AFAIK none of these installations is still in use, though some
>> lasted until the 1980s.
>>
>Are you referring to the collision on the Brighton line (early 1980s? -
>shortly before the Three Bridges resignalling)?


Yes, between Hassocks and Preston Park.


-- 
 David Hansen, Edinburgh | PGP email preferred-key number F566DA0E
 I will always explain revoked keys, unless the UK government
 prevents me by using the RIP Act 2000.

"Robert Wilson"  wrote in message
news:43319027$0$73621$ed2619ec@ptn-nntp-reader03.plus.net...
 >

> Actually Gerald Corbett is working looking after a Pig.  It's called
> Woolworths.


And undoing the years of good work that Geoffrey Mulcahy put in!

"Robert Wilson" <


> Actually Gerald Corbett is working looking after a Pig.  It's called
> Woolworths.


What's "Woolworth's"?  ;-)

Not had them over here for 20 years or so.


--
Cheers
Roger T.

Home of the Great Eastern Railway
http://www.highspeedplus.com/~rogertra/

"Robert Wilson" <


> Actually Gerald Corbett is working looking after a Pig.  It's called
> Woolworths.


What's "Woolworth's"?  ;-)

Not had them over here for 20 years or so.


--
Cheers
Roger T.

Home of the Great Eastern Railway
http://www.highspeedplus.com/~rogertra/

On Wed, 21 Sep 2005 08:58:25 +0100, tony sayer 
wrote:


>I wonder if this would have been different before the advent of the
>modern privatised railway?, in that the signallers would have hit the
>stop everything mode?. Not having to worry about the pressure to keep
>everything moving?....


Not sure.  One thing that does surprise me, though, is that the
interlocking wasn't set up such that a detected SPAD would
*automatically* cause that mode to be engaged, or certainly to stop
all potentially conflicting movements.

Do modern computerised panels/IECCs provide this?

Neil

-- 
Neil Williams in Milton Keynes, UK
When replying please use neil at the above domain
'wensleydale' is a spam trap and is not read.

Neil Williams wrote:

> Not sure.  One thing that does surprise me, though, is that the
> interlocking wasn't set up such that a detected SPAD would
> *automatically* cause that mode to be engaged, or certainly to stop
> all potentially conflicting movements.


A couple of things to point out: -

1. At the time of the accident (1999), there was no "SPAD Alarm" at
Slough. All the signaller got was an ARS generated Track circuit
occupied out of sequence alarm which as pointed out is no more than the
normal alarms that IECCs generate frequently.

2. Since Paddington, all IECCs have had a simple, temporary SpadAlarm
added in the form of a unique alarm and LED message display. I believe
this taps into the ARS links with a PC.

NR have issued a standard for proper Spad Alarms which are integrated
into the system software and indicate in yellow the overlap that has
been occupied. They also display a message "SPAD by 1A11 at S1234" and
it is requested that acknowleging the alarm jumps to the detail view
where the incident occured to allow the signaller to quickly move
points or replace signals to mitigate the incident.
Systems must be able to send a message on the incident to connected
systems (such as CSR).

AFAIK, the only system that currently complies fully with these new
requirements is GE Transportation SpadAlert used with MCS on the WCML
at Rugby and Stoke on Trent.

3.In many cases, it is not possible or desirable for the system to
automatically take avoiding action because there are too many unknowns
and what might be best in some cases, might be disasterous in others,
and vary with what other trains are around. This is especially worth
noting as most SPADs are short and avoiding action might make things
worse. Some new interlockings do mitigate to some extent, but generally
the human signaller is the best person to make the decisions and SPAD
alarms draw their attention to the incident as fast as possible,
maximizing the time they have to make the correct avoiding action.

4. The Emergency Signals On Controls (ESOCs) are rarely, if ever used.
As well as replacing all signals, they kill the interlocking. Not only
does this take some time to recover, causing delays, but once you have
killed the interlocking you have other problems: -

a. You can not see what is happening in that area on the screen or
panel as the interlocking is turned off and unable to communicate with
the panel or the ground. You now have a potentially serious incident
and you are working blind.

b. With no interlocking, you can't take any evading action such as
moving points to divert other trains or the runaway.

c. With no interlocking, you loose all data logging which would be
useful in the investigation.

The purpose of the ESOCs is to stop trains in an emergency, when it is
not possible to do so by normal means, because of an interlocking
malfunction or systems failure.

All new installations have buttons or controls on the panel to replace
all signals in an area via the interlocking in a controlled way. These
are called Signal Group Replacement Controls (SGRCs).

Hope this helps!

regards
HN28

On 21 Sep 2005 12:23:05 -0700, hn28_signal@yahoo.co.uk wrote:


>Hope this helps!


It certainly does.  Thanks very much for this detailed and interesting
explanation.

Neil

-- 
Neil Williams in Milton Keynes, UK
When replying please use neil at the above domain
'wensleydale' is a spam trap and is not read.

On Wed, 21 Sep 2005 18:49:12 GMT, Neil Williams wrote:


> On Wed, 21 Sep 2005 08:58:25 +0100, tony sayer 
> wrote:
> 
>>I wonder if this would have been different before the advent of the
>>modern privatised railway?, in that the signallers would have hit the
>>stop everything mode?. Not having to worry about the pressure to keep
>>everything moving?....
> 
> Not sure.  One thing that does surprise me, though, is that the
> interlocking wasn't set up such that a detected SPAD would
> *automatically* cause that mode to be engaged, or certainly to stop
> all potentially conflicting movements.
> 
> Do modern computerised panels/IECCs provide this?
> 


This form of control was a normal feature of panels (and this is in the
days of relays) until the decision to dispense with it [1] (and some of the
more obscure instances of flank protection - "out of route" calling of
points) in the mid- to late 80s.  Cost and reliability were both factors in
this decision.  

In complex areas with bidirectional running the controls can be rather
horrendous due to the need to condition out track circuits occupied by
movements in the "safe" direction (proceeding away from the point of
conflict with the legitimate route).  If this isn't done, then the capacity
of the layout may suffer considerably, as perfectly safe concurrent
movements have to take place consecutively.

Following Ladbroke Grove however, this form of control is being
re-introduced, certainly for new schemes.

[1] by this I mean it wasn't provided on new schemes, I am not aware of any
intent or retrospective action to remove it from existing installations
"for the sake of it", though it may have been removed or simplified if
other major works were carried out.


Wobbly Bob

David Hansen  writes:


> Most people like to believe that they would instantly leap into
> action in such a situation. However, that is with the benefit of
> hindsight. I don't know that any more can realistically be expected
> of humans, we are talking of seconds.


That reminds me of one the incidents in one of Adrian Vaughn's
books. Where the signallers were all on the 'bus' phone and suddenly
heard the sound of levers being thrown back followed by 'obstruction
danger' on the bells. One of them had, even though he was on the
phone, heard a 'ting' as a train passed over treadle which it should
not have done. His reaction was almost instantaneous.

"Neil Williams"  wrote in message 
news:4331b384.3684898@news.tesco.net...

> On 21 Sep 2005 12:23:05 -0700, hn28_signal@yahoo.co.uk wrote:
>
>>Hope this helps!
>
> It certainly does.  Thanks very much for this detailed and interesting
> explanation.


Yes indeed. Very informative.

I find it hard to believe that signalling systems which could identify SPADs 
were designed initially to sound the same alarm as for other routine 
signalling events. How did that ever get past acceptance testing? You'd 
think that the need to distinguish SPADs from run-of-the-mill events was an 
essential feature.

In the case of the Ladbroke Grove crash, how long elapsed roughly between 
the Thames Train SPADding and the collision? If the signaller had put the 
HST's signals to danger as soon as the SPAD occurred, would it actually have 
had any effect or had the HST already passed its last signal by then?

How does Cab Secure Radio work? Does it send an alert that is targeted at a 
specific train or is it a broadcast to all trains in the vicinity? How is 
the alert notified to the driver? Is it a visible message with audible noise 
or is it actually the signaller's voice saying "Train ABCD, Stop!!!!!!!!"?

On Wed, 21 Sep 2005 12:41:31 +0100, David Hansen wrote:


> On Wed, 21 Sep 2005 09:31:25 +0100 someone who may be Wobbly Bob
>  wrote this:-
> 
>>Since the portion of line between 8059B & 8063A is exclusively Up
>>direction, used only by trains coming off the Up Main then, IMO, it would
>>have made more sense for 8059B to have formed a crossover with 8063
>>instead, 8059A then being single ended.  This would have formed an inherent
>>trap (flank protection) for the Up Main.  
> 
> Having taken a good look at the diagram I agree.
> 
>>> I think the designers did the best they could, by providing the
>>> greatest possible distance for a driver to realise their mistake and
>>> stop.
>>
>>But this only applies to the portion of line West of 8059B, the rest of the
>>line from there back to SN109 is bi-directional.  So this gives very little
>>thinking time (at 50MPH) before the Up Main is fouled.
> 
> It gives less time. However, my recollection is that the only routes
> from SN109 were either via 8055 to the relief line or via 8057 to
> the main(s), so a more experienced driver would have had rather more
> time that it at first appears.
> 


My reading of the probable routes was based on the fact that since the DR
is (or is shown to be) uni-directional beyond 8059 points, there can be no
Up direction movement over them, so if they are not used by Down movements
from "Line 3" to the DR, then they are superfluous, which would be unusual
to say the least.  

I would suggest that they *are* for movements from Line 3 to the DR, and
that 8055 are intended for one or more of the following:
Up direction movements from SN114;
Down direction movements from SN109 to the Carriage sidings;
and possibly an alternative route from SN109 to the DR (allowing SN120
overlap to be swung over 8063 R / 8059 N to permit a movement from SN107 to
the DM at the same time).

Routing Down movements to the DR via 8059 also leaves free the routes from
the UR to Lines 4 & 5, which would be blocked by a movement from SN109 to
the DR via 8055 Reverse, which would be unecessarily restrictive if 8055
were the only route to the DR.


Wobbly Bob

Martin Underwood wrote:

> I find it hard to believe that signalling systems which could identify SPADs
> were designed initially to sound the same alarm as for other routine
> signalling events. How did that ever get past acceptance testing? You'd
> think that the need to distinguish SPADs from run-of-the-mill events was an
> essential feature.


The purpose of the Out of Sequence alarms was to alert the signaller to
a potential track circuit failure. Its use as a SPAD alarm was
presumably just not considered. Hindsight is a wonderful thing -
unfortunatly it took some serious accidents to bring SPADs to the top
of the list and in everyones minds.

However, prevention is better than cure - Much better to stop the train
than to worry too much about alarms if it does. ATP (which wasn't
fitted to the 165s - why not?!) would have stopped the accident at
Paddington, and at Southall (where it was turned off). And now, we have
the cheaper, almost as effective, TPWS which has already prevented
serious accidents.


> In the case of the Ladbroke Grove crash, how long elapsed roughly between
> the Thames Train SPADding and the collision? If the signaller had put the
> HST's signals to danger as soon as the SPAD occurred, would it actually have
> had any effect or had the HST already passed its last signal by then?


I havn't time to look up the report but it was in there. I think the
conclusion was it was far too late to stop the HST and in any case even
if stationary, the 165 was accelerating at about 50mph towards it!

However, IIRC the signaller had about 5-10 seconds to get a STOP
message out on the CSR, which if reacted to by the 165 driver would
have stopped it just clear of the point of collision. As it was, the
collision was on the points with the 165 within a whisker of being head
on with the HST.

I think the points to the DR line would have been deadlocked (by the
165 being on the same TC as them) almost as soon as the SPAD occurred.


> How does Cab Secure Radio work? Does it send an alert that is targeted at a
> specific train or is it a broadcast to all trains in the vicinity? How is
> the alert notified to the driver?


It can be a GEN STOP to all trains in the area, or a STOP to a specific
train ID entered. The latter was done but far too late.

Whilst the standard calls for SPAD detection systems to be able to send
messages to other systems on a SPAD occuring, CSR has not been modified
to accept such messages yet. However, since Paddington, signallers have
been trained a lot more to go straight to the CSR ALL STOP as stopping
the train involved and those arround it is the fastest way of stopping
them. CSR is not in all areas though.


> Is it a visible message with audible noise
> or is it actually the signaller's voice saying "Train ABCD, Stop!!!!!!!!"?


I think it is a built in pre-recorded message or alarm. It is certainly
audable. Perhaps a driver can answer this?

regards
HN28

In article <dgq2p3$rug$1@nwrdmz01.dmz.ncs.ea.ibs-infra.bt.com>, SiC
 writes

>However, if a number of drivers repeatedly said the same thing, the traffic 
>light would've been moved.
>
>I wasn't entirely convinced by the demonising of Corbett, though.   More 
>complex than that.
>


Was he really as bad as made out, and would anyone else have coped
better in that really impossible situation?....
-- 
Tony Sayer

wrote in message 
news:1127333854.070973.87410@z14g2000cwz.googlegroups.com...

> However, prevention is better than cure - Much better to stop the train
> than to worry too much about alarms if it does. ATP (which wasn't
> fitted to the 165s - why not?!) would have stopped the accident at
> Paddington, and at Southall (where it was turned off). And now, we have
> the cheaper, almost as effective, TPWS which has already prevented
> serious accidents.


ISTR, BICBW, that when the 165s/166s were built the intention was that the 
Chiltern version was to be fitted with ATP for that route and the Thames 
units with GW ATP. Of course the Thames sets didn't get ATP. However, the 
relief lines out of Padd weren't ATP fitted until HEx came along, though I 
don't know how far out of Padd was fully ATP fitted as part of the initial 
installation.


>> How does Cab Secure Radio work? Does it send an alert that is targeted at 
>> a
>> specific train or is it a broadcast to all trains in the vicinity? How is
>> the alert notified to the driver?
>
> It can be a GEN STOP to all trains in the area, or a STOP to a specific
> train ID entered. The latter was done but far too late.
>
> Whilst the standard calls for SPAD detection systems to be able to send
> messages to other systems on a SPAD occuring, CSR has not been modified
> to accept such messages yet. However, since Paddington, signallers have
> been trained a lot more to go straight to the CSR ALL STOP as stopping
> the train involved and those arround it is the fastest way of stopping
> them. CSR is not in all areas though.


Nor is it on all trains. The HST would only have had NRN, not CSR.

wrote in message
news:1127333854.070973.87410@z14g2000cwz.googlegroups.com...

> I havn't time to look up the report but it was in there. I think the
> conclusion was it was far too late to stop the HST and in any case even
> if stationary, the 165 was accelerating at about 50mph towards it!
>
> However, IIRC the signaller had about 5-10 seconds to get a STOP
> message out on the CSR, which if reacted to by the 165 driver would
> have stopped it just clear of the point of collision. As it was, the
> collision was on the points with the 165 within a whisker of being head
> on with the HST.
>
> I think the points to the DR line would have been deadlocked (by the
> 165 being on the same TC as them) almost as soon as the SPAD occurred.


According to the copy I have, the CSR message would have had to be sent
within about 15 seconds to allow the 165 time to stop before fouling the up
main.  To divert the 165 to the down relief would have had to be done within
12 seconds.  The signal for the HST was replaced after about 18-20 seconds,
by which time the HST was so close to it that any braking made little
difference.

Roger

On Wed, 21 Sep 2005 00:30:54 +0100, Martin Underwood wrote in
<43309bb5$0$1278$ed2619ec@ptn-nntp-reader02.plus.net>, seen in
uk.railway:

[...]

> Wasn't there a suggestion (not referred to in the programme, AFAIK) that the 
> low-angle sun may have shone onto other lights making them appear partly 
> illuminated? Or has that theory been discounted? 


I believe the industry's official position was that this can't happen.

Which nicely explains the notice posted recently at my depot advising
us all to take care as there had been 3 SPADs across the (national)
network in which low sun "may" have led to misreads of the aspect
being displayed.
-- 
Ross, a.k.a.
Prof. E. Scrooge, CT, 153 & bar, Doctor of Cynicism (U. Life)
Hon. Pres., National Soc. for the Encouragement for Cruelty to Dogboxes
Proud to be the target of various trolls, sock puppets and other idiots

On 21 Sep 2005 13:17:34 -0700, hn28_signal@yahoo.co.uk wrote in
, seen in
uk.railway:

> Martin Underwood wrote:
[...]
> > Is it a visible message with audible noise
> > or is it actually the signaller's voice saying "Train ABCD, Stop!!!!!!!!"?
> 
> I think it is a built in pre-recorded message or alarm. It is certainly
> audable. Perhaps a driver can answer this?


Way back when, after the accident happened, Rob Vasey (one of those
who have long since stopped posting here, possibly after being subject
to pressure) posted in response to a similar question that a CSR STOP
is a *loud* audible alarm combined with a visual "STOP" message on the
CSR unit.
-- 
Ross, a.k.a.
Prof. E. Scrooge, CT, 153 & bar, Doctor of Cynicism (U. Life)
Hon. Pres., National Soc. for the Encouragement for Cruelty to Dogboxes
Proud to be the target of various trolls, sock puppets and other idiots

On Wed, 21 Sep 2005 23:23:25 +0100, Ross wrote:


> On Wed, 21 Sep 2005 00:30:54 +0100, Martin Underwood wrote in
> <43309bb5$0$1278$ed2619ec@ptn-nntp-reader02.plus.net>, seen in
> uk.railway:
> 
> [...]
>> Wasn't there a suggestion (not referred to in the programme, AFAIK) that the 
>> low-angle sun may have shone onto other lights making them appear partly 
>> illuminated? Or has that theory been discounted? 
> 
> I believe the industry's official position was that this can't happen.
> 


Well it shouldn't be, because it definitely can, though it depends upon the
condition of the lenses to some extent and, in the case of sub signals, the
type and design.

That sort of statement was made about searchlight signals, until a SPAD
somewhere on, IIRC, the  MML (a depot/siding outlet signal) when this was
found to be a possibility.  This was partly responsible for a programme to
remove them where possible, though some still survive (are the ones at
Nottingham Midland still there?).

 

> Which nicely explains the notice posted recently at my depot advising
> us all to take care as there had been 3 SPADs across the (national)
> network in which low sun "may" have led to misreads of the aspect
> being displayed.


In the case of the SPAD I referred to in an earlier post, two of us went
out to look at the signal before the early-ish morning rising sun moved too
much, this was probably within 10-15 mins of the incident, and we could see
a faint, but noticable, glow in the cats-eye lenses.  There was a
possibilty that the effect seen by the driver was worse than what we saw,
and neither of us were about to dismiss his claim of an apparently lit sub
aspect.


Wobbly Bob

"Wobbly Bob"  wrote in message
news:1gm6dfh5yd107$.zp78u0205uyb.dlg@40tude.net...


> That sort of statement was made about searchlight signals, until a SPAD
> somewhere on, IIRC, the  MML (a depot/siding outlet signal) when this was
> found to be a possibility.  This was partly responsible for a programme to
> remove them where possible, though some still survive (are the ones at
> Nottingham Midland still there?).


Surely you're far LESS likely to read a false aspect on a search light
signal because only the required aspect is visible? And yes, there are still
some at Nottigham Midland!


-- 
Ronnie
--
Have a great day...
....Have a Great Central day.
www.greatcentralrailway.com

On Wed, 21 Sep 2005 20:36:35 +0100 someone who may be Graham Murray
 wrote this:-


>His reaction was almost instantaneous. 


And I can think of other examples of the same sort of thing, but I
don't think they invalidate my point. In the case you mention the
train was derailed by trap points seconds after the indication in
the box, there was no possibility of time for the driver to come to
a stand.


-- 
 David Hansen, Edinburgh | PGP email preferred-key number F566DA0E
 I will always explain revoked keys, unless the UK government
 prevents me by using the RIP Act 2000.

On Wed, 21 Sep 2005 18:49:12 GMT someone who may be
wensleydale@pacersplace.org.uk (Neil Williams) wrote this:-


>Not sure.  One thing that does surprise me, though, is that the
>interlocking wasn't set up such that a detected SPAD would
>*automatically* cause that mode to be engaged,


That would cause needless delays to other trains.


>or certainly to stop all potentially conflicting movements.


That is more promising, together with sending stop messages on CSR
(and its replacement) to affected trains. I also think there is
scope for "playing trains" on a simulator, which could help hone
emergency and other out of the usual actions.


>Do modern computerised panels/IECCs provide this?


Slough New is a "modern" computerised panel.


-- 
 David Hansen, Edinburgh | PGP email preferred-key number F566DA0E
 I will always explain revoked keys, unless the UK government
 prevents me by using the RIP Act 2000.

On Wed, 21 Sep 2005 21:56:18 GMT someone who may be "Roger H.
Bennett"  wrote this:-


>The signal for the HST was replaced after about 18-20 seconds,
>by which time the HST was so close to it that any braking made little
>difference.


ISTR that had it been replaced earlier then the driver wouldn't have
seen it much earlier anyway. In a different crash it might have made
a difference though.


-- 
 David Hansen, Edinburgh | PGP email preferred-key number F566DA0E
 I will always explain revoked keys, unless the UK government
 prevents me by using the RIP Act 2000.

On 21 Sep 2005 13:17:34 -0700 someone who may be
hn28_signal@yahoo.co.uk wrote this:-


>ATP (which wasn't
>fitted to the 165s - why not?!) would have stopped the accident


As John has said, ATP was not fitted to the relief lines. Although
there were shrill voices at the start of the circus about this they
largely died down after the evidence was given. It simply wasn't
considered cost effective to fit expensive equipment to trains which
mostly ran on the relief lines.

It is also the case that the ATP trial on that line was about
express trains, including how to cope with gaps in the track
equipment (there was at least one gap to try this out). The other
ATP trial was about local trains. One can expand trials to cover
everything, but they are less likely to produce useful information
in this way. That is not to say that the ATP trial was run well, it
suffered a lack of focus and it seems to only have been the crash
that stung those involved into treating it more seriously.


-- 
 David Hansen, Edinburgh | PGP email preferred-key number F566DA0E
 I will always explain revoked keys, unless the UK government
 prevents me by using the RIP Act 2000.

On Wed, 21 Sep 2005 20:59:42 +0100 someone who may be Wobbly Bob
 wrote this:-


>My reading of the probable routes was based on the fact that since the DR
>is (or is shown to be) uni-directional beyond 8059 points, there can be no
>Up direction movement over them, so if they are not used by Down movements
>from "Line 3" to the DR, then they are superfluous, which would be unusual
>to say the least.


I have had another look and you are right, there is less distance to
realise a mistake than I thought. The diagram is also to scale,
along the line, which I didn't realise.


-- 
 David Hansen, Edinburgh | PGP email preferred-key number F566DA0E
 I will always explain revoked keys, unless the UK government
 prevents me by using the RIP Act 2000.

"Ross"  wrote in message
news:37n3j197lp8lsaubsgotttvumc0frn1gaj@4ax.com...

> On Wed, 21 Sep 2005 00:30:54 +0100, Martin Underwood wrote in
> <43309bb5$0$1278$ed2619ec@ptn-nntp-reader02.plus.net>, seen in
> uk.railway:
>
> [...]
> > Wasn't there a suggestion (not referred to in the programme, AFAIK) that
the
> > low-angle sun may have shone onto other lights making them appear partly
> > illuminated? Or has that theory been discounted?
>
> I believe the industry's official position was that this can't happen.
>

There was an accident near London Bridge around 1976 where the Inspecting
Officer accepted that the driver had been misled by the Sun reflected off a
position light signal into accepting it as clear when it was in fact at
danger.

There was also a sidelong collision near New Cross around the same time,
caused when a driver 'read through', and it transpired that he was not the
first to have fallen into the same trap at that signal.

I suspect  there are many examples where, despite the best efforts of the
designers, new signalling, when translated into hardware on the ground, has
thrown up difficulties for drivers.

Peter

On Wed, 21 Sep 2005 11:05:08 GMT someone who may be "Roger H.
Bennett"  wrote this:-


>From the fact that he accelerated we have to
>assume that for some reason he believed SN109 was double yellow.


Indeed.

Had the signal been displaying double yellow then it would also have
been displaying route information, as there was no "straight on"
route from the signal. A more experienced driver may well have
spotted this absence.


-- 
 David Hansen, Edinburgh | PGP email preferred-key number F566DA0E
 I will always explain revoked keys, unless the UK government
 prevents me by using the RIP Act 2000.

"David Hansen"  wrote in message 
news:nh55j1ljg9kqiq4tb6maosmb6mi638u1q2@4ax.com...

> On Wed, 21 Sep 2005 11:05:08 GMT someone who may be "Roger H.
> Bennett"  wrote this:-
>
>>From the fact that he accelerated we have to
>>assume that for some reason he believed SN109 was double yellow.
>
> Indeed.
>
> Had the signal been displaying double yellow then it would also have
> been displaying route information, as there was no "straight on"
> route from the signal. A more experienced driver may well have
> spotted this absence.
>
>
> -- 
> David Hansen, Edinburgh | PGP email preferred-key number F566DA0E
> I will always explain revoked keys, unless the UK government
> prevents me by using the RIP Act 2000.
>
>

I have always considered the Thames Train driver as the real victim of this 
awful preventable tragedy.

On Thu, 22 Sep 2005 12:49:55 +0100 someone who may be "4sub"
 wrote this:-


>I have always considered the Thames Train driver as the real victim of this 
>awful preventable tragedy. 


As with many things it is a matter of balance. He bears some
responsibility for the crash, but so do others.


-- 
 David Hansen, Edinburgh | PGP email preferred-key number F566DA0E
 I will always explain revoked keys, unless the UK government
 prevents me by using the RIP Act 2000.

In article , MIG 
 writes

>It is almost inconceivable that a train driver would try to pass a red
>light in order to slip in front of another train.


In one of his books Adrian Vaughan describes a situation where a driver 
deliberately passed a red signal, basically in order to get home 
earlier.

[He was held in a loop for a faster train to pass. He then headed off as 
soon as the points were reversed, presumably assuming that he would not 
catch up to the other one before the next signalbox.]

I mention this only to point out how rare it is.

-- 
Clive D.W. Feather                       | Home: 
Tel: +44 20 8495 6138 (work)             | Web:  <http://www.davros.org>
Fax: +44 870 051 9937                    | Work: 
Please reply to the Reply-To address, which is:

In article , David Hansen 
 writes

>>His reaction was almost instantaneous.
>
>And I can think of other examples of the same sort of thing, but I
>don't think they invalidate my point. In the case you mention the
>train was derailed by trap points seconds after the indication in
>the box, there was no possibility of time for the driver to come to
>a stand.


But his quick action *did* stop another approaching train.

-- 
Clive D.W. Feather                       | Home: 
Tel: +44 20 8495 6138 (work)             | Web:  <http://www.davros.org>
Fax: +44 870 051 9937                    | Work: 
Please reply to the Reply-To address, which is:

In article <4330957f$0$17496$ed2e19e4@ptn-nntp-reader04.plus.net>, 
Martin Underwood  writes

>Assuming that the layout shown on the programme was accurate, then yes it is
>negligent for the points to be set to provide a route from SN109 to the
>track where the HST was until the signal is actually cleared to green.


Shortly after the accident, one of the people involved in designing that 
layout posted on a mailing list I belong to. He said that they had 
looked at a number of alternative arrangements for that bit of 
trackwork, and concluded that the one they chose was *marginally* safer 
than the alternatives. It certainly wasn't a "negligent" decision.

For example, while it's true that a glancing collision with a train on 
the Down Relief is probably going to be less serious than a head-on 
collision with one on the Up Main, it's also true that the former is 
rather more likely, because there's far less distance for a driver to 
realize his mistake and stop.

Then, as others have said, there's the ATP issue.

-- 
Clive D.W. Feather                       | Home: 
Tel: +44 20 8495 6138 (work)             | Web:  <http://www.davros.org>
Fax: +44 870 051 9937                    | Work: 
Please reply to the Reply-To address, which is:

In article , Neil Williams 
 writes

>Not sure.  One thing that does surprise me, though, is that the
>interlocking wasn't set up such that a detected SPAD would
>*automatically* cause that mode to be engaged, or certainly to stop
>all potentially conflicting movements.


Apart from the other comments made about this, don't forget that it 
would only require one track circuit failure to set off the alarm. If 
the failure was due to a faulty IBJ at the signal, it would even look 
like a SPAD. And this is probably rather more likely than an actual 
SPAD.

You have to do an overall assessment of the various probabilities and 
risks.

-- 
Clive D.W. Feather                       | Home: 
Tel: +44 20 8495 6138 (work)             | Web:  <http://www.davros.org>
Fax: +44 870 051 9937                    | Work: 
Please reply to the Reply-To address, which is:

On Thu, 22 Sep 2005 15:40:31 +0100 someone who may be "Clive D. W.
Feather"  wrote this:-


>But his quick action *did* stop another approaching train.


It did indeed, but I knew that already.


-- 
 David Hansen, Edinburgh | PGP email preferred-key number F566DA0E
 I will always explain revoked keys, unless the UK government
 prevents me by using the RIP Act 2000.

"Clive D. W. Feather"  wrote in message 
news:1AR5+TusCsMDFwQ3@romana.davros.org...

> In article , MIG 
>  writes
>>It is almost inconceivable that a train driver would try to pass a red
>>light in order to slip in front of another train.
>
> In one of his books Adrian Vaughan describes a situation where a driver 
> deliberately passed a red signal, basically in order to get home earlier.
>
> [He was held in a loop for a faster train to pass. He then headed off as 
> soon as the points were reversed, presumably assuming that he would not 
> catch up to the other one before the next signalbox.]
>
> I mention this only to point out how rare it is.
>
> -- 
> Clive D.W. Feather                       | Home: 
> Tel: +44 20 8495 6138 (work)             | Web:  <http://www.davros.org>
> Fax: +44 870 051 9937                    | Work: 
> Please reply to the Reply-To address, which is:  
>
>

I have only known it happen once.
In Selhurst depot, the driver involved was removed from footplate duties 
permanently.