Some may remember the rather foolish comments of a sheriff regarding
this crash, which http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/scotland/1689415.stm
reflects.

According to http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/scotland/4166234.stm a
Hutton has had rather more sensible things to say about this crash
more recently:

==================================================================

Lawyers for Miss Rogerson, a 38-year-old television producer, had
argued that the level crossing near the A9 at Moulinearn was of an
"inherently dangerous design". 

But Lord Hodge, in his judgement, ruled she had failed to keep a
proper lookout and had not obeyed instructions at the crossing. 

Mr Clegg, 47, and his wife, 39, were seeking damages for depression
and other mental disorders. 

Miss Rogerson, formerly from Glasgow, failed in an action against
Railtrack, which was brought into the proceedings as a third party. 

She told the court said she did not hear a klaxon at the crossing
sounding before her vehicle was struck by an 80mph Inverness train. 

Lord Hope accepted Miss Rogerson was not aware of the klaxon
sounding or a miniature red warning light. 

But he said: "I consider that the accident was caused by her failure
to exercise reasonable care. 

"It appears that she did not apply her mind to ascertain the safe
way to cross the railway and did not read the visible instructions
but rather followed the guidance of her boyfriend." 

==================================================================

The crash was certainly a tragedy for those involved, but that does
not mean that the railways were at fault.




-- 
 David Hansen, Edinburgh | PGP email preferred-key number F566DA0E
 I will always explain revoked keys, unless the UK government
 prevents me by using the RIP Act 2000.

> "It appears that she did not apply her mind to ascertain the safe
> way to cross the railway and did not read the visible instructions
> but rather followed the guidance of her boyfriend."
>
> ==================================================================
>
> The crash was certainly a tragedy for those involved, but that does
> not mean that the railways were at fault.
>


I agree 100%.

While network rail does need to ensure there is adequate warning at
crossings it is always up to the driver to react to those warnings
appropriately.

Pete_uk wrote:

> > "It appears that she did not apply her mind to ascertain the safe
> > way to cross the railway and did not read the visible instructions
> > but rather followed the guidance of her boyfriend."
> >
> > ==================================================================
> >
> > The crash was certainly a tragedy for those involved, but that does
> > not mean that the railways were at fault.
> >
>
> I agree 100%.
>
> While network rail does need to ensure there is adequate warning at
> crossings it is always up to the driver to react to those warnings
> appropriately.


This seems to be a rather odd and interesting case.  'The Scotsman'
reports that: "It [the hamlet of Moulinearn] was reached by a private
road off the A9 and across the "user-worked crossing", where motorists
could operate the barriers by leaning out of their window and pressing
buttons. It was the only crossing of its kind in Britain. After working
the controls under directions from Mr Thomson, who was familiar with
the crossing, Ms Rogerson drove forward, but a train was approaching",
and that, "Lord Hodge said: "The fact that the driver has to take the
initiative [in raising the barrier] ought to cause the careful driver
to instruct himself or herself on the operation of the crossing. A
careful driver looking for instructions at Moulinearn would not have
had difficulty in finding them."

So, we have a unique crossing that a careful driver would be able to
operate safely.  However, the Sheriff at the earlier hearing called for
additional signs and warning lights to be provided: "He said warning
lights and additional signs should be put up at the crossing at
Moulinearn, near Pitlochry ... Sheriff Dunlop said that although there
was one sign and a small warning light, it was positioned away from the
driver-side controls at a point where it was difficult to see on
approach from the A9 road."

Given the unique nature of the crossing, and the small cost involved,
the benefits of providing warning lights and/or signs adjacent to the
controls would seem to be fairly obvious.

Motorists should, of course, be careful, but taking simple steps to
alert those who are perhaps not so careful as they should be would be
to the benefit of all.

A couple of questions: Why is this unique crossing installed at this
location?

Why are the signs covered with yellow/black tape in the photographs at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/scotland/1689415.stm ?

And why on earth are the controls so arranged that the barriers can be
raised when the warning lights are showing red?

And, finally, a slightly puzzling statement from the father of the
injured child: 'Mr Clegg said of the accident: "I think Lorna screamed
and we clambered over the barrier and ran up to the door of the car.'
If they had to clamber over the barrier, it must have been lowered.
Why would this be so at this point?

Chippy wrote:

> Why are the signs covered with yellow/black tape in the photographs at
> http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/scotland/1689415.stm ?


I think the crossing may have been closed for a time pending the enquiry.

eat

-- 
<><|"Gentlemen, you can't fight in here! This is the War Room."
....|   -- President Merkin Muffley
ScR|http://groups.yahoo.com/group/scot-rail/
Pix|http://photos.eatnet.org.uk/Latest <- Highland Spoons & Tractors

On 20 Aug 2005 11:59:25 -0700 someone who may be "Chippy"
 wrote this:-


>A couple of questions: Why is this unique crossing installed at this
>location?


It was to be a standard user worked barrier crossing, where road
users pump up the barriers with a hydraulic pump, cross once and
lower the barriers afterwards. This avoids crossing the line five
times, as is needed to use a gated crossing properly. These
crossings also have the advantage that the barriers will fall after
a few minutes if the road user is too lazy to close them.

However, before or shortly after it was installed it was pointed out
that the pumping would be difficult for a disabled motorist who
lived nearby at the time to operate. In order to be helpful the
railways replaced the hand operated pump with buttons. All the other
parts of the crossing remained as on any other such crossing.




-- 
 David Hansen, Edinburgh | PGP email preferred-key number F566DA0E
 I will always explain revoked keys, unless the UK government
 prevents me by using the RIP Act 2000.

David Hansen wrote:


> It was to be a standard user worked barrier crossing, where road
> users pump up the barriers with a hydraulic pump, cross once and
> lower the barriers afterwards. This avoids crossing the line five
> times, as is needed to use a gated crossing properly. These
> crossings also have the advantage that the barriers will fall after
> a few minutes if the road user is too lazy to close them.


The barriers do, indeed, fall after a time.  However, when these
crossings first started to appear, in the mid-1970s, the workings of
the barriers were not made well known to drivers.  The experience of
seeing a raised barrier from the cab for the first time was
disconcerting to several drivers.


>
> However, before or shortly after it was installed it was pointed out
> that the pumping would be difficult for a disabled motorist who
> lived nearby at the time to operate. In order to be helpful the
> railways replaced the hand operated pump with buttons. All the other
> parts of the crossing remained as on any other such crossing.


This gets more and more interesting.  We now have a tacit admission
that the pump-up barriers may be a hindrance to disabled people.

Also, the change from pump to push-button isn't trivial - it removes
time for the motorist to think.  One might compare the action of the
motorist pumping the barrier up with that of a signalman winding a
Welwyn control release.

Given the removal of the 'thinking time', an additional warning sign
would certainly have been justified.  There is also the point that
interlocking the push-button with the red warning light would have been
even easier than doing so with a pump.

On 21 Aug 2005 06:10:09 -0700 someone who may be "Chippy"
 wrote this:-


>> However, before or shortly after it was installed it was pointed out
>> that the pumping would be difficult for a disabled motorist who
>> lived nearby at the time to operate. In order to be helpful the
>> railways replaced the hand operated pump with buttons. All the other
>> parts of the crossing remained as on any other such crossing.
>
>This gets more and more interesting.  We now have a tacit admission
>that the pump-up barriers may be a hindrance to disabled people.


Less of a hindrance than gates, I would suggest.


>Also, the change from pump to push-button isn't trivial - it removes
>time for the motorist to think.


It does. I suspect that is why the crossing is equipped with an
audible warning, something I have never heard of on this type of
crossing anywhere else. That seems to me to be a sensible step to
take.


>Given the removal of the 'thinking time', an additional warning sign
>would certainly have been justified.


One can add more and more signs. However, doing so does not mean
people will read any of them. Indeed, more clutter can make things
more dangerous. Less is more.

Would more signs, lights and audible alarms on the right hand side
of the road prevented the crash? It is difficult to say. Would they
be cost effective? Probably not. How much must be done to protect
people against themselves?


>There is also the point that
>interlocking the push-button with the red warning light would have been
>even easier than doing so with a pump.


I assume so, but that is more equipment to maintain and go wrong. In
addition the button operated pump is not doing anything different to
the hand operated pump on crossings of this type. Having raised the
barriers it is up to the driver to check that the green light is
still showing before crossing. If they don't do this then they may
well have a close encounter with the front of a train.


-- 
 David Hansen, Edinburgh | PGP email preferred-key number F566DA0E
 I will always explain revoked keys, unless the UK government
 prevents me by using the RIP Act 2000.

David Hansen wrote:

> On 21 Aug 2005 06:10:09 -0700 someone who may be "Chippy"
>  wrote this:-
>
> >This gets more and more interesting.  We now have a tacit admission
> >that the pump-up barriers may be a hindrance to disabled people.
>
> Less of a hindrance than gates, I would suggest.


Probably, in the majority of cases. But that isn't really relevant.


>
> >Also, the change from pump to push-button isn't trivial - it removes
> >time for the motorist to think.
>
> It does. I suspect that is why the crossing is equipped with an
> audible warning, something I have never heard of on this type of
> crossing anywhere else. That seems to me to be a sensible step to
> take.



Except that it makes the crossing even more non-standard.  And, of
course, the driver stated that she didn't hear it.


>
> >Given the removal of the 'thinking time', an additional warning sign
> >would certainly have been justified.
>
> One can add more and more signs. However, doing so does not mean
> people will read any of them. Indeed, more clutter can make things
> more dangerous. Less is more.


A sign, and perhaps repeated miniature warning lights, adjacent to the
button would be appropriate.


>
> Would more signs, lights and audible alarms on the right hand side
> of the road prevented the crash? It is difficult to say. Would they
> be cost effective? Probably not. How much must be done to protect
> people against themselves?


The cost would be pretty minimal.  As for protecting people against
themselves; that is what the Welwyn release control (that I alluded to
by way of comparison, and which you snipped) does.

>
> >There is also the point that
> >interlocking the push-button with the red warning light would have been
> >even easier than doing so with a pump.
>
> I assume so, but that is more equipment to maintain and go wrong. In
> addition the button operated pump is not doing anything different to
> the hand operated pump on crossings of this type. Having raised the
> barriers it is up to the driver to check that the green light is
> still showing before crossing. If they don't do this then they may
> well have a close encounter with the front of a train.


The button operated pump isn't doing anything different, but it
iseasier to operate.  It is also easier to interlock.  At the most
basic, one could just take the motor feed from the circut for the green
light.

Should this go to appeal, a good lawyer might make much of the point
that the railway provides a device specifically to delay the actions of
its signalmen, recognising that actions can be taken hastily or
thoughtlessly.  Conversely, they altered this crossing from the
standard arrangement, and in so doing removed a somewhat tiresome but
delaying action that gave drivers time to think.  It would have been
easy and cheap to provide additional warning near the push-button, and
to disable the button when the green light was not showing, in order to
make up for the removal of 'thinking time', but this was not done.

On Sat, 20 Aug 2005 15:39:06 +0100, David Hansen
 wrote:


>
>Lawyers for Miss Rogerson, a 38-year-old television producer, had
>argued that the level crossing near the A9 at Moulinearn was of an
>"inherently dangerous design". 


I agree, suspecting that never having met this type of crossing I
would have been caught out..  We are now prgrammed  into thinking that
if we press a button then we will only get a reaction when it is safe.
Consider a pelican crossing, or lift doors for example.

Given that there is an indication brought to the site which lights
warning lights and sounds klaxons, why on earth can't the gate
operation be interlocked?   It seems that the design aim was only to
replace the manual pump, and not to supply a safe crossing.
-- 
Peter Lawrence

"Peter Lawrence"  wrote in message
news:430982d7.462881@text.news.ntlworld.com...

> On Sat, 20 Aug 2005 15:39:06 +0100, David Hansen
>  wrote:
>
> >
> >Lawyers for Miss Rogerson, a 38-year-old television producer, had
> >argued that the level crossing near the A9 at Moulinearn was of an
> >"inherently dangerous design".
>
> I agree, suspecting that never having met this type of crossing I
> would have been caught out..  We are now prgrammed  into thinking that
> if we press a button then we will only get a reaction when it is safe.
> Consider a pelican crossing, or lift doors for example.
>
> Given that there is an indication brought to the site which lights
> warning lights and sounds klaxons, why on earth can't the gate
> operation be interlocked?   It seems that the design aim was only to
> replace the manual pump, and not to supply a safe crossing.


Any crossing is only as safe as the people using it. It is a part of
learning to drive that one takes care when crossing another line of traffic.

On Mon, 22 Aug 2005 07:52:27 GMT someone who may be "Peter Lawrence"
 wrote this:-


>>Lawyers for Miss Rogerson, a 38-year-old television producer, had
>>argued that the level crossing near the A9 at Moulinearn was of an
>>"inherently dangerous design". 
>
>I agree, suspecting that never having met this type of crossing I
>would have been caught out..


Lots of people have managed to use this crossing before and after
the crash, without being "caught out".


>We are now prgrammed  into thinking that
>if we press a button then we will only get a reaction when it is safe.


Are we? ISTM that it is perfectly possible to press the button to
start an electric drill without the machine checking whether it is
safe to do so. Pedestrian crossings certainly don't check whether it
is safe for the pedestrian to cross.



-- 
 David Hansen, Edinburgh | PGP email preferred-key number F566DA0E
 I will always explain revoked keys, unless the UK government
 prevents me by using the RIP Act 2000.

On Mon, 22 Aug 2005, David Hansen wrote:


> On Mon, 22 Aug 2005 07:52:27 GMT someone who may be "Peter Lawrence"
>  wrote this:-
> 
> >>Lawyers for Miss Rogerson, a 38-year-old television producer, had
> >>argued that the level crossing near the A9 at Moulinearn was of an
> >>"inherently dangerous design". 
> >
> >I agree, suspecting that never having met this type of crossing I
> >would have been caught out..
> 
> Lots of people have managed to use this crossing before and after
> the crash, without being "caught out".


Without for a moment wanting to make excuses for someone who AIUI was 
found by the court to have failed to keep a proper lookout, I must 
say that the operation of the crossing as described here strikes me as 
unintuitive and, frankly, dubious.


> Pedestrian crossings certainly don't check whether it
> is safe for the pedestrian to cross.


Pedestrian crossings AIUI don't even check that the lights facing
the traffic are showing red before the pedestrians are shown green.
We expect a higher standard of proving from railway signalling!

But I'm not sure that the analogy is a good one, anyway.  Pedestrian 
crossings are supposed to stop the traffic, whereas this kind of level 
crossing isn't meant to stop any trains.  And car drivers aren't 
supposed to be verifying level crossing safety by looking for oncoming 
trains, but by looking at red/green light indicators - the very thing 
which you're implying that pedestrians dare not rely on.

On Mon, 22 Aug 2005 12:43:16 +0100 someone who may be "Alan J.
Flavell"  wrote this:-


>Without for a moment wanting to make excuses for someone who AIUI was 
>found by the court to have failed to keep a proper lookout, I must 
>say that the operation of the crossing as described here strikes me as 
>unintuitive and, frankly, dubious.


Why?

One walks, cycles or drives up to the crossing. If one is unfamiliar
then one reads the signs, which are clear enough.

One then checks if the green light is showing, if it is one presses
the button to raise the barriers. One then checks to see if the
green light is still showing, if it is one crosses. On the other
side one lowers the barriers. Fairly obvious to most people, as is
demonstrated by the fact that many people managed to cross the line
here without impailing themselves on the front of a train.

Some people even manage to operate far more complicated devices,
such as computers, video recorders and cars.


-- 
 David Hansen, Edinburgh | PGP email preferred-key number F566DA0E
 I will always explain revoked keys, unless the UK government
 prevents me by using the RIP Act 2000.

David Hansen wrote:

> On Mon, 22 Aug 2005 12:43:16 +0100 someone who may be "Alan J.
> Flavell"  wrote this:-
>
> >Without for a moment wanting to make excuses for someone who AIUI was
> >found by the court to have failed to keep a proper lookout, I must
> >say that the operation of the crossing as described here strikes me as
> >unintuitive and, frankly, dubious.
>
> Why?
>
> One walks, cycles or drives up to the crossing. If one is unfamiliar
> then one reads the signs, which are clear enough.
>
> One then checks if the green light is showing, if it is one presses
> the button to raise the barriers. One then checks to see if the
> green light is still showing, if it is one crosses. On the other
> side one lowers the barriers. Fairly obvious to most people, as is
> demonstrated by the fact that many people managed to cross the line
> here without impailing themselves on the front of a train.


Many train drivers stopped at signals showing a stop aspect before ATC,
AWS, or TPWS.  I'm sure that most signalmen would manage to perform
most movements if the interlocking of their frames or panels was
removed.  I don't think that anyone would advocate the removal of such
safety aids.

As I have twice mentioned, the Welwyn control release provides a good
analogy, and may well prove useful in the event of an appeal.

The crossing could have ben made much more safe at minimal cost.

>
> Some people even manage to operate far more complicated devices,
> such as computers, video recorders and cars.


Would you say that it would be acceptable to have the pins, rather than
holes, at the end of the computer and video power leads?  They'd be
live if anyone plugged the lead in and swithched on at the outlet, but
that would be OK because we'd have told them not to do it, wouldn't it?

On Mon, 22 Aug 2005, David Hansen wrote:


> On Mon, 22 Aug 2005 12:43:16 +0100 someone who may be "Alan J.
> Flavell"  wrote this:-
> 
> >Without for a moment wanting to make excuses for someone who AIUI was 
> >found by the court to have failed to keep a proper lookout, I must 
> >say that the operation of the crossing as described here strikes me as 
> >unintuitive and, frankly, dubious.
> 
> Why?


I'm not sure whether this is a posture, or whether you really don't 
understand user interface design.


> One walks, cycles or drives up to the crossing. If one is unfamiliar
> then one reads the signs, which are clear enough.


You're basically implying here (unless and until you clarify your 
position) that no matter how unintuitive the user interface might be, RTFM 
is all that it needs.  Well, sorry, but there's swathes of expertise in 
user interface design, for very good reason, that says that designing an 
intuitive interface beats RTFM.


> Some people even manage to operate far more complicated devices,
> such as computers, video recorders


Neither of which normally penalise the operator with death for an
operational blunder, by the way.


> and cars.


Fortunately, the major controls are standardised.  According to your 
present attitude, it wouldn't matter if the occasional car was steered 
with the feet and the accelerator operated with the elbow, as long as the 
instructions were clear enough.  But we don't do that, at least not for 
cars meant to be driven by the general public.  And for good reason.

David Hansen wrote:


> An interlock needs to be carefully considered. Imagine the case
> where a train has not yet struck in and a mother presses the button
> to raise the barriers. They can rise because the green light is
> showing. The mother is distracted by a child in the back of the car
> and turns round to attend to the child, which takes 30 seconds. As
> she does so the train strikes in. The barriers are now up and will
> remain so for four minutes. After 30 seconds the mother turns round
> to drive off. The barriers are up and in her mind that means it is
> safe to cross. She moves off.


That is a pretty contrived example. Why do the barriers have to remain
up for as long as 4 minutes? A normal CCTV-controlled level crossing
is activated when a train is about 2-3 minutes away. If interlocking
from a similar distance was in place here, leaving the barriers up for
just 2 minutes would still provide ample time for anyone to cross the
line, and would mean that the barriers would fall before the next
train arrived.

-- 
                          Stevie D
    \\\\\       /////     Bringing dating agencies to the
   \\\\\\\__X__///////    common hedgehog since 2001 - "HedgeHugs"
___\\\\\\\'/ \'///////_____________________________________________

On Tue, 23 Aug 2005 21:42:09 +0100 someone who may be Stevie D
 wrote this:-


>That is a pretty contrived example.


I don't think so. Children and babies can be very distracting and if
someone is stopped they are likely to turn all their attention to
the back seat.


>Why do the barriers have to remain
>up for as long as 4 minutes?


I am told that is the length of time they remain up on such
crossings, before they lower automatically. Presumably this time was
chosen by the road and rail interests after considering the options.

I imagine that one of the options considered was trapping motor
vehicles on the crossing. These are not CCTV crossings and one needs
to be careful in transporting ideas between different types of
crossing.



-- 
 David Hansen, Edinburgh | PGP email preferred-key number F566DA0E
 I will always explain revoked keys, unless the UK government
 prevents me by using the RIP Act 2000.

David Hansen wrote:

> On Tue, 23 Aug 2005 21:42:09 +0100 someone who may be Stevie D
>  wrote this:-
>
> >That is a pretty contrived example.
>
> I don't think so. Children and babies can be very distracting and if
> someone is stopped they are likely to turn all their attention to
> the back seat.


Contrived or not, it would apply equally to a crossing with the more
common manual pump. The innterlocking of the push button for the
electric pump would have no disadvantage, and would have the advantage
of stopping unwary motorists from being misled by the very
counter-intuitive nature of the controls.

But, as I have said, irrespective of interlocks, the provision of signs
(probably costing a couple of hundred quid) and/or lights (costing a
few hundred more) next to the button would undoubtedly help improve
understanding and safety.


>
> >Why do the barriers have to remain
> >up for as long as 4 minutes?
>
> I am told that is the length of time they remain up on such
> crossings, before they lower automatically.


Though users of pumped crossings are supposed to lower them using a
valve immediately after crossing.  I'm assuming that a means of
lowering the barrier is provided at the crossing with push-button
operated barriers.

There is also the point that installation and maintenance of the
hydraulic pipework under the track, along with associated gear, must be
more expensive than the electrical installation.  I wonder if the prime
reason for this installation may have been cost, rather than the need
to help a disabled driver?


>  Presumably this time was
> chosen by the road and rail interests after considering the options.
>
> I imagine that one of the options considered was trapping motor
> vehicles on the crossing. These are not CCTV crossings and one needs
> to be careful in transporting ideas between different types of
> crossing.


Like the idea that the raising of the barriers signifies clear, as is
the common belief amongst motorists?  That wouldbe imported from AHBs.

David Hansen wrote:


> Before I answer that a little background.
>
> There are road and rail interests at level crossings, represented by
> various organisations. These come up with various principles and
> standards. One of the aims is to present as standardised an
> interface as possible to road users.


This interface was unique, and by a considerable margin.


>
> Within what these organisations have set up there is some room for
> manoeuvre. For some insight into the sort of work involved before
> changing things go to http://www.rssb.co.uk/allsearch.asp and
> download Report 3 of T269 (and the rest of T269 and the others on
> level crossings if interested).
>
> I see nothing wrong with replacing a manually operated pump with a
> manually controlled one for example. However, interlocking the
> manual control would change the balance of responsibility a lot and
> require careful thought.
>
> I can just imagine the scene in court after the first crash at a
> crossing with such interlocking, say involving a mother and several
> children. The argument would be that since raising the barrier is
> interlocked with the movement of trains that implies that when the
> barriers are raised no train will pass over the crossing. How was
> the mother to know that this is not the case? She was able to raise
> the barriers and was then distracted by a child for 30 seconds. As
> the barriers were still raised she then proceeded onto the crossing,
> not noticing the red light or audible alarm.
>


All intersting stuff, but unconvincing.  We have been talking about
preventing the barrier lifting when a train approaches, and removing
the impression that a raised barrier means that it is safe to proceeed.
No-one has suggested that motorists should be told that the barrier
being raised indicates that no train is coming.

And none of this, of course, would prevent the provision of additional
signs and/or an additional set of lights adjacent to the push-button,
irrespective of interlocking issues.

You whinge about personal attacks, but you set yourself up as an
unofficial Crusading Defender of the Railway and Scourge of the
Motorist.  You'll recall the thread a few months ago, where I suggested
the provision of 'Another Train Coming' signs at crossings.  You were
against the idea, and adopted your 'It's Darwinism' attitude.  Until,
that is, I pointed out that such signs were in use at other crossings -
you then quietly disappeared.  My reason for raising this?  Simply to
show that you lack objectivity.

In message , 
Chippy  writes

>The mere fact that pressing the button causes the barriers to rise is
>counter-intuitive to 'stop'.  This is irrespective of signage or
>lights, which are, in any case, mounted on the opposite side to the
>driver, who will be concentrating on the push button and barriers.
>
>The Sheriff referred to this:
>
>"The sheriff said drivers were not warned that the barrier could go up
>if someone pushed a button even if a train was coming.
>
>He added: "There is a risk that they (drivers) will associate the
>raising of the barrier with a signal that it is safe to proceed across
>the level crossing.
>
>"In my view the critical failing of the level crossing is that the
>arrangements do not ensure that the instructions for its safe operation
>are clearly brought home to users."
>
>The impression that it is correct and safe to proceed if the barrier
>rises will be reinforced in many motorists minds by experience with
>car-park barriers, where the raising of the barrier signifies proceed
>(some such installations have lights, but you will find that the norm
>is for the raising of the barrier to be the thing upon which the driver
>concentrates and acts). In fact, the impression that it is right to
>procedd will probably be greater at the crossing, as the driver will
>see both barriers rise, giving the impression of a path being cleared
>for him or her.
>
>To make another comparison with railway operation, at quite a number of
>locations steps are taken to ensure that drivers are not misled by
>signal aspects on lines adjacent to their own.  There is no difference
>in principle between a train driver reading the wrong signal and the
>motorist taking the barrier as the signal to proceed (other than the
>fact that the train driver has had route learning, and has signed as
>familiar with the route).
>


Then surely it's not beyond the Wit of NR engineers to fit some kind of 
'in section' interlocking on the crossing?
I.e. the barriers won't lift if there's a train on it's way etc.
-- 
Regards,

James Christie

"Luck is my middle name," he said, indistinctly.
"Mind you, my first name is Bad."

On Tue, 23 Aug 2005, David Hansen wrote:


> On Mon, 22 Aug 2005 22:34:55 +0100 someone who may be "Alan J.
> Flavell"  wrote this:-
> 
> >> >Without for a moment wanting to make excuses for someone who AIUI was 
> >> >found by the court to have failed to keep a proper lookout, I must 
> >> >say that the operation of the crossing as described here strikes me as 
> >> >unintuitive and, frankly, dubious.
> >> 
> >> Why?
> >
> >I'm not sure whether this is a posture, or whether you really don't 
> >understand user interface design.
> 
> I note that you didn't answer the question.


Neither did you: my argument was that the operation was counter-intuitive, 
but you disregarded that: your response was based solely on RTFM.  If you 
didn't want to create the impression that, as far as you were concerned, 
the operation could be as counter-intuitive as possible, so long as the 
instructions were clearly set out, then you were entirely free to do so.


> Instead of making personal attacks


I know nothing about your person, and am not interested in attacking it.
I'm specifically trying to respond to what was posted here in your name.

On Tue, 23 Aug 2005 10:20:27 +0100 someone who may be "Alan J.
Flavell"  wrote this:-


>> I note that you didn't answer the question.
>
>Neither did you:


Incorrect.


>my argument was that the operation was counter-intuitive, 
>but you disregarded that: your response was based solely on RTFM.


You need to propose something that is "more intuitive". "I must 
say that the operation of the crossing as described here strikes me
as unintuitive and, frankly, dubious", is not a proposal of a
different system. If you make a proposal we can then consider
whether it is likely to be approved given the current setup.



-- 
 David Hansen, Edinburgh | PGP email preferred-key number F566DA0E
 I will always explain revoked keys, unless the UK government
 prevents me by using the RIP Act 2000.

On Tue, 23 Aug 2005 10:03:38 +0100 someone who may be James Christie
 wrote this:-


>Then surely it's not beyond the Wit of NR engineers to fit some kind of 
>'in section' interlocking on the crossing?
>I.e. the barriers won't lift if there's a train on it's way etc.


At the moment these crossings are not linked to the signalling
system. The lights are activated by treadles and the red ones are
illuminated 40 seconds before the fastest train passes.

An interlock needs to be carefully considered. Imagine the case
where a train has not yet struck in and a mother presses the button
to raise the barriers. They can rise because the green light is
showing. The mother is distracted by a child in the back of the car
and turns round to attend to the child, which takes 30 seconds. As
she does so the train strikes in. The barriers are now up and will
remain so for four minutes. After 30 seconds the mother turns round
to drive off. The barriers are up and in her mind that means it is
safe to cross. She moves off.

How will the train be detected in your concept? Not all lines are
track circuited and some sections are very long. If the barriers are
raised and a train enters the section what happens?

There are already concerns about the cost of such crossings. How
much more should be spent to guard against people doing foolish
things?



-- 
 David Hansen, Edinburgh | PGP email preferred-key number F566DA0E
 I will always explain revoked keys, unless the UK government
 prevents me by using the RIP Act 2000.

On Mon, 22 Aug 2005 22:34:55 +0100 someone who may be "Alan J.
Flavell"  wrote this:-


>> >Without for a moment wanting to make excuses for someone who AIUI was 
>> >found by the court to have failed to keep a proper lookout, I must 
>> >say that the operation of the crossing as described here strikes me as 
>> >unintuitive and, frankly, dubious.
>> 
>> Why?
>
>I'm not sure whether this is a posture, or whether you really don't 
>understand user interface design.


I note that you didn't answer the question.

Instead of making personal attacks you could try doing so.


-- 
 David Hansen, Edinburgh | PGP email preferred-key number F566DA0E
 I will always explain revoked keys, unless the UK government
 prevents me by using the RIP Act 2000.

David Hansen wrote:

> On Mon, 22 Aug 2005 22:34:55 +0100 someone who may be "Alan J.
> Flavell"  wrote this:-
>
> >> >Without for a moment wanting to make excuses for someone who AIUI was
> >> >found by the court to have failed to keep a proper lookout, I must
> >> >say that the operation of the crossing as described here strikes me as
> >> >unintuitive and, frankly, dubious.
> >>
> >> Why?
> >
> >I'm not sure whether this is a posture, or whether you really don't
> >understand user interface design.
>
> I note that you didn't answer the question.
>
> Instead of making personal attacks you could try doing so.


The mere fact that pressing the button causes the barriers to rise is
counter-intuitive to 'stop'.  This is irrespective of signage or
lights, which are, in any case, mounted on the opposite side to the
driver, who will be concentrating on the push button and barriers.

The Sheriff referred to this:

"The sheriff said drivers were not warned that the barrier could go up
if someone pushed a button even if a train was coming.

He added: "There is a risk that they (drivers) will associate the
raising of the barrier with a signal that it is safe to proceed across
the level crossing.

"In my view the critical failing of the level crossing is that the
arrangements do not ensure that the instructions for its safe operation
are clearly brought home to users."

The impression that it is correct and safe to proceed if the barrier
rises will be reinforced in many motorists minds by experience with
car-park barriers, where the raising of the barrier signifies proceed
(some such installations have lights, but you will find that the norm
is for the raising of the barrier to be the thing upon which the driver
concentrates and acts). In fact, the impression that it is right to
procedd will probably be greater at the crossing, as the driver will
see both barriers rise, giving the impression of a path being cleared
for him or her.

To make another comparison with railway operation, at quite a number of
locations steps are taken to ensure that drivers are not misled by
signal aspects on lines adjacent to their own.  There is no difference
in principle between a train driver reading the wrong signal and the
motorist taking the barrier as the signal to proceed (other than the
fact that the train driver has had route learning, and has signed as
familiar with the route).

On 22 Aug 2005 23:32:34 -0700, "Chippy"  wrote:


>"The sheriff said drivers were not warned that the barrier could go up
>if someone pushed a button even if a train was coming.


That is a good point.  If it was manually gated, people would probably
understand that gates don't (generally) interlock with the signalling.
The use of a pushbutton would suggest that it likely was (and why not
- it wouldn't be an expensive mod to an already-electronic system).

Neil

-- 
Neil Williams in Milton Keynes, UK
When replying please use neil at the above domain
'wensleydale' is a spam trap and is not read.

Neil Williams wrote:

> On 22 Aug 2005 23:32:34 -0700, "Chippy"  wrote:
>
> >"The sheriff said drivers were not warned that the barrier could go up
> >if someone pushed a button even if a train was coming.
>
> That is a good point.  If it was manually gated, people would probably
> understand that gates don't (generally) interlock with the signalling.
> The use of a pushbutton would suggest that it likely was (and why not
> - it wouldn't be an expensive mod to an already-electronic system).


There is also the point that considerable effort is made to get
motorists to repect barriers, particularly at AHBs.  This, of course,
increases the likelihood that a raised barrier will be seen as the 'all
clear'.

On Tue, 23 Aug 2005 06:53:42 GMT someone who may be
wensleydale@pacersplace.org.uk (Neil Williams) wrote this:-


>That is a good point.  If it was manually gated, people would probably
>understand that gates don't (generally) interlock with the signalling.
>The use of a pushbutton would suggest that it likely was (and why not
>- it wouldn't be an expensive mod to an already-electronic system).


Before I answer that a little background.

There are road and rail interests at level crossings, represented by
various organisations. These come up with various principles and
standards. One of the aims is to present as standardised an
interface as possible to road users.

Within what these organisations have set up there is some room for
manoeuvre. For some insight into the sort of work involved before
changing things go to http://www.rssb.co.uk/allsearch.asp and
download Report 3 of T269 (and the rest of T269 and the others on
level crossings if interested).

I see nothing wrong with replacing a manually operated pump with a
manually controlled one for example. However, interlocking the
manual control would change the balance of responsibility a lot and
require careful thought.

I can just imagine the scene in court after the first crash at a
crossing with such interlocking, say involving a mother and several
children. The argument would be that since raising the barrier is
interlocked with the movement of trains that implies that when the
barriers are raised no train will pass over the crossing. How was
the mother to know that this is not the case? She was able to raise
the barriers and was then distracted by a child for 30 seconds. As
the barriers were still raised she then proceeded onto the crossing,
not noticing the red light or audible alarm.


-- 
 David Hansen, Edinburgh | PGP email preferred-key number F566DA0E
 I will always explain revoked keys, unless the UK government
 prevents me by using the RIP Act 2000.

"David Hansen"  wrote in message 
news:5r0mg1palrqlot6alhkkju9e8knl4b95n6@4ax.com...

> On Tue, 23 Aug 2005 10:03:38 +0100 someone who may be James Christie
>  wrote this:-
>
>>Then surely it's not beyond the Wit of NR engineers to fit some kind of
>>'in section' interlocking on the crossing?
>>I.e. the barriers won't lift if there's a train on it's way etc.
>
> At the moment these crossings are not linked to the signalling
> system. The lights are activated by treadles and the red ones are
> illuminated 40 seconds before the fastest train passes.
>
> An interlock needs to be carefully considered.


Indeed it does.
Moulinearn has no other access, so keeping the barriers down when the 
Track/Treadle shows a train present is all very well, but what would happen 
if there was a failure mode of the crossing and an emergency in the hamlet?

In the end, the crossing instructions were provided, and failed to be 
observed by the users.
If it was the first time using the crossing, would one not be wary of using 
something they didn't know how it worked?

On Tue, 23 Aug 2005 11:39:11 GMT, "Not Here"
 wrote:


>Moulinearn has no other access, so keeping the barriers down when the 
>Track/Treadle shows a train present is all very well, but what would happen 
>if there was a failure mode of the crossing and an emergency in the hamlet?


There can be a failure mode of any automated crossing.  This suggests
to me that manual gates may be a better solution here, perhaps
together with an all-clear light.  This makes the responsibility
clear.

Neil

-- 
Neil Williams in Milton Keynes, UK
When replying please use neil at the above domain
'wensleydale' is a spam trap and is not read.