The report into the Lewisham collision of 1957 is now online at
http://www.railwaysarchive.co.uk/docSummary.php?docID=157 , courtesy of
Wobbly Bob, and the tragic collision at Armagh in 1889 is at
http://www.railwaysarchive.co.uk/docSummary.php?docID=106 , courtesy of
me.

>The report into the Lewisham collision of 1957 is now online at
>http://www.railwaysarchive.co.uk/docSummary.php?docID=157 , courtesy >of
>Wobbly Bob, and the tragic collision at Armagh in 1889 is at
>http://www.railwaysarchive.co.uk/docSummary.php?docID=106 , courtesy >of
>me.



Excellent.  It's probably in poor taste to go into operational
curiosity mode, but I infer that in those days, "fast" trains from
Cannon Street crossed to what would now be the Charing Cross side (but
was maybe then the "fast" side) before New Cross, whereas nowadays
they'd stay on the other side till after Orpington when it goes down to
two tracks.

Also, the Lewisham bridge was knocked down in December 1957.  About
five weeks later it was reopened as a tressle bridge which is still
there and seems unlikely to be replaced.  This would seem inconceivable
nowadays.

"MIG"  wrote

>
> Excellent.  It's probably in poor taste to go into operational
> curiosity mode, but I infer that in those days, "fast" trains from
> Cannon Street crossed to what would now be the Charing Cross side (but
> was maybe then the "fast" side) before New Cross, whereas nowadays
> they'd stay on the other side till after Orpington when it goes down to
> two tracks.
>

Until London Bridge PSB opened (1976?) down trains used platforms 1, 2 and 3
at London Bridge, while  up trains used platforms 4, 6 and 7 (now renumbered
4, 5 and 6), and the Up Passenger Loop did not exist. They were then sorted
out through flat junctions at Spa Road and Southwark Park, so that fast
trains mainly used the fast lines. However, there were platforms on the fast
lines at New Cross and St Johns, and you will have noted that the Hayes
train run into in the collision had called at New Cross. Some fast trains
used the slow lines, and indeed at around that time there were Cannon Street
departures at 6.16 pm to Ramsgate via the slow line and Chatham and 6.18 pm
to Deal via the fast line and Tonbridge. The 6.16 was often checked at
Borough Market, so the two trains sometimes ran side by side from there
until the Chatham route train veered off at Chislehurst.

Now some, especially Chatham route, trains use the slow lines as far as
Chislehurst, and the down Chatham loop at Chislehurst has been made
reversible so that the up morning peak trains can run all the way on the
Cannon Street side, though Tonbridge route trains to and from Cannon Street
more often cross at Parks Bridge Junction, and use the fast lines between
Parks Bridge and Orpington.

There is little difference in permitted speeds on the fast and slow lines -
the slow lines have a slightly lower limit at St Johns, in view of the
divergence from the original North Kent route as well as curvature under the
Nunhead line flyover, while the fast lines have a 60 mph limit at the
country end of Chislehurst station, because of reverse curves.

Peter

Fantastic! Lewisham was an outstandingly good, detailed report. It is
of particular interest to me as at 1820 (the time of the accident), I
am very often stopped on the modern equivalent of those very signals at
Parks Bridge on the Dn Fast, on board a Hayes train awaiting a slot
down onto the Mid Kent.

I thought Driver Trew came accross particually badly, as a rather
incompetent driver. However, the damning evidence on the visability of
the signals would have the railways slaughtered if it happened today.
To write in an official report that under the weather conditions, the
signals would not have been visable to the driver at all would be taken
to pieces by the press. Equally, the very sensible comments about being
unable to lenghten overlaps or fit train stops as they would decrease
capacity and cost too much could never be said today.

As for the recovery operation, it is nothing short of remarkable that
they were able to clear such deverstation so quickly, and build a new
(temporary) bridge which has lasted almost 50 years with no sign of
replacement, in just 5 weeks.

Many, Many thanks for getting this scanned and online.

I'll read Armagh tommorrow.

rehards
HN28

May I also record my thanks for placing this on-line. At the time of the 
accident I was living in Lewisham and although only 6 years old I remember 
the terrible sadness of it all - the headline in the Evening Standard the 
next day "Oh What a Tragedy - Just Before Christmas" is seared on my memory.
One of our neighbours who was in the Hayes Train lost his life and several 
friends from Tunbridge Wells were travelling on the Ramsgate train - one 
seriously injured but the others were able to step out onto St John's 
platform into what they described as an eerie silence.
Thanks again,

Adrian


 wrote in message 
news:1122411456.091900.170210@g49g2000cwa.googlegroups.com...

> Fantastic! Lewisham was an outstandingly good, detailed report. It is
> of particular interest to me as at 1820 (the time of the accident), I
> am very often stopped on the modern equivalent of those very signals at
> Parks Bridge on the Dn Fast, on board a Hayes train awaiting a slot
> down onto the Mid Kent.
>
> I thought Driver Trew came accross particually badly, as a rather
> incompetent driver. However, the damning evidence on the visability of
> the signals would have the railways slaughtered if it happened today.
> To write in an official report that under the weather conditions, the
> signals would not have been visable to the driver at all would be taken
> to pieces by the press. Equally, the very sensible comments about being
> unable to lenghten overlaps or fit train stops as they would decrease
> capacity and cost too much could never be said today.
>
> As for the recovery operation, it is nothing short of remarkable that
> they were able to clear such deverstation so quickly, and build a new
> (temporary) bridge which has lasted almost 50 years with no sign of
> replacement, in just 5 weeks.
>
> Many, Many thanks for getting this scanned and online.
>
> I'll read Armagh tommorrow.
>
> rehards
> HN28
> 

meant to include this link which is of relevance to the Lewisham accident 
and of some interest

http://www.thisislewisham.co.uk/news/dartgravenews/display.var.427058.0.hero_blasts_track_morons.php


"Adrian Clarkson"  wrote in message 
news:PxzFe.77800$G8.14789@text.news.blueyonder.co.uk...

> May I also record my thanks for placing this on-line. At the time of the 
> accident I was living in Lewisham and although only 6 years old I remember 
> the terrible sadness of it all - the headline in the Evening Standard the 
> next day "Oh What a Tragedy - Just Before Christmas" is seared on my 
> memory.
> One of our neighbours who was in the Hayes Train lost his life and several 
> friends from Tunbridge Wells were travelling on the Ramsgate train - one 
> seriously injured but the others were able to step out onto St John's 
> platform into what they described as an eerie silence.
> Thanks again,
>
> Adrian
>
>
>  wrote in message 
> news:1122411456.091900.170210@g49g2000cwa.googlegroups.com...
>> Fantastic! Lewisham was an outstandingly good, detailed report. It is
>> of particular interest to me as at 1820 (the time of the accident), I
>> am very often stopped on the modern equivalent of those very signals at
>> Parks Bridge on the Dn Fast, on board a Hayes train awaiting a slot
>> down onto the Mid Kent.
>>
>> I thought Driver Trew came accross particually badly, as a rather
>> incompetent driver. However, the damning evidence on the visability of
>> the signals would have the railways slaughtered if it happened today.
>> To write in an official report that under the weather conditions, the
>> signals would not have been visable to the driver at all would be taken
>> to pieces by the press. Equally, the very sensible comments about being
>> unable to lenghten overlaps or fit train stops as they would decrease
>> capacity and cost too much could never be said today.
>>
>> As for the recovery operation, it is nothing short of remarkable that
>> they were able to clear such deverstation so quickly, and build a new
>> (temporary) bridge which has lasted almost 50 years with no sign of
>> replacement, in just 5 weeks.
>>
>> Many, Many thanks for getting this scanned and online.
>>
>> I'll read Armagh tommorrow.
>>
>> rehards
>> HN28
>>
>
> 

On 26 Jul 2005 13:57:36 -0700, hn28_signal@yahoo.co.uk wrote:

>
>I thought Driver Trew came accross particually badly, as a rather
>incompetent driver.


Looks like he was tried for something (presumably manslaughter) - para
61 states "Driver Trew had made a similar statement about the aspects
of the signals between New Cross and St. Johns when he gave evidence
at the Coroner's Inquest on 31st December, but on 22nd April, at his
trial he denied having seen signals L.16 and L.17 in the fog."

Can anyone advise the outcome of the trial?  It was presumably covered
in the newspapers at the time and probably exists in some archived law
report.

Paul Harley

-- 
Remove "eeek" to contact me!

"Paul Harley"  wrote in message
news:oqbke15v8fjbs9n1l9f0cq0uvl682oahaf@4ax.com...

> On 26 Jul 2005 13:57:36 -0700, hn28_signal@yahoo.co.uk wrote:
> >
> >I thought Driver Trew came accross particually badly, as a rather
> >incompetent driver.
>
> Looks like he was tried for something (presumably manslaughter) - para
> 61 states "Driver Trew had made a similar statement about the aspects
> of the signals between New Cross and St. Johns when he gave evidence
> at the Coroner's Inquest on 31st December, but on 22nd April, at his
> trial he denied having seen signals L.16 and L.17 in the fog."
>
> Can anyone advise the outcome of the trial?  It was presumably covered
> in the newspapers at the time and probably exists in some archived law
> report.
>

He was tried for manslaughter, but the jury failed to agree, and at the
retrial the prosecution offered no evidence, so he was acquitted. He was
given a job in the stores at his home depot, but couldn't bear to face his
colleagues and retired, and died not long afterwards.

Peter

The first page of text contains the footnote "Note: Driver W.J.Trew,
who was in charge of the Ramsgate train engine, was tried for
Manslaughter on 21st April 1958. The jury disagreed, and at the second
trial on 8th May he was aquitted."

My comment really gets to the fact he was confused over the evidence he
gave about the signals. Sometimes saying he saw them, then not. Perhaps
he changed his story. And on top of that, he acknowleged the
difficulties seeing the signals but was quite happy to state that it
wasn't his practice to ask, or expect the fireman to look for them in
the conditions. He assumed the signals would be clear, which is a
dangerous assumption at the best of times, but in thick fog, with
service disruption, at a major junction on one of the busiest lines in
the world, was inexcusable.

regards
HN28

wrote in message
news:1122647355.610651.327470@g14g2000cwa.googlegroups.com...

> The first page of text contains the footnote "Note: Driver W.J.Trew,
> who was in charge of the Ramsgate train engine, was tried for
> Manslaughter on 21st April 1958. The jury disagreed, and at the second
> trial on 8th May he was aquitted."
>
> My comment really gets to the fact he was confused over the evidence he
> gave about the signals. Sometimes saying he saw them, then not. Perhaps
> he changed his story. And on top of that, he acknowleged the
> difficulties seeing the signals but was quite happy to state that it
> wasn't his practice to ask, or expect the fireman to look for them in
> the conditions. He assumed the signals would be clear, which is a
> dangerous assumption at the best of times, but in thick fog, with
> service disruption, at a major junction on one of the busiest lines in
> the world, was inexcusable.
>

It is impossible, from his confused answers after the accident, to gain a
clear understanding of what was going through his mind in the moments
leading up to it. The inquiry report does not discuss the disorienting
effect of thick fog, which is better understood following serious motorway
accidents, though there might be a clue in Gerry Fiennes' discussion (in 'I
tried to run a Railway') of the 1947 Gidea Park collison, when he states
that the driver of the Haughley Mail 'misjudged his distance in a couple of
minutes by three quarters of a mile'.

Although Driver Trew's statement that 'he didn't expect to be stopped at St
Johns' might explain the accident (did the driver at Southall expect to be
stopped there?) other possibilities are that he assumed he'd see the two
intermediate signals, or expected his mate to call them, and so misjudged
his position that he didn't realise he'd missed them.

Peter

On 29 Jul 2005 07:29:15, hn28_signal@yahoo.co.uk wrote:


>The first page of text contains the footnote "Note: Driver W.J.Trew,
>who was in charge of the Ramsgate train engine, was tried for
>Manslaughter on 21st April 1958. The jury disagreed, and at the second
>trial on 8th May he was aquitted."


Sorry, I must have missed that.  My thanks to Peter Masson for his
comprehensive reply.

One unreported death seems to be the investigating officer, as the
text mentions "This Inquiry was begun by the late  Lieutenant-Colonel
G. R. S. Wilson......" and the published report was signed by
Brigadier C. A. Langley.

Paul Harley

-- 
Remove "eeek" to contact me!

wrote in message 
news:1122647355.610651.327470@g14g2000cwa.googlegroups.com...

> The first page of text contains the footnote "Note: Driver W.J.Trew,
> who was in charge of the Ramsgate train engine, was tried for
> Manslaughter on 21st April 1958. The jury disagreed, and at the second
> trial on 8th May he was aquitted."
>
> My comment really gets to the fact he was confused over the evidence he
> gave about the signals. Sometimes saying he saw them, then not. Perhaps
> he changed his story. And on top of that, he acknowleged the
> difficulties seeing the signals but was quite happy to state that it
> wasn't his practice to ask, or expect the fireman to look for them in
> the conditions. He assumed the signals would be clear, which is a
> dangerous assumption at the best of times, but in thick fog, with
> service disruption, at a major junction on one of the busiest lines in
> the world, was inexcusable.
>
> regards
> HN28



>

It would seem to be a case of  "driving by rote" by someone not overly 
gifted with "nowse"

AC