Last night oneof the Hex Heathrow-Paddington spaded at 50 mph plus
with all six coaches, and it took  Notwork Rail some time to stop him.
He thought the signal on the gantry was clear from what he saw, but
this was the same gantry as the Hodder one signal 109 was misread.
It would seem that no lessons have beenlearned by notwork rail and
they have done nothing to make the signals on that gantry more visible
from a distance , and done little about it.     It beggars belief.

"Martin WY"  wrote

> Last night oneof the Hex Heathrow-Paddington spaded at 50 mph 
> plus
> with all six coaches, and it took  Notwork Rail some time to 
> stop him.
> He thought the signal on the gantry was clear from what he saw, 
> but
> this was the same gantry as the Hodder one signal 109 was 
> misread.
> It would seem that no lessons have beenlearned by notwork rail 
> and
> they have done nothing to make the signals on that gantry more 
> visible
> from a distance , and done little about it.     It beggars 
> belief.


Don't they have ATP fitted? If so how could it SPAD, if it 
actually did?
Nev

Martin WY wrote:

> Last night oneof the Hex Heathrow-Paddington spaded at 50 mph plus
> with all six coaches, and it took  Notwork Rail some time to stop him.
> He thought the signal on the gantry was clear from what he saw, but
> this was the same gantry as the Hodder one signal 109 was misread.
> It would seem that no lessons have beenlearned by notwork rail and
> they have done nothing to make the signals on that gantry more visible
> from a distance , and done little about it.     It beggars belief.


I thought TPWS was meant to be good for up to 70mph, which ought to have 
stopped anything from happening.  Is there something I'm missing here? 
Incidentally, how do you get a 6 coach HEx train, given that they only 
have 4 and 5 car units?

Robin

"Martin WY"  wrote in message 
news:gu1cd1t04otbjiakj53cgqhu5e6bk86ev7@4ax.com...

> Last night oneof the Hex Heathrow-Paddington spaded at 50 mph plus
> with all six coaches, and it took  Notwork Rail some time to stop him.
> He thought the signal on the gantry was clear from what he saw, but
> this was the same gantry as the Hodder one signal 109 was misread.
> It would seem that no lessons have beenlearned by notwork rail and
> they have done nothing to make the signals on that gantry more visible
> from a distance , and done little about it.     It beggars belief.


How do you know he had a SPAD ?  Did you speak to him afterwards ?

Regarding the actual signal, ALL gantry signals have a much higher risk 
rating as they can be `read across'.

Eliminating this risk would mean scrapping all gantries, which of course is 
not practicable.

"Martin WY"  wrote in message
news:gu1cd1t04otbjiakj53cgqhu5e6bk86ev7@4ax.com...

> Last night oneof the Hex Heathrow-Paddington spaded at 50 mph plus
> with all six coaches, and it took  Notwork Rail some time to stop him.
> He thought the signal on the gantry was clear from what he saw, but
> this was the same gantry as the Hodder one signal 109 was misread.
> It would seem that no lessons have beenlearned by notwork rail and
> they have done nothing to make the signals on that gantry more visible
> from a distance , and done little about it.     It beggars belief.


Actually they have. All of the signals in that area were replaced,
post-Ladbroke Grove, with single searchlight-type aspects, which are
positioned lower on the gantries than the previous four-aspects and which
are, allegedly, brighter and better shaded than the previous ones.
Nevertheless, there may still be a problem - as you point out, the incident
occurred last night:  a very clear, bright, sunny evening, when  the sun
would be descending. At that point on the GWML you would be heading directly
INTO the sun.

In fact the signals are just optical heads.  The lamps and colour
filters are in locations trackside fed by fibre optics.  It makes
servicing a lot easier (and safer) and in new installations may reduce
the need for such large signalling structures.

As previously said the use of a single searclight (type) aspect (made
by Adtranz/Bombardier IIRC) has meant that it is lower on the gantry
and should have better visibility, which was what thought to be the
issue at Ladbroke Grove, however there will always be signals that will
be affected by a low sun and there is nothing that you can do about it!
 All drivers should be aware of this and drive accordingly (defensive
driving I believe it's now called!) or route knowledge (or both!)!

It is also true that TPWS is good up to 75mph (in good braking
conditions), however you can normally tell on the train the difference
between a "Full Service" brake and a TPWS application, if nothing else
the Full Service will (normally) release just as you come to a stand
(or at least ease the brake rate) the TPWS application is a constant
application and you'll stop with quite a jerk.

Cheers

Peter

Martin WY wrote:


> Last night oneof the Hex Heathrow-Paddington


Heathrow TO Paddington is in the UP direction.


> with all six coaches,


There is no way to make up HEX 6 car trains.


> this was the same gantry as the Hodder one signal 109 was misread.


Surely 109 was a DOWN direction signal and missed/misinterpreted by a
DOWN Thames train? It may be on same gantry but must be different
sighting completely if your report of an Up train is correct.

Thus how accurate is this report ?

--
Nick

In article ,
   D7666  wrote:



> Martin WY wrote:

> > Last night oneof the Hex Heathrow-Paddington

> Heathrow TO Paddington is in the UP direction.

> > with all six coaches,

> There is no way to make up HEX 6 car trains.

> > this was the same gantry as the Hodder one signal 109 was misread.

> Surely 109 was a DOWN direction signal and missed/misinterpreted by a
> DOWN Thames train? It may be on same gantry but must be different
> sighting completely if your report of an Up train is correct.

> Thus how accurate is this report ?



Probably not accurate at all. Anyway HEX trains have ATP (and TPWS), so it
doesn't sound very plausible. 

David

On Thu, 14 Jul 2005 09:21:01 GMT, "Capt. Flack"
 wrote:


>
>"Martin WY"  wrote in message 
>news:gu1cd1t04otbjiakj53cgqhu5e6bk86ev7@4ax.com...
>> Last night oneof the Hex Heathrow-Paddington spaded at 50 mph plus
>> with all six coaches, and it took  Notwork Rail some time to stop him.
>> He thought the signal on the gantry was clear from what he saw, but
>> this was the same gantry as the Hodder one signal 109 was misread.
>> It would seem that no lessons have beenlearned by notwork rail and
>> they have done nothing to make the signals on that gantry more visible
>> from a distance , and done little about it.     It beggars belief.
>
>How do you know he had a SPAD ?  Did you speak to him afterwards ?
>
>Regarding the actual signal, ALL gantry signals have a much higher risk 
>rating as they can be `read across'.
>
>Eliminating this risk would mean scrapping all gantries, which of course is 
>not practicable.

Advised to a group of Strategic Infrastructure managers this morning
by a network rail manager.

>
>
>

On Thu, 14 Jul 2005 12:27:01 +0100 someone who may be gwr4090
 wrote this:-


>> Thus how accurate is this report ?
>
>Probably not accurate at all.


I suspect so.


>Anyway HEX trains have ATP (and TPWS), so it
>doesn't sound very plausible. 


While, especially with a TPWS intervention, the train may have
passed the signal at danger it would probably not have been by very
much.

Is ATP (now) fitted to the relief lines as far as Airport Junction
and to the whole of the six track layout? It was certainly only
fitted to the main lines at one time.


-- 
 David Hansen, Edinburgh | PGP email preferred-key number F566DA0E
 I will always explain revoked keys, unless the UK government
 prevents me by using the RIP Act 2000.

David Hansen wrote:

> On Thu, 14 Jul 2005 12:27:01 +0100 someone who may be gwr4090
>  wrote this:-
>
> >> Thus how accurate is this report ?
> >
> >Probably not accurate at all.
>
> I suspect so.




I wonder if this is somehow a chinese whisper distortion.


A scenario that does meet part of OP message is not of a signal passed
at danger but one failing to stop at stations. If the train were not a
Heathrow Express but a Heathrow Connect it might fit the case. Thus
TPWS and ATP would not intervene of the train had unrestricted signals
and it would also explain why is alleged it took some time to stop the
train.


I remain suspicious of a real SPAD without some intervention.


--
Nick

Martin WY wrote:


> >> Last night oneof the Hex Heathrow-Paddington spaded at 50 mph plus
> >> with all six coaches, and it took  Notwork Rail some time to stop him.
> >> He thought the signal on the gantry was clear from what he saw, but
> >> this was the same gantry as the Hodder one signal 109 was misread.

> Advised to a group of Strategic Infrastructure managers this morning
> by a network rail manager.



Then if that was such a report from a manager, it is flawed or
imprecise with key facts omitted - like anyone making such a report
should surely report on TPWS and ATP and if these had not yet been
tested to say so.

--
Nick

Sounds a load of rubbish.

Somebody trying to impress this NG with duff info.

"D7666"  wrote in message 
news:1121338934.837544.62070@f14g2000cwb.googlegroups.com...

>
>
> Martin WY wrote:
>
>> Last night oneof the Hex Heathrow-Paddington
>
> Heathrow TO Paddington is in the UP direction.
>
>> with all six coaches,
>
> There is no way to make up HEX 6 car trains.
>
>> this was the same gantry as the Hodder one signal 109 was misread.
>
> Surely 109 was a DOWN direction signal and missed/misinterpreted by a
> DOWN Thames train? It may be on same gantry but must be different
> sighting completely if your report of an Up train is correct.
>
> Thus how accurate is this report ?
>
> --
> Nick
> 

Garry Richards wrote:

> Sounds a load of rubbish.
>
> Somebody trying to impress this NG with duff info.


Because impressing NG's is such a grand thing to do?

On 14 Jul 2005 06:55:06 -0700, "D7666"  wrote:


>
>
>Martin WY wrote:
>
>> >> Last night oneof the Hex Heathrow-Paddington spaded at 50 mph plus
>> >> with all six coaches, and it took  Notwork Rail some time to stop him.
>> >> He thought the signal on the gantry was clear from what he saw, but
>> >> this was the same gantry as the Hodder one signal 109 was misread.
>
>> Advised to a group of Strategic Infrastructure managers this morning
>> by a network rail manager.
>
>
>Then if that was such a report from a manager, it is flawed or
>imprecise with key facts omitted - like anyone making such a report
>should surely report on TPWS and ATP and if these had not yet been
>tested to say so.

I have just returned home from talking to the same NR manager and one
of the Infrastructure team, and he advised that the train went past
the signal by   ****eight car lengths****not eight cars.   It was ATP
at paddington who stopped him, and he admits that he took the signal
next to his own which was a green on the next line to him which was
clear.   That is from NR Management itself, not made up , not a wild
dream as some seem to think.

On Thu, 14 Jul 2005 16:26:11 +0100, "dwb"
 wrote:


>Garry Richards wrote:
>> Sounds a load of rubbish.
>>
>> Somebody trying to impress this NG with duff info.
>
>Because impressing NG's is such a grand thing to do?
>

If you think that, then follow what Tony Miles does each time.
He listens, he replies that he will find out, and he contacts the
management team he knows,  and finds out the truth.   Why dont some of
you follow his example????

Martin WY wrote:


> He listens,


And I questioned.


> he replies that he will find out, and he contacts the
> management team he knows,  and finds out the truth.


Exactly my point and others. We are simply saying what was in the
original post is unlikely to be the whole truth.



> Why dont some of
> you follow his example????


We don't have those contacts and do you think that they would reply
with facts to the likes of us ?

TM is press and media and known. We are not.

--
Nick

Martin WY wrote:

> On 14 Jul 2005 06:55:06 -0700, "D7666"  wrote:


Compare this :


> >> >> spaded at 50 mph plus
> >> >> with all six coaches, and it took  Notwork Rail some time to stop him.

to :

> that the train went past
> the signal by   ****eight car lengths****not eight cars.   It was ATP
> at paddington who stopped him, and he admits that he took the signal
> next to his own which was a green

> clear.   That is from NR Management itself, not made up , not a wild
> dream as some seem to think.



It is wildly different from the original text.


The original 'took NR some time to stop him' does imply had not stopped
at all. You had not said it stopped - and as I said key info was
ommitted.


And I'm still not clear as to if it was an Up train or a Down train
involved and if an Up train why was down signal 109 mentioned ????

Surely you must be able to see why some of us queried it based on
*your* *original* wording !!!

--
Nick

On Thu, 14 Jul 2005 15:48:07 GMT someone who may be Martin WY
 wrote this:-


>I have just returned home from talking to the same NR manager and one
>of the Infrastructure team, and he advised that the train went past
>the signal by   ****eight car lengths****not eight cars.


That's quite a way for ATP. Had the driver accelerated after
reaching the release speed?



-- 
 David Hansen, Edinburgh | PGP email preferred-key number F566DA0E
 I will always explain revoked keys, unless the UK government
 prevents me by using the RIP Act 2000.

On 14 Jul 2005 08:58:25 -0700, "D7666"  wrote:


>
>
>Martin WY wrote:
>
>> He listens,
>
>And I questioned.
>
>> he replies that he will find out, and he contacts the
>> management team he knows,  and finds out the truth.
>
>Exactly my point and others. We are simply saying what was in the
>original post is unlikely to be the whole truth.

The original message this morning was received very soon after it
happened. No one knew how or why,  I just reported what I and others
had been told.   Its only later today after much questioning that the
truth has come out and relayed back.

On Thu, 14 Jul 2005 17:14:03 +0100, David Hansen
 wrote:


>On Thu, 14 Jul 2005 15:48:07 GMT someone who may be Martin WY
> wrote this:-
>
>>I have just returned home from talking to the same NR manager and one
>>of the Infrastructure team, and he advised that the train went past
>>the signal by   ****eight car lengths****not eight cars.
>
>That's quite a way for ATP. Had the driver accelerated after
>reaching the release speed?

No he was still doing 56mph

Martin WY wrote:

> On 14 Jul 2005 08:58:25 -0700, "D7666"  wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> Martin WY wrote:
>>
>>> He listens,
>>
>> And I questioned.
>>
>>> he replies that he will find out, and he contacts the
>>> management team he knows,  and finds out the truth.
>>
>> Exactly my point and others. We are simply saying what was in the
>> original post is unlikely to be the whole truth.
> The original message this morning was received very soon after it
> happened. No one knew how or why,  I just reported what I and others
> had been told.   Its only later today after much questioning that
> the truth has come out and relayed back.


It's not clear to me that the truth has come out in this thread yet.

Originally you said it happened at the gantry including SN109, which
IIRC is by the Golborne Road bridge, west of Westbourne Park.  Is that
still your story?  The gantry does have signals for both directions, so
it's certainly possible.  By the way, not only have the signals been
replaced, but there are bloody great boards above them with the track
numbers.

You say that the train was stopped by ATP "at Paddington".  From
Golborne Road to western end of the platforms at Paddington is about 2
km, which is rather more than the 8 car lengths you mentioned.

I'm not familiar enough with ATP or TPWS to judge whether an overrun by
8 car lengths would expected for a Class 332 at 56 mph.  If the train
stopped within the signal overlap, then the safety protection did its
job.
-- 
Richard J.
(to e-mail me, swap uk and yon in address)

Somebody mentioned earlier in the thread that the driver read the signal 
for the wrong line. On the entrance to Paddington this should not 
happen. There are line numbers between the rails and numbers above 
signals so that the driver knows which signal applies to which line.

This numbers are big and there is no way he should be able to mis-read them.

Dave

On Thu, 14 Jul 2005 16:52:05 GMT, "Richard J."
 wrote:


>Martin WY wrote:
>> On 14 Jul 2005 08:58:25 -0700, "D7666"  wrote:
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Martin WY wrote:
>>>
>>>> He listens,
>>>
>>> And I questioned.
>>>
>>>> he replies that he will find out, and he contacts the
>>>> management team he knows,  and finds out the truth.
>>>
>>> Exactly my point and others. We are simply saying what was in the
>>> original post is unlikely to be the whole truth.
>> The original message this morning was received very soon after it
>> happened. No one knew how or why,  I just reported what I and others
>> had been told.   Its only later today after much questioning that
>> the truth has come out and relayed back.
>
>It's not clear to me that the truth has come out in this thread yet.

That is you fo findout when its published, but let me tell you, it is
more than their job is worth for managers of Network Rail and
Strategic Infrastructure to lie and spread rumours believe you me

>
>Originally you said it happened at the gantry including SN109, which
>IIRC is by the Golborne Road bridge, west of Westbourne Park.  Is that
>still your story?  The gantry does have signals for both directions, so
>it's certainly possible.  By the way, not only have the signals been
>replaced, but there are bloody great boards above them with the track
>numbers.

If you read earlier threads, I did say,  I reported what had come down
the wires directly after the incident when no one knew exactly what
had happened   that has only come out this afternoon after intensive
questioning

>You say that the train was stopped by ATP "at Paddington".  From
>Golborne Road to western end of the platforms at Paddington is about 2
>km, which is rather more than the 8 car lengths you mentioned.


I did not say that,  Network Rail did

>
>I'm not familiar enough with ATP or TPWS to judge whether an overrun by
>8 car lengths would expected for a Class 332 at 56 mph.  If the train
>stopped within the signal overlap, then the safety protection did its
>job.

Then I should learn a bit more

On Thu, 14 Jul 2005 18:03:24 +0100, David Steele
 wrote:


>Somebody mentioned earlier in the thread that the driver read the signal 
>for the wrong line. On the entrance to Paddington this should not 
>happen. There are line numbers between the rails and numbers above 
>signals so that the driver knows which signal applies to which line.
>
>This numbers are big and there is no way he should be able to mis-read them.
>
>Dave

But alas he did

"David Hansen"  wrote in message 
news:g9mcd11vqd4qdbn5u8bjul5eaqst1oh63b@4ax.com...

> On Thu, 14 Jul 2005 12:27:01 +0100 someone who may be gwr4090
>  wrote this:-
>
>>> Thus how accurate is this report ?
>>
>>Probably not accurate at all.
>
> I suspect so.
>
>>Anyway HEX trains have ATP (and TPWS), so it
>>doesn't sound very plausible.
>
> While, especially with a TPWS intervention, the train may have
> passed the signal at danger it would probably not have been by very
> much.
>
> Is ATP (now) fitted to the relief lines as far as Airport Junction
> and to the whole of the six track layout? It was certainly only
> fitted to the main lines at one time.


Can anyone confirm that the HEx units (the original ones) are TPWS fitted? I 
ask since I had understood that they didn't require TPWS since they operate 
with ATP operational 100% of the time on 100% ATP fitted lines.

BICBW, of course.

On Thu, 14 Jul 2005 16:23:28 GMT someone who may be Martin WY
 wrote this:-


>>>I have just returned home from talking to the same NR manager and one
>>>of the Infrastructure team, and he advised that the train went past
>>>the signal by   ****eight car lengths****not eight cars.
>>
>>That's quite a way for ATP. Had the driver accelerated after
>>reaching the release speed?
>No he was still doing 56mph


Thanks. Was the eight car lengths within the overlap?


-- 
 David Hansen, Edinburgh | PGP email preferred-key number F566DA0E
 I will always explain revoked keys, unless the UK government
 prevents me by using the RIP Act 2000.

On Thu, 14 Jul 2005 22:21:15 +0100, David Hansen
 wrote:


>On Thu, 14 Jul 2005 16:23:28 GMT someone who may be Martin WY
> wrote this:-
>
>>>>I have just returned home from talking to the same NR manager and one
>>>>of the Infrastructure team, and he advised that the train went past
>>>>the signal by   ****eight car lengths****not eight cars.
>>>
>>>That's quite a way for ATP. Had the driver accelerated after
>>>reaching the release speed?
>>No he was still doing 56mph
>
>Thanks. Was the eight car lengths within the overlap?


This would appear to be a classic example of the two different kinds of
reporting available today.

1) Report all the "facts" that are available as soon as possible even if
this means back tracking as new "facts" become available eg Sky News
2) Report all the facts as they become available eg BBC
-- 
Tessy @ nospam.com
Life is complex: it has real and imaginary parts

Martin WY wrote:

> On Thu, 14 Jul 2005 16:52:05 GMT, "Richard J."
>  wrote:
>
>> Martin WY wrote:
>>> On 14 Jul 2005 08:58:25 -0700, "D7666"  wrote:
>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Martin WY wrote:
>>>>
>>>>> He listens,
>>>>
>>>> And I questioned.
>>>>
>>>>> he replies that he will find out, and he contacts the
>>>>> management team he knows,  and finds out the truth.
>>>>
>>>> Exactly my point and others. We are simply saying what was in the
>>>> original post is unlikely to be the whole truth.
>>> The original message this morning was received very soon after it
>>> happened. No one knew how or why,  I just reported what I and
>>> others had been told.   Its only later today after much
>>> questioning that the truth has come out and relayed back.
>>
>> It's not clear to me that the truth has come out in this thread
>> yet.
> That is you fo findout when its published, but let me tell you, it
> is more than their job is worth for managers of Network Rail and
> Strategic Infrastructure to lie and spread rumours believe you me


Well, you were the one to spread the rumours in public first, so I was
expecting that when you said that the truth had "come out and relayed
back", you believed that you had corrected previous misinformation.  So
I was trying to clarify what was not yet clear.


>> Originally you said it happened at the gantry including SN109,
>> which IIRC is by the Golborne Road bridge, west of Westbourne
>> Park.  Is that still your story?

Answer?

>> The gantry does have signals for both directions, so it's
>> certainly possible.  By the way, not only have the signals
>> been replaced, but there are bloody great boards above them
>> with the track numbers.

> If you read earlier threads, I did say,  I reported what had come
> down the wires directly after the incident when no one knew
> exactly what had happened that has only come out this afternoon
> after intensive questioning


If your original post (07:40 today) was made "when no one knew exactly
what was happening", why did you not indicate this?  You were very
definite about the direction (Heathrow-Paddington), that it was the same
gantry as SN109, that Network Rail "have done nothing to make the
signals on that gantry more visible from a distance , and done little
about it", which is complete nonsense.


>> You say that the train was stopped by ATP "at Paddington".  From
>> Golborne Road to western end of the platforms at Paddington is
>> about 2 km, which is rather more than the 8 car lengths you
>> mentioned.
>
> I did not say that,  Network Rail did


With respect, you were reporting what you understood your contact at
Network Rail to say.  The fact is that 8 car lengths from the SN109
gantry is nowhere near "at Paddington".


>> I'm not familiar enough with ATP or TPWS to judge whether an
>> overrun by 8 car lengths would expected for a Class 332 at 56 mph.
>> If the train stopped within the signal overlap, then the safety
>> protection did its job.
> Then I should learn a bit more


Indeed.  My hunch (and it is only that) is that this was a SPAD that the
protection systems dealt with properly, and should not have been
overdramatised in this way.

Oh, and you are more likely to get proper information out of Network
Rail if you stop calling them Notwork Rail, as in your original post.
-- 
Richard J.
(to e-mail me, swap uk and yon in address)

On Thu, 14 Jul 2005 22:21:15 +0100, David Hansen
 wrote:


>On Thu, 14 Jul 2005 16:23:28 GMT someone who may be Martin WY
> wrote this:-
>
>>>>I have just returned home from talking to the same NR manager and one
>>>>of the Infrastructure team, and he advised that the train went past
>>>>the signal by   ****eight car lengths****not eight cars.
>>>
>>>That's quite a way for ATP. Had the driver accelerated after
>>>reaching the release speed?
>>No he was still doing 56mph
>
>Thanks. Was the eight car lengths within the overlap?

Sorry I cant confirm that,  as said,  I only reported what came down
the wires later in the afteroon when the questioning was over, and the
info was minimal.   We shall all have to wait and see when the
official publication is made public as it was at Ladbrook Grove.

On Fri, 15 Jul 2005 05:30:09 GMT someone who may be Martin WY
 wrote this:-


>Sorry I cant confirm that,  as said,  I only reported what came down
>the wires later in the afteroon when the questioning was over, and the
>info was minimal.   We shall all have to wait and see when the
>official publication is made public as it was at Ladbrook Grove.


I see from http://www.hse.gov.uk/railways/spad/index.htm that they
have reports up to May 2005. Presumably we will see this incident
included in a couple of months or so.


-- 
 David Hansen, Edinburgh | PGP email preferred-key number F566DA0E
 I will always explain revoked keys, unless the UK government
 prevents me by using the RIP Act 2000.

On Fri, 15 Jul 2005 08:04:01 +0100, David Hansen
 wrote:


>On Fri, 15 Jul 2005 05:30:09 GMT someone who may be Martin WY
> wrote this:-
>
>>Sorry I cant confirm that,  as said,  I only reported what came down
>>the wires later in the afteroon when the questioning was over, and the
>>info was minimal.   We shall all have to wait and see when the
>>official publication is made public as it was at Ladbrook Grove.
>
>I see from http://www.hse.gov.uk/railways/spad/index.htm that they
>have reports up to May 2005. Presumably we will see this incident
>included in a couple of months or so.

If not before David as this did not include deaths like Ladbrook.

I now have one of the Strategic group lodging with us as he is so far
from home and working up here as he is part family,  so he reads these
newsgroups with me at night,  I would not repeat some of the comments
he has made of some of the posters on here.

One thing he did say which I dont understand at all as im not
interested in tpws and all that stuff, but evidently there was a track
piece of equipment before the signal he went over, but it was to weak
to pick up the trains signal, whatever that means I personally dont
know.

On Fri, 15 Jul 2005 08:37:00 GMT someone who may be Martin WY
 wrote this:-


>>I see from http://www.hse.gov.uk/railways/spad/index.htm that they
>>have reports up to May 2005. Presumably we will see this incident
>>included in a couple of months or so.
>If not before David as this did not include deaths like Ladbrook.


I recollect the infamous SPAD at Ladbroke Grove being included in
the relevant previous reports, along with the others for the period
the report covered.


>One thing he did say which I dont understand at all as im not
>interested in tpws and all that stuff, but evidently there was a track
>piece of equipment before the signal he went over, but it was to weak
>to pick up the trains signal, whatever that means I personally dont
>know.


If anything the other way round. Generally signals are transmitted
from the track and picked up by passing trains. Two-way data
communication tends to be left to transmission based signalling (of
which RETB is an early and simple example, created by "backward"
BR).


-- 
 David Hansen, Edinburgh | PGP email preferred-key number F566DA0E
 I will always explain revoked keys, unless the UK government
 prevents me by using the RIP Act 2000.

Martin WY wrote:

> On Fri, 15 Jul 2005 08:04:01 +0100, David Hansen
>  wrote:
>
>> On Fri, 15 Jul 2005 05:30:09 GMT someone who may be Martin WY
>>  wrote this:-
>>
>>> Sorry I cant confirm that,  as said,  I only reported what came
>>> down the wires later in the afteroon when the questioning was
>>> over, and the info was minimal.   We shall all have to wait and
>>> see when the official publication is made public as it was at
>>> Ladbrook Grove.
>>
>> I see from http://www.hse.gov.uk/railways/spad/index.htm that they
>> have reports up to May 2005. Presumably we will see this incident
>> included in a couple of months or so.
> If not before David as this did not include deaths like Ladbrook.


The Ladbroke Grove crash is irrelevant.  We are talking about a SPAD
with presumably no collision or injuries.  I'm not aware of any public
source of reports on these other than the monthly summaries referred to
above.


> I now have one of the Strategic group lodging with us as he is so
> far from home and working up here as he is part family,  so he
> reads these newsgroups with me at night,  I would not repeat some
> of the comments he has made of some of the posters on here.
>
> One thing he did say which I dont understand at all as im not
> interested in tpws and all that stuff, but evidently there was a
> track piece of equipment before the signal he went over, but it was
> to weak to pick up the trains signal, whatever that means I
> personally dont know.


Is he talking about TPWS equipment or ATP equipment?  If TPWS, then it
won't pick up the train's signal because there isn't one.  Class 332 HEx
stock is not fitted with TPWS. (I confirmed that today on the Railway
Safety and Standards Board site.)

-- 
Richard J.
(to e-mail me, swap uk and yon in address)

Richard J. wrote:


> Well, you were the one to spread the rumours in public first,

> Indeed.  My hunch (and it is only that) is that this was a SPAD that the
> protection systems dealt with properly, and should not have been
> overdramatised in this way.


Have to agree with you Richard.

Right away when I read the opening comments in this thread it did not
read right.

Sorry Martin, while you did the right thing in alerting the n.g. to the
incident , and not many get news like this, I do think you have either
posted uninformed speculation from others, or have over done it
yourself.

If you had kept to a simple report that there was a SPAD by a HEx train
and not commented on signal 109 or ''Notwork'' or implying nothing had
been done then the original posting may have had more credibility.

--
Nick

In article <fcMBe.70296$G8.42544@text.news.blueyonder.co.uk>,
   Richard J.  wrote:


> Is he talking about TPWS equipment or ATP equipment?  If TPWS, then it
> won't pick up the train's signal because there isn't one.  Class 332 HEx
> stock is not fitted with TPWS. (I confirmed that today on the Railway
> Safety and Standards Board site.)


So presumably all tracks from Paddington to Airport Jc are now ATP fitted
throughout ?

David

Thank you for your reply this  morning, making sense too.
The new lodger has just arrived for a rest as he has to go back on a
later evening duty when most of the trains have stopped running , so I
asked him what was the problem this morning at the signal, and he just
gave me a two line slip of wire paper, which stated simply:-

ATP, the one before the gantry, the  power was not strong enough,, and
the ATP did not communicate with the train and vice versa.  That was
all it said.
Him indoors said ,someone would have been sent out immediately to test
and correct fast. 
That is all it said.

By the way for those who dont know what down the wire means,   its the
companies own private IntrANet system between all points, and the
means of communication direct from one Manager to another anywhere.
There are thousands of them flying up and down day and night, so they
term it,   *its come down the wire*.


Thank you David, I hope this explains what you already knew in your
post this morning.

In article , David Hansen 
 writes

>>>That's quite a way for ATP. Had the driver accelerated after
>>>reaching the release speed?
>>No he was still doing 56mph


Surely ATP enforces a braking curve that will ensure the train stops 
before the signal? IIRC, the release speed is nowhere near 56mph, or 
even 56km/h.


>Thanks. Was the eight car lengths within the overlap?


The standard overlap is 183m, which will hold 9x20m or 8x23m (give or 
take a smidgeon). Which end of the train is "8 car lengths" measured 
from?

-- 
Clive D.W. Feather                       | Home: 
Tel: +44 20 8495 6138 (work)             | Web:  <http://www.davros.org>
Fax: +44 870 051 9937                    | Work: 
Please reply to the Reply-To address, which is:

In article , David Hansen 
 writes

>>One thing he did say which I dont understand at all as im not
>>interested in tpws and all that stuff, but evidently there was a track
>>piece of equipment before the signal he went over, but it was to weak
>>to pick up the trains signal, whatever that means I personally dont
>>know.
>
>If anything the other way round. Generally signals are transmitted
>from the track and picked up by passing trains.


I thought ATP involved unpowered balises which are triggered by a signal 
radiated from the train.

Equally, I thought ATP included a "next balise is N metres ahead" 
component in the packets.

-- 
Clive D.W. Feather                       | Home: 
Tel: +44 20 8495 6138 (work)             | Web:  <http://www.davros.org>
Fax: +44 870 051 9937                    | Work: 
Please reply to the Reply-To address, which is:

On Fri, 15 Jul 2005 17:56:27 +0100 someone who may be "Clive D. W.
Feather"  wrote this:-


>>If anything the other way round. Generally signals are transmitted
>>from the track and picked up by passing trains.
>
>I thought ATP involved unpowered balises which are triggered by a signal 
>radiated from the train.


I would't think so for signal information, but I have no idea.

For fixed information an unpowered balise would seem to be ideal.


-- 
 David Hansen, Edinburgh | PGP email preferred-key number F566DA0E
 I will always explain revoked keys, unless the UK government
 prevents me by using the RIP Act 2000.

On Fri, 15 Jul 2005 17:54:40 +0100 someone who may be "Clive D. W.
Feather"  wrote this:-


>Surely ATP enforces a braking curve that will ensure the train stops 
>before the signal?


I think that the theoretical braking curve would stop the train just
in the rear of the signal, but the warning curve and intervention
curve mean that if ATP acts the train will stop a little in advance
of the signal. That is my recollection of the evidence at the
Ladbroke Grove lawyer's circus, when several ATP interventions were
discussed.


>IIRC, the release speed is nowhere near 56mph, or 
>even 56km/h.


It is obviously related to the length of the overlap (and presumably
also the braking characteristics of the train). The highest release
speed, according to Stanley Hall's little book, is 50mph.

This also indicates release speeds going down in steps of 5mph, with
the lowest release speed being 0mph. I can't quite understand that
one, though I can understand 5mph when there is a "zero length"
overlap.


>The standard overlap is 183m, which will hold 9x20m or 8x23m (give or 
>take a smidgeon). Which end of the train is "8 car lengths" measured 
>from?


I would hope from the front.

I have no idea whether standard "plain line" overlaps are used in
the area or they are reduced. Presumably the original BR/Railtrack
signalling included at least standard overlaps (as we know Mr Hodder
had been given rather longer to realise his mistake by the design of
the signalling). I presume that the replacement also included
standard overlaps, at the very least for political reasons, even
though speeds have been reduced.


-- 
 David Hansen, Edinburgh | PGP email preferred-key number F566DA0E
 I will always explain revoked keys, unless the UK government
 prevents me by using the RIP Act 2000.

On Fri, 15 Jul 2005 10:27:23, "Richard J." 
wrote:

>
>The Ladbroke Grove crash is irrelevant.  We are talking about a SPAD
>with presumably no collision or injuries.  I'm not aware of any public
>source of reports on these other than the monthly summaries referred to
>above.


In that case, you might like to browse 
http://www.hse.gov.uk/railways/spad/investigation/index.htm

The report for the SPAD on 19/09/03 is particularly interesting, given
the motive power involved!

Paul Harley
-- 
Remove "eeek" to contact me!

In article , Paul Harley
 writes

>On Fri, 15 Jul 2005 10:27:23, "Richard J." 
>wrote:
>>
>>The Ladbroke Grove crash is irrelevant.  We are talking about a SPAD
>>with presumably no collision or injuries.  I'm not aware of any public
>>source of reports on these other than the monthly summaries referred to
>>above.
>
>In that case, you might like to browse 
>http://www.hse.gov.uk/railways/spad/investigation/index.htm
>
>The report for the SPAD on 19/09/03 is particularly interesting, given
>the motive power involved!
>
>Paul Harley


Poor quality coal that had formed clinker in the firebox. 

The driver, in attempting to break up the clinker, burnt himself badly
on the leg. 

 The gradient on leaving Glenfinnan is 1 in 50 rising. As a result of
this incident, the West Coast Railway Company has been required to: 

Take steps to improve the quality of the coal supplied

----------------------------------------------

Wouldn't have thought that would appear in a SPAD report 

Good job it wasn't the 1/4/03 :)
-- 
Tony Sayer

"Paul Harley"  wrote in message 
news:ut9gd196cl5k6tbaksqqt4e948fppbgsdp@4ax.com...

> On Fri, 15 Jul 2005 10:27:23, "Richard J." 
> wrote:
>>
>>The Ladbroke Grove crash is irrelevant.  We are talking about a SPAD
>>with presumably no collision or injuries.  I'm not aware of any public
>>source of reports on these other than the monthly summaries referred to
>>above.
>
> In that case, you might like to browse
> http://www.hse.gov.uk/railways/spad/investigation/index.htm
>
> The report for the SPAD on 19/09/03 is particularly interesting, given
> the motive power involved!


A VERY interesting report!

BTW there was a similar (to the HEx Spad) at Stockport today with adjacent 
signals being read.
Passed by one train length (2 carriages)

KW

"tony sayer"  wrote

>
>  The gradient on leaving Glenfinnan is 1 in 50 rising. As a result of
> this incident, the West Coast Railway Company has been required to:
>
> Take steps to improve the quality of the coal supplied
>
> ----------------------------------------------
>
> Wouldn't have thought that would appear in a SPAD report
>
> Good job it wasn't the 1/4/03 :)


Colonel Pringle, the inspecting officer into the Ais Gill accident in 1913,
made a very similar recommendation. (see 'Red for Danger'). That accident
resulted from a SPAD.

Peter

Philip Hardy wrote:


> 
> While they obviously help to vastly reduce the possibiity of human 
> error, they don't eliminate it.
>


I agree there is still a chance that the signals could be mis-read but 
these numbers should have greatly reduced the risk. If a driver is 
paying attention then there should be no excuse for mis-reading them.

I have been commuting into Paddington for the last year or so and these 
numbers have been there all the time.

I think I remember reading that the Automatic Route Setting system was 
modified so that it could only use a set of pre-determined routes 
whereas before it could make up any it liked. This was supposed to 
prevent the drivers from being "surprised" by a strange route.

In the end we are all human and make mistakes. It appears the systems 
did their jobs and stopped an accident - that's what they are there for.

Dave Steele

Paul Harley wrote:



> In that case, you might like to browse 
> http://www.hse.gov.uk/railways/spad/investigation/index.htm
> 
> The report for the SPAD on 19/09/03 is particularly interesting, given
> the motive power involved!


Indeed.

I also note the extremely poor standard of editing of that website.

The 'new' flags have false links in them, the report you
mention has its whole text repeated, another one is truncated
part way through .... and why not include the location of
the SPAD on the index page rather than the NR 'territory'?

Pathetic.

Charlie